DOYLE EDWARD SKILLERN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

v.

W.J. ESTELLE, JR., DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE

TATE, Circuit Judge:

The petitioner Skillern, a Texas state prisoner sentenced to death, appeals from the denial without an evidentiary hearing of his application for federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Skillern and a codefend-ant Sanne were convicted of murdering Patrick Randel, a state narcotics agent. The victim Randel and the codefendant Sanne had been sitting in Randel’s car at a roadside park when the petitioner Skillern drove up, immediately following which the codefendant Sanne shot and killed Randel. In arguing for reversal on his appeal, the petitioner raises three groups of contentions:

I. that his death penalty was unconstitutionally imposed under En-mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), in the absence of sufficient evidence of his own personal culpability for the allegedly unexpected act of the codefendant triggerman in shooting the victim, and under instructions that allegedly permitted the jury to impute to Skillern the triggerman’s intent to kill the victim;

II. that the district court improperly denied him an evidentiary hearing on his allegations that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel because the denial of a continuance forced a newly-appointed defense counsel to go to trial on the capital charge three weeks after his appointment; and

III. that evidentiary error of constitutional magnitude rendered the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair and violative of due process, because of the admittedly erroneous admission into evidence of the allegedly expert opinion of a forensic pathologist that there was a probability that Skillern would commit future criminal acts of violence and would constitute a continuing threat to society; and that the sentencing hearing was similarly infected by the admission into evidence of an indictment for murder with malice in an earlier offense, when Skillern had then been convicted of the lesser offense of murder without malice.

Although these contentions are not insubstantial, we find no error under the circumstances shown by the denial of the petitioner’s § 2254 application without an' eviden-tiary hearing.

Factual context

The victim Randel, a state narcotics agent, had been working undercover to set up a purchase of illegal drugs from Skillern and his codefendant Sanne. The day before the killing Skillern and Sanne had become concerned that Randel might be a state informant. Nevertheless, the three had met in Randel’s motel room, where other narcotics agents eavesdropped on the conversation from an adjoining room.

Sanne and Skillern showed the officer a sample of the drugs they intended to sell. The officer then asked them how they wanted to handle the deal, and one of the defendants replied, “Let’s go some place where we can talk business.” Leaving the State money that was to be used for the transaction in the motel room, Randel drove off in his car with Sanne as passenger, while Skillern followed in another automobile. Approximately an hour later, Skillern and Sanne returned, and Sanne was seen entering Randel’s motel room. They then drove off.

A few hours later Randel was found shot to death in his locked car at a roadside park twenty to twenty-five miles distant from the motel. About four hours later, Skillern and Sanne were arrested. Skillern had the State purchase money and Randel’s gun in his possession, while Sanne was in possession of Randel’s credit cards and other effects.

Skillern and Sanne were indicted for intentionally causing the death of Randel in the course of committing and attempting to commit a robbery, a capital offense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974). At an initial trial, at which neither testified, Skillern and Sanne were found guilty; in the sentencing hearing, the jury assessed a life sentence for Sanne (who had a minor criminal record) and a death sentence for the petitioner Skillern (whose criminal record included a prior killing). On direct appeal, the convictions were reversed because of a failure to sequester the jury. Skillern v. State, 559 S.W. 2d 828 (Tex.Cr. App.1977).

The present conviction results from a retrial, at which Sanne now took the stand and confessed to firing the gun that killed Randel. According to Sanne, Randel struck him on the face and unexpectedly pulled a gun on him, following which Sanne shot him six times in the chest and abdomen. (Under this version of the crime, Skillern points out, his own personal participation was at most limited to a planned robbery and did not encompass the unexpected killing of Randel by Sanne.) On this second trial, the jury again found both defendants guilty, and in the sentencing phase the death penalty was assessed against both defendants. The convictions and Skillern’s death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, but Sanne’s death sentence was reformed to life imprisonment on the basis of double jeopardy. Sanne v. State, 609 S.W. 2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, Skillern v. Texas, 452 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 3067, 69 L.Ed.2d 432 (1981). Exhausting state habeas proceedings, Skillern now applies for federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

As previously noted, the petitioner Skil-lern contends that the district court erred in denying him federal habeas relief, relying upon three principal groups of contentions, which respectively concern: I. The En-mund issues; II. The denial of an eviden-tiary hearing on his contentions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; and III. Erroneous evidentiary rulings of constitutional magnitude in the sentencing hearing.

