RICHARD D. JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Richard Johnson appealed his conviction and sentence for armed robbery and conspiracy, challenging whether the trial court properly scored prior burglary convictions on his sentencing guidelines scoresheet. The court affirmed, holding that prior convictions must be scored according to their felony classification at the time they were committed, not their current classification under later-enacted statutes.
Prior convictions must be scored according to the felony classification in effect at the time the convictions were committed, not the classification in effect at the time of sentencing for the current offense. Therefore, Johnson's 1975 burglaries should have been scored as second-degree felonies under the law existing in 1975.
[1] Prior convictions are scored for sentencing purposes according to the felony classification in effect at the time the prior offenses were committed, not at the time of th…
[2] A change in the statutory classification of an offense after its commission does not retroactively alter the classification for purposes of scoring prior convictions.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the classification in effect at the time of appellant's prior convictions should control any later scoring of those convictions”
States the holding that prior convictions are scored according to their original classification, not subsequent reclassifications
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was convicted of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. At sentencing, the trial court scored two prior 1975 burglary convictio…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Appellant raises numerous points seeking reversal of a conviction and sentence for armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. We affirm, addressing only the issue of whether the trial court erred in scoring previous convictions on appellant’s sentencing guidelines score-sheet.
At the sentencing proceeding, defense counsel objected to the scoring of two prior 1975 burglary convictions as second-degree felonies, arguing that they should be scored as classified under present law: third-degree felonies. Appellant had previously been convicted of two burglaries, which at the time of their commission in March 1975, were classified by Section 810.01(2), Florida Statutes (1973), as second-degree felonies. The repeal of Section 810.01, Florida Statutes (1973), and the addition of section 810.02(3), effective July 1, 1975, reclassified appellant’s burglaries from second-degree felonies to third-degree felonies. Chapter 74-383, Sections 31, 66-67, Laws of Florida. If the trial court had scored appellant's 1975 burglary convictions as third-degree felonies, his score-sheet point total in the instant case would have been reduced from 201 to 138, placing him in the 5V2-7 years recommended range. The trial court instead, however, scored the convictions as second-degree felonies, placing appellant in the 9-12 years recommended range, and sentenced him to concurrent ten and five year terms of incarceration.
Appellant, citing Pugh v. State, 463 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), argues that his prior convictions should be scored in accordance with the severity that the legislature presently places upon them, by virtue of the degree of felony classification. Pugh is distinguishable from the case at bar. The instant appellant asserts that his prior convictions should be scored as classified by the legislature subsequent to the commission of his crimes, but in Pugh this court found that the appellant’s prior conviction should be scored as classified when he committed the crime. Consistent with the result reached in Pugh, the classification in effect at the time of appellant’s prior convictions should control any later scoring of those convictions. We believe this approach provides certainty and relieves the sentencing judge of the often difficult task of analyzing a legislature’s reasons for changing an offense’s classification.1
AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . The Committee Note to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(5) states in pertinent part:
Any uncertainty in the scoring of the defendant’s prior record shall be resolved in favor of the defendant, and disagreement as to the propriety of scoring specific entries in the prior record should be resolved by the trial judge.
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Johnson v. State, 525 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…State, 524 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), and cases cited therein. Moreover, assigning a degree to a Florida felony which had no degree at the time of a defendant’s conviction for that felony would violate the rule established in Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), that prior offenses should be scored according to their degree at the time of the prior conviction. Where, as here, the felony has no degree at the time of the defendant’s conviction, we conclude the degree is “impossible to det…
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Harris v. State, 674 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1996)…tes.” .This situation is distinguishable from one in which the trial court scores a prior conviction where that conviction was classified by degrees at the time of the conviction but the degree was subsequently amended. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (finding that the classification in effect at^the time of the prior convictions should control any later scoring of those convictions).…
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Doyal Powell Roberts v. State, 507 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…estigation report lists two prior breaking and entering offenses for which appellant was convicted. Prior convictions scored on the sentencing guidelines scoresheet are to be classified as they were at the time of the convictions. Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Pugh v. State, 463 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The presentence investigation report states that appellant was adjudicated guilty on July 9, 1970, of one count of breaking and entering and one count of aggravated assault, for…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robbie Pugh v. State, 463 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)