THE CELOTEX CORPORATION, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
BUILDEX, INC. AND CROSSLY ARCHITECTURAL PRODUCTS, INC., APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
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Celotex sought prejudgment interest on a suppliers' contract claim against Buildex. The court held that where a disputed contractual claim becomes liquidated by judgment, prejudgment interest should be awarded from the date payment was due, and absent a valid written agreement for a higher rate, interest accrues at the statutory rate of 6% per annum.
Prejudgment interest should be awarded from the date payment was due (January 25, 1981) at the statutory rate of 6% per annum, not the contractual rate of 18% per annum, because the parties never executed a valid written agreement establishing the higher contractual rate.
[1] Where a disputed contractual claim becomes liquidated by a court determination, prejudgment interest should be awarded from the date payment was due.
[2] A preprinted clause on invoices providing for interest at a specific rate is insufficient to establish an agreement for interest at that rate absent proof that the partie…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where a disputed contractual claim becomes liquidated by jury verdict as to the amounts recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date payment was due”
Establishes the core holding that prejudgment interest accrues once judgment liquidates a formerly disputed claim
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 25, 1981, Celotex demanded $129,203.04 from Buildex on an open account. Buildex acknowledged owing some amount but refused to pay, claiming…
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FERGUSON, Judge.
Celotex appeals that part of an amended final judgment entered in a suppliers’ contract action which denies it prejudgment interest.
On January 25, 1981, Celotex made a demand for $129,203.04 on its account with Buildex. Buildex conceded that it owed Celotex certain amounts but made no payments, ostensibly because of the dispute over the amount. Buildex contends that prejudgment interest is not allowable because the dispute rendered the claim “un-liquidated,” and that the claim was not “liquidated” for the purpose of adding accrued interest until the court determined by judgment of September 12, 1984, that the amount due and owing was $86,313.23.
The settled law is that where a disputed contractual claim becomes liquidated by jury verdict as to the amounts recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date payment was due. Jockey Club, Inc. v. Bleemer, Levine & Associates, 413 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) and cases collected therein. See also Meigs & Cope Agency of Florida, Inc. v. Koffey, 435 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Payment was due on January 25, 1981, the date from which interest is to be computed.1
A second issue is whether interest is to be based on contract or statute. Section 687.01, Florida Statutes (1981), the controlling statute in effect at the time the parties contracted, provided that:
In all cases where interest shall accrue without a special contract for the rate thereof, the rate shall be 6 percent per annum, but parties may contract for a lesser or greater rate by contract in writing. The statute was amended, effective July 1, 1982, to fix the interest rate at 12%.
It is undisputed that invoices sent to Buildex over the course of dealings between the parties contained a statement that “interest will be charged at the rate of 1 ½% per month or 18% per annum on all past due accounts.” No proof was presented, however, that the parties ever agreed in writing that interest shall accrue at 18% per annum. See Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co., Inc. v. Florida Rock Industries, Inc., 475 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (preprinted clause at bottom of stationery used in correspondence providing for interest at highest legal rate in event of default insufficient basis for award of interest at rate above statutory rate absent evidence that terms were agreed to by parties and formed part of contract).
By cross-appeal Buildex contends the court erred in rejecting its affirmative defense and counterclaim, particularly that (1) there was a novation whereby Buildex was relieved of an obligation to pay, and (2) it is entitled to a set-off because some of the products delivered by Celotex were defective. The trial court’s findings on the defenses and counterclaim are supported by competent substantial evidence and will not be disturbed. Laufer v. Norma Fashions, Inc., 418 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
The denial of prejudgment interest is REVERSED and the cause is remanded for an award of prejudgment interest at the statutory rate. The judgment entered against Buildex on its counterclaim is AFFIRMED.
. Once a verdict has liquidated the damages as of a date certain, computation of prejudgment interest is a purely ministerial duty of the trial judge or clerk of the court. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla.1985).
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Martin Cnty. v. Edenfield, 609 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1992)…). For example, our courts consistently have held that plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment unless they conclusively disprove the existence of a defense raised by the defendants or establish its legal insufficiency. E.g., O’Neal v. Brady, 476 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The reverse thus also must be true: Defendants moving for summary judgment must conclusively prove both the factual existence of the defense upon which they rely and its legal sufficiency. Cf id. Martin County has not conclusive…
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Cufferi v. Royal Palm Dev. Co., Inc., 516 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…sserts affirmative defenses, the plaintiff must either disprove those defenses by evidence or establish the legal insufficiency of the defenses. Id. at 127. Aroll v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 496 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); O’Neal v. Brady, 476 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); First Mortgage Investors v. Boulevard National Bank of Miami, 327 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Howdeshell v. First National Bank of Clearwater, 369 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The burden is on the plaintiff, as the moving pa…
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Berloni S.P.A. v. Della CASA, LLC, 972 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…ntgomery, 641 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). “[Wjhere a disputed contractual claim becomes liquidated by jury verdict as to the amounts recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date the payment was due.” Celótex Corp. v. Buildex, Inc., 476 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The trial court relied on Aetna Insurance Co. v. Settembrino, 369 So. 2d 954, 955 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), to conclude that it had no authority to assess interest because the verdict failed to allow or indicate the desire to awa…
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Argonaut Ins. Co. v. MAY Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985)
- Laufer v. Norma Fashions, Inc., 418 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Jockey Club, Inc. v. Bleemer, 413 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Meigs & Cope Agency OF Fla., Inc. v. Edythe Koffey, 435 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Wilkinson & Jenkins Constr. Co., Inc. v. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc., 475 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)