I. The Enmund Issues

In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3376-77, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not permit “imposition of death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.” Enmund had been sentenced to die for a murder that occurred during the course of a robbery in which he was the getaway car driver. In holding the death penalty constitutionally excessive for Enmund’s criminal conduct, the Court observed that “[t]he focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims,” 458 U.S. at 798, 102 S.Ct. at 3377 (emphasis added by the Court), and it concluded that Enmund’s death penalty was invalid “in the absence of proof that En-mund killed or attempted to kill” or “intended or contemplated that life would be taken,” 458 U.S. at 801, 102 S.Ct. at 3379.

In Bell v. Watkins, 692 F. 2d 999, 1012 (5th Cir.1982), we summarized Enmund as holding “that under the eighth amendment a death sentence may not be imposed on someone who neither committed the homicide, attempted to commit the homicide, nor participated in the plot to kill the victim.” Similarly, in Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F. 2d 75, 76-77 (1982), reh. denied, 697 F. 2d 699 (5th Cir.1983), we interpreted Enmund as holding that “the Eighth Amendment does not permit imposition of the death penalty upon one who participates in a robbery but does not kill or contemplate the taking of a life.” In the latter case, although not on Enmund grounds (see note⁶, infra), we vacated a death sentence because of instructions that unconstitutionally permitted conviction of first-degree murder on the basis of a cocon-spirator robber’s killing, even absent specific intent to kill by the defendant sentenced to death.

Based upon the principles enunciated and applied in these decisions, the petitioner Skillern raises two principal contentions: A. that the evidence was insufficient to subject him to the death penalty because it does not show that he personally had taken life, attempted to take life, or intended to take life; and B. that, in any event, the instructions on which the case was submitted to the jury permitted it to assess the death penalty against him on the basis of his confederate Sanne’s intentional killing of the victim and absent any requirement that the jury find Skillern himself had killed or had personally contemplated that Sanne would murder the victim.

A. Sufficiency of the evidence

Skillern points out that the uncontradict-ed testimony of Sanne, his codefendant and his accomplice in the prospective drug transaction, is to the effect that Sanne himself had not planned to kill the narcotics officer before the two had driven in the agent’s vehicle to the roadside park, and that the killing of the agent had resulted, without prior premeditation by Sanne, when the agent had unexpectedly drawn a pistol on Sanne and had struck him. The jury was not, of course, required to believe Sanne’s account of the incident.

Assuming the jury was properly instructed, we find that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2793, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), that Skillern had agreed in advance with Sanne not only to rob Randel, but also to kill Randel, the suspected police informant, after they would lure him away from his motel room to the roadside park. Prior to the meeting with Randel in the latter’s motel room to set up the drug transaction, the triggerman Sanne testified that he had told his supplier in Mexico to put the transaction on “hold”. When Randel’s body was found, it was in a position indicating that he was totally unaware of the imminence of danger; a cigarette was still dangling from his right hand. Considering the distance from the motel to the roadside park and back, the jury could reasonably have found that Randel was killed immediately upon the arrival of the two vehicles at the roadside park (as indeed Sanne so testified), according to previous plan, and that immediately the accomplices returned to the motel room within an hour of their leaving to retrieve the State purchase money.

B. The jury instructions

Skillern was indicted and convicted for capital murder, as having intentionally caused the death of the victim Randel in the course of committing and attempting to commit a robbery. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).1 Capital mur der is defined as a “capital felony”, Id. § 19.03(b); a capital felony is punishable either by confinement for life or by death. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 12.31(a) (Vernon 1974).2

When an accused is convicted of a capital offense (which, to reiterate, under Texas law is punishable either by death or by life imprisonment), Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1974) provides for a separate sentencing hearing before the trial jury, which is required to make certain findings in response to special issues submitted to it before the trial judge may sentence the defendant to death.3

We have excerpted and set forth in Appendix¹, attached to this opinion, the charges of the state trial judge at the guilt and innocence phase of the state trial that are pertinent to the issues before us. Although the charge emphasized that capital murder requires that the accused “inten tionally kills or causes the death of another” while in the course of robbing another, paragraphs⁶ and⁷ of the charge permitted the jury to find Skillern guilty of the trig-german Sanne’s killing, under the Texas law of criminal responsibility, as a conspirator in a robbery attempt equally guilty of the murder by his coconspirator if the killing “was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose [of the robbery] and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.” (Emphasis added.)

