SOL WEISS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
H. EUGENE CHERRY AND KARIN CHERRY, APPELLEES/CROSS- APPELLANTS
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In this contract dispute, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment awarding the plaintiff-appellant partial damages and instead directed entry of judgment for the defendants-appellees on a promissory note. The court found no evidence of fraud supporting the plaintiff's claim to rescind the restaurant purchase contract.
The court held that Weiss failed to establish fraud, and because the contract contained an integration clause excluding oral representations, his action to rescind could not survive. Accordingly, the Cherrys were entitled to judgment on the promissory note with interest, costs, and attorneys' fees as called for by the note.
[1] A claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract is barred by an integration clause stating that no promises or representations outside the written contract are binding.
[2] An action to rescind a contract based on a claim of unsuitability of the purchased property fails when the contract contains an integration clause and no provision within…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We have diligently examined the record and are unable to find any evidence to support the trial court's finding that the appellees were guilty of fraud which induced the appellant to enter into the contract to purchase the restaurant in question.”
Establishes the court's finding that no fraud was proven, which is the basis for rejecting Weiss's rescission claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSol Weiss purchased a restaurant from H. Eugene Cherry and Karin Cherry, executing a promissory note and mortgage in their favor. Weiss sought to resc…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, plaintiff below, appeals from a judgment awarding him less damages than those to which he believed himself entitled; the appellees cross-appeal, contending that the appellant was entitled to no damages whatsoever and that instead, they, the appellees, were entitled to a judgment on a promissory note executed by the appellant in their favor. We agree with the appellees and reverse the judgment below with directions to enter judgment for them in the amount due under the promissory note, plus interest, costs and attorneys’ fees called for by the note.
We have diligently examined the record and are unable to find any evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the appellees were guilty of fraud which induced the appellant to enter into the contract to purchase the restaurant in question.
Therefore, the appellant’s action to rescind the sale, cancel the note and mortgage executed by him, and for the return of moneys paid by him (all founded on the claim that the restaurant was suitable to serve seated patrons) cannot survive the “integration” clause of the contract, which states that there are “no promises, inducements, assurances, guarantees, warranties, representations, solicitations, either express or implied, oral or written, except those recited and contained herein.” Cassara v. Bowman, 136 Fla. 302, 186 So. 514 (1939) (action to rescind not based on fraud in procurement does not survive integration clause).
See Cas-Kay Enterprises, Inc. v. Snapper Creek Trading Center, Inc., 453 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
There being no promise, representation or the like in the written contract that the restaurant was suitable as a “sit down” restaurant, the appellant’s action must fail and the appellees’ action to recover on the note, succeed.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
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Citator
Cited By
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McIntosh Fish Camp, LLC v. Colwell (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)
Authorities Cited
- Cassara v. Bowman, 136 Fla. 302 (Fla. 1939)
- Cas-Kay Enters., Inc. v. Snapper Creek Trading Ctr., Inc., 453 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)