LONNIE JACKSON TANNER, ET. AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
ESTATE OF JACKSON B. TANNER, APPELLEE
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Appellants challenged the admission of a will to probate and sought to assert defenses to the petition for administration. The court reversed the lower court's order striking their defenses as untimely, holding that the twenty-day filing deadline under Florida probate law is a procedural rule rather than a mandatory statute of limitations, and that defenses filed before the hearing and final order are timely.
The twenty-day requirement in Section 731.301(1)(b) is a procedural rule, not a statute of limitations or mandatory non-claim provision. Defenses filed before the hearing on the petition and before entry of final orders admitting the will and granting letters are timely filed and should not be stricken.
[1] A twenty-day period for filing defenses to a petition for administration of a will, following formal notice, is a procedural rule and not a statute of limitations or a no…
[2] Defenses to a petition for administration are considered timely filed if submitted before an order admitting the will to probate and issuing letters of administration is…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in no sense a statute of limitations or a mandatory non-claim provision”
Establishes that the 20-day filing deadline is procedural rather than jurisdictional
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJackson B. Tanner died on May 20, 1984. A petition for administration of a will dated February 10, 1984 was filed by Archie Tanner. Formal notice was …
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SMITH, Judge.
Appellants appeal final orders entered by the circuit court granting appellee’s motion to strike appellants’ defenses to a petition for administration filed on behalf of appel-lee, admitting the challenged will to probate, and issuing letters of administration. The issue is whether appellants’ written defenses were timely filed, after formal notice under the Florida Probate Code, where the defenses were filed more than twenty days from service of the notice, but before the order admitting the challenged will to probate and issuance of letters.
We find the defenses were timely filed,, and therefore reverse. The decedent, Jackson B. Tanner, died May 20, 1984. Archie Tanner, one of the decedent’s children, filed a petition for administration of a will, purportedly the last will and testament of decedent, dated February 10, 1984. Subsequently, pursuant to Sections 731.301(1), 733.212, and 733.2123, Florida Statutes (1983), formal notice of the petition for administration was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each of the named beneficiaries identified in the will. According to the return receipts signed by the various beneficiaries, formal notice was received by each beneficiary between June 14 and June 16, 1984.
Appellants Lonnie Jackson Tanner, Sarah Pearl Edwards, and Horace Eugene Tanner, all beneficiaries of the February 10, 1984 will, filed a joint answer to the petition for administration on July 11, 1984, asserting as defenses that venue was improper in Bradford County since, according to these appellants, the decedent was domiciled in Columbia County, and that decedent and his wife had executed a joint will prohibiting the execution of separate wills by either spouse. Appellant Lorraine Edwards filed a notice of adoption of the other appellants’ answer on July 19, 1984.
Appellee then filed a motion to strike the appellants’ responses, contending that the answers were untimely filed pursuant to Section 731.301(l)(b) (1983), which provides:
(b) If there is no answer served on the petitioner within 20 days from the service of the petition, the petition shall be considered ex parte. If an answer is served, a hearing shall be set and reasonable notice given.
A hearing on appellee’s motion was continued until October 29, 1984. At that time, the trial judge granted appellee’s motion to strike. Thereafter, the trial judge entered orders admitting the February 10, 1984 will to probate and granting letters of administration to Archie Tanner, the person named as personal representative in that will.
We reverse the orders appealed from on the authority of Nardi v. Nardi, 390 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In that case the court interpreted the requirement of Section 731.301(1) and Rule 5.040(a)(1), Florida Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure (as amended 1980, 387 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)) — that the opponent of a will file defenses to the petition for admission of the will to probate within twenty days of service of the petition — -as being merely a procedural rule, and “in no sense” a statute of limitations or a mandatory non-claim provision. 390 So. 2d 440, n.
2. Since the answers were filed before the hearing on the petition for administration and before entry of any order admitting the will and granting letters, they were timely filed and should not have been stricken.
Accordingly, we reverse the orders granting appel-lee’s motion to strike appellants’ answers, admitting the February 10, 1984 will to probate, and granting letters of administration to the person named in the will, and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED with directions.
MILLS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Rocca v. Boyansky, 80 So. 3d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…(2011); Nardi v. Nardi, 390 So. 2d 438, 440 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Rather, this Court and other Florida courts which have considered the question all treat the rule as a procedural one. See Long, - So. 3d at -; see also Tanner v. Estate of Tanner, 476 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Since Rocca’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counter Petition was filed before the hearing on the petition, Rocca was not barred from participation in the hearing on the Amended Petition or asserting such defenses as he…
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Long v. Willis, 100 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…en defenses within twenty days, the probate court may consider the pleading ex parte, Florida courts treat this rule as merely procedural; it is “‘in no sense’ a statute of limitations or a mandatory non-claim provision.” Tanner v. Estate of Tanner, 476 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Applying this reasoning in Tanner, the First District held that where the decedent’s beneficiaries filed a joint answer to the petition for administration asserting defenses five days after the time for answers had expired…
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Anderson v. In re Est. of Admiral Lear Anderson (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)
Authorities Cited
- Nardi v. Nardi, 390 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- The Fla. Bar. in re Fla. Rules of Probate & Guardianship Procedure, 387 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)