Skillern argues that this charge, in violation of Enmund, permitted the jury to find Skillern guilty of capital murder, even though he did not personally contemplate or intend Sanne’s allegedly unexpected shooting the victim. This argument overlooks, however, that Enmund only prohibits, as a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the execution of a person for the uncontemplat-ed (i.e., personally by him) act of an accomplice in the course of committing a non-capital felony upon which both were engaged. Nothing in Enmund or any other decision cited to us implicates any violation of rights guaranteed by the federal constitution by a state rule (such as that provided by Tex.Penal Code Ann. §§ 7.01, 7.02 (Vernon 1974)4), by which the guilt of an accused for an offense committed by a confederate may nevertheless be established- — even though the accused himself may not personally have intended the particular criminal act committed — by his criminal responsibility for the act or. conduct of a confederate when engaged in a joint criminal endeavor. Enmund merely invalidates a death penalty when based solely upon a defendant’s criminal responsibility for a killing by an accomplice that is unintended or not contemplated by the defendant; it does not invalidate a conviction of a substantive offense of murder when guilt is so based.

Under Texas law, an accused may be convicted of the substantive offense of capital murder — which, to reiterate, is punishable either by life imprisonment or by death, see notes¹ and², supra — under the Texas law of parties and of criminal responsibility for the act of a confederate, even though the killing that occurred in the course of another offense was not intended by the defendant before the court.⁵ In denying rehearing in Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F. 2d 75 (5th Cir.1982), we noted that the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid “a state from defining criminal culpability so as to allow an assumed or deemed assent to the act of a coconspirator in a different crime. There is no bar in the Fourteenth Amendment against the crime of felony murder.” 697 F. 2d 699, 700 (1983) (on petition for rehearing).⁶

Thus, neither Enmund nor any cited constitutional principle bars Skillern’s conviction under Texas law of the substantive offense of capital murder, which is not necessarily punishable by a sentence of death, simply because his guilt of the substantive offense was established by the Texas law of criminal responsibility for the acts of his confederate Sanne — whether or not Skillern himself intended or contemplated that a life would be taken in the commission of the robbery upon which Skillern and the confederate were jointly engaged. Enmund might well bar a death penalty upon jury instructions that permitted its imposition based solely upon a coconspirator’s intent and act, and absent personal intent or contemplation of the accused that a killing take place. However, the present instructions of which complaint is made did not purport to determine the sentencing option of the jury as whether life imprisonment or instead death would be imposed. Their sole purport was to furnish a basis upon which the jury could determine Skillern’s guilt of the substantive offense of capital murder, only following which (see note 3 supra)— and under different instructions — would the jury determine the criteria by which a death sentence, instead of life imprisonment, would be the penalty for conviction of the substantive offense of capital murder. We therefore do not find merit to Skillern’s contention that the jury instructions complained of permitted imposition of a capital sentence in violation of the principles enunciated by Enmund.

In the present state case, following the conviction, a sentencing hearing was held at which evidence was submitted; after which, the jury was asked to decide three special issues, its answers to which would determine whether the court would sentence Skillern to death or instead to life imprisonment. See note 3 supra. The district court then gave brief general instructions, to which no objection was made, that did not include any reference to the Texas law of criminal responsibility, and that required the jury to find proved beyond a reasonable doubt its answer to the three special issues submitted to it, as required by Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981) (quoted in note 3 supra). A unanimous jury answered Special Issue No. 1 in the affirmative:

Was the conduct of the Defendant, Doyle Edward Skillern that caused the death of the deceased, Patrick Allen Randel, committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result?7

The instructions at the sentencing hearing on their face thus required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Skillern’s conduct that caused the victim’s death was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the victim’s death would result. It might have been preferable that an additional instruction have been given that the Texas law of a party’s criminal responsibility for the act of another did not supply the accused’s deliberate intent and reasonable expectation that death would result, a prerequisite for imposition of the death penalty. However, no request was made for a special instruction to this effect, nor was any objection made to the charge as given. We cannot say that the sentencing instructions themselves permitted the jury to find that the requisite deliberate intent or contemplation to kill could be based solely upon the accomplice Sanne’s killing of the victim, in violation of Enmund.8

Nor can we say that the possible ambiguity in that regard of the jury instructions resulted in a level of uncertainty and unreliability in the fact-finding process, as enhanced by misleading prosecution argument at the sentencing hearing,9 such as resulted in the vacation of the death sentence in Clark v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 694 F. 2d 75 (5th Cir.1982). In the state’s brief opening argument, the prosecutor summarized the state’s theory of the case with regard to Special Issue No. 1. Referring to the previous verdict of guilty, he succinctly stated, “You found that they, acting together, intended to kill him. What could be more deliberate and what could bring a more reasonably expected result?”10

In his argument, Skillern’s counsel clearly delineated the different issue before .the jury in the sentencing phase as to Skillern’s criminal responsibility for the act of Sanne:

Obviously, I don’t think that you will bind Mr. Skillern with what went on in Mr. Sanne’s mind at the time of the shooting. I think the law tells you, and I am sure Mr. Butts will tell you again, that when “parties” were defined to you and you find that one was criminally responsible for the conduct of another, that is necessarily the framework in which you found Mr. Skillern guilty in this case.

That may be true but, when we get to the issue of punishment, why, it seems to me that so far as meting out what the punishment should be in a case like this, that you have got to assume, in your own minds, what may have been anticipated by Mr. Skillern with respect to what another would do under circumstances that possibly no one could foresee, at that roadside park.11

In the fourth paragraph of his closing argument, it is true, the prosecutor (without objection by the defense) stated that the defendants “were acting together as a party within the meaning of the word ‘party’, as defined in paragraph six of the first charge,” also noting “that charge is just as much the law of the land at this phase of the trial.”12 Nevertheless, the thrust of his argument was that everything Skillern and Sanne had “done” had been done in concert —“practically everything you have heard has been done in concert, in one way or another. Maybe one was playing the drum and the other blowing the bugle, but in concert.” Id. at 2890-91. The prosecutor made no further reference to the law of parties in his nine-page closing argument. In asking for the jury’s affirmative answer to Special Issue No. 1, the prosecutor quoted that the jury must find that the conduct of Skillern that caused the death was “committed deliberately in reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased would result,”13 without again referring to Skil-lern’s criminal responsibility as a party for Sanne’s act.

Reviewing the sentencing hearing arguments as a whole, in the light of the sentencing instructions given by the state trial court, we think that with regard to Skillern the issue pinpointed to the jury for its determination was whether Skillern himself deliberately participated in conduct that contemplated the murder by his accomplice Sanne of the victim. We are unable to say that the fleeting reference by the prosecution to the Texas law of party responsibility casts sufficient uncertainty or unreliability onto the jury’s determination that Skillern was personally culpable in the victim’s death as to require vacation of the death sentence.

II. Effective Assistance of Counsel

Skillern next urges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel or other constitutional right through the denial of a continuance to allow his counsel more time to prepare for his defense. Skillern contends that, at the least, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to prove the prejudice he suffered in that regard.

With regard to the contention that an evidentiary hearing is required, counsel overlooks that in fact an evidentiary hearing was held in the state court on the pretrial motion for continuance, at which the state trial court rejected the contentions that more time was needed. Further, on the motion for a new trial the contention was made that the denial of the motions for pretrial continuance had prejudiced counsel in their preparation of the defense; at the hearing on this motion the defense counsel attempted to explain why the continuance had prejudiced their preparation of the defense; and these contentions were likewise rejected by the state trial court by its denial of the motion for a new trial.14

Thus, if the facts developed at these State hearings are sufficient to establish the factual reasons concerning whether a continuance was or was not required to assure adequate time to serve as effective counsel, no further evidentiary hearing is required. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Preliminarily, we must also note that the issue before us is not whether the state trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. “When a denial of a continuance forms a basis of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not only must there have been an abuse of discretion but it must have been so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violates constitutional principles of due process.” Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F. 2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir.1981). The denial of a continuance to afford appointed counsel a reasonable opportunity to confer with the accused and to prepare his defense may indeed amount to a deprivation of constitutional right, Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940), but whether in fact this has occurred requires an examination of the circumstances of the case, id. 308 U.S. at 450, 60 S.Ct. at 324 (denial of continuance to counsel appointed three days prior to trial in murder case did not under circumstances there present, offend the federal constitution). See also Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F. 2d 1318 (5th Cir.1978) (where denial of right to counsel found in the denial of a continuance sought because of abrupt loss of representation by retained counsel). “There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964) (emphasis added).

The appointment of counsel and the denial of continuance occurred in the following factual context:

Skillern’s previous conviction and death penalty for the same crime had been reversed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, following which on February 11, 1978, the state trial judge ordered a change of venue to another county and set the retrial for March 13,1978. On February 20, twenty-two days before the trial date, attorney Connery was appointed to represent Skillern in his trial for capital murder, although he had been apprised of his upcoming appointment some five days prior thereto. Between February 20 and March 2, Connery filed fifteen pretrial motions (admittedly based mostly on those filed in the previous proceedings). One of these was a motion for a continuance, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing on March 8. Jury selection commenced on March 13, and the trial in chief commenced on March 21 and proceeded daily thereafter. On March 30, Skillern and his codefendant were found guilty of capital murder. On March 31, following a sentencing hearing held that day, these defendants were sentenced to death.

The chief ground urged by Skillern’s pretrial motion for continuance was the inadequate time allowed to examine the nine-volume record of the previous trial, which had been made available to the defense counsel, and to interview the witnesses (who were out-of-county) before they testified. At the hearing, defense counsel estimated that a minimum delay of 2-3 weeks was necessary. In denying a re-urged motion for the continuance, the trial judge allowed defense counsel time to interview state witnesses, if requested, before they testified. The record further indicates that the prosecution made available to the defense counsel reports and other documents for the latter’s use in cross-examination. All of the witnesses except one (who was interviewed by defense counsel before he took the stand) had testified in the prior trial. The experienced trial counsel from the previous trial and appeal, which had resulted in a reversal, indicated his willingness to give present defense counsel the benefit of his views, although some difficulty was experienced in securing them because of his other trial commitments.

At the hearing on the motion for the new trial, the defense counsel asserted as chief prejudice for the denial of the delay an inability to secure an investigator to go into the background of the defendants a little more for the punishment phase of the trial (mentioning with regard to Skillern the opportunity to find out more detail about his prior conviction for killing his brother), and the securing of more evidence with regard to the nature of the undercover narcotics business, as well as to explore further details concerning the victim Randel as re-fleeted by his personnel record that the prosecutor had furnished to the defendants for use at the second trial.

We are unable on the showing made or for the reasons proffered to the state trial judge before and after the trial, to hold that the denial of a continuance was arbitrary or that Skillern has borne his burden of demonstrating that he was thereby deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial because of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Martin v. Maggio, 711 F. 2d 1273, 1279, 1281 (5th Cir.1981) (citing other decisions of this circuit). The constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel guarantees the defendant, not error-free representation, but “ ‘counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering effective assistance’ ”. Id. While the seriousness of the charges must be considered as part of the totality of circumstances when ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the standard of competence required of trial counsel is no higher in capital cases than in non-capital cases. Id. 711 F. 2d at 1279-80.

In our view, the state record shows no disadvantage to Skillern’s defense by the allegedly inadequate preparation time. Although the issue is not entirely free from doubt (see the dissenting opinion in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Sanne v. State, supra, 609 S.W. 2d at 777, 779), we are unable to say that the denial of the continu-anee caused any actual prejudice to the appointed counsels’ effective representation of the accused at the trial three weeks later — considering the appointed attorneys’ access to the record of the previous state trial, the full discovery afforded by the prosecution, and the substantial identity of the issues and witnesses of the first and second trials. As is illustrated by the sug-gestión of defense counsel at the hearing on the motion for a new trial of what they might have done further had they been afforded the additional 2-3 weeks continu-anee requested, the original reasons sought for the continuance were largely obviated by the measures taken by the district court and by the appointed trial counsels’ own energetic efforts to familiarize themselves with the evidence and the issues to prepare the defense of the accused. Outside of the conclusory allegation that more time was needed b inted state trial counse! to adequately for trial on this habeas review> no reason is suggested to us as to what tria] counsel migM have done differ_ ent]y or more effectively had more time been afforded. The most serious defect in skillern’s habeas argument that the relatively short period afforded his counsel rendered his trial constitutionally inadequate, }s that the state trial record in fact reflects a competent defense, while Skillern is unable to point out any failing of his counsel or to suggest evidence that should have been uncovered in his favor through more adequate representation. Martin v. Mag-gio, supra, 711 F. 2d at 1280-81 (citing other Fifth Circuit decisions),

We therefore conclude that Skillern is not entitled to federal habeas relief on grounds related to the state trial court’s denial of a continuance to his attorney or of the attorney’s allegedly ineffective assistance at the trial, on the basis of: the state record and the reasons there suggested by counsel for the need for an additional 2-3 weeks to prepare the defense; the state trial court’s reasons for rejection of the continuance and its remedial measures to facilitate appointed counsel’s efficient preparation of the defense the infact effective representation Skillern at his state trial; and the lack on federal habeas review of any specific allegations as to what more could have been done in Skillern s defense,

III Evidentiary Rulings in the Sentencing Hearing

Skillern’s final substantial contention is that his fundamental right to a fair trial at the sentencing hearing was violated by the admission, over his counsel’s objection, of the incompetent expert opinion of a forensic pathologist, based upon a hypothetical question, that there was a probability that Skillern “would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”

„ ,. , i it. m n 4. * Criminal Appeals found that although the admission of the doctors answer was error because he was incompetent to testify as an expert and lacked firsthand familiarity with Skillern’s personality to testify as a lay witness, it was harmless error due to the other evidence of Skillern’s violent propensities adduced by the prosecution. Sanne v. State, supra, 609 S.W. 2d at 773-74. The defendant’s attorney extensively cross-examined the doctor and established in the presence of the jury that the doctor was not formally licensed to practice psychiatry and that his opinion as to future behavior was strictly based upon a hypothetical situation, The state appellate court concluded that the incremental effect of the doctor’s opinion was not great enough to have had a persuasive effect on the mind of the average juror. Id. 609 S.W. 2d at 774. The dissenting opinion in that court does set forth, however, strong reasons why the doctor’s testimony was prejudicial to Skillern’s defense against receiving a capital sentence. Id 609 S W 2d at 777 778-79

The role of a federal habeas court is more limited than that of the state appellate court. We do not sit as a super state supreme court to review error under state law. Porter v Estelle, 709 F. 2d 944, 957 (5th Cir.1983); Mendiola v. Estelle, 635 F. 2d 487, 491 (5th Cir.1981), quoting Cronnon v. Alabama, 587 F. 2d 246, 251 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974, 99 S.Ct. 1542, 59 L.Ed.2d 792 (1979). An evidentiary error in a state trial does not justify federal habeas corpus relief unless it is of such magnitude as to constitute a denial of fundamental fairness under the due process clause. Porter, supra, 709 F. 2d at 957, and decisions there cited. Thus, even the erroneous admission of prejudicial testimony does not justify habeas relief unless it is “material in the sense of a crucial, critical, highly significant factor.” Porter, supra, 709 F. 2d at 957; Anderson v. Maggio, 555 F. 2d 447, 451 (5th Cir.1977); Hills v. Henderson, 529 F. 2d 397, 401 (5th. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Hills v. Maggio, 429 U.S. 850, 97 S.Ct. 139, 50 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976); Corpus v. Beto, 469 F. 2d 953, 956 (5th Cir.1972) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 932, 94 S.Ct. 236, 38 L.Ed.2d 162 (1973).

We are unable to say that the erroneous admission of the doctor’s opinion, even conceding with the state appellate dis“nt that it may have caused some prejudice,15 caused prejudice of constitutional magnitude as tested by these standards.

Similarly so tested, the admission of the indictment of Skillern for the murder with malice of his brother, proper under state law, Sanne v. State, supra, 609 S.W. 2d at 773, possesses no merit as a basis for federal habeas relief. In any event, the defendant could not have been harmed by the introduction of the indictment, as the Jury immediately was informed that Skillern was convicted of murder without mallce-The authenticating witness, a practicin£ attorney and former prosecutor, explained to the jury during cross-examination by the defendant’s counsel, the legal difference between murder with malice and murder without malice.

Conclusion

pinding no merit to the petitioner Skil-iern’s contentions, we AFFIRM the judg-merd 0f the district court dismissing with-otd an evidentiary hearing his petition for federal habeas relief.

AFFIRMED '

Appendix

The state trial is found at pp. 237-59 in the State Record (which was intro duced in evidence in the present habeas record) filed with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on November 16, 1979. The defendant objected to Charge⁶ insofar as it permitted conviction of Skillern, absent proof of his personal participation in or encouragement of the murder. Id. pp. 207, 212.

The pertinent portions of the jury charge at the guilt stage of the trial (other instructions were given at the submission to the jury following the post-conviction sentencing hearing) are: