ROBERT CLARK; SLENDER YOU FIGURE SALONS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; SLENDER YOU SALES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; AND R.C. ENGINEERING AND MACHINING, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
ALLIED ASSOCIATES, INC., APPELLEE
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Clark and affiliated corporations appealed a final judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages, a permanent injunction, and attorney's fees in a dispute involving motorized exercise equipment. The appellate court affirmed the damages and attorney's fees but quashed the permanent injunction as overly broad and insufficiently particularized, remanding for redrafting.
The court affirmed the compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees, but quashed the permanent injunction as overly broad and insufficiently particularized. The injunction failed to restrict application to a specific geographical area, failed to designate with sufficient particularity the enjoined acts and machines, and improperly commanded return of personal property that was not of peculiar value and character.
[1] A permanent injunction is overly broad when it fails to restrict its application to a specific geographical area.
[2] An injunctive order must designate with sufficient particularity the acts, machines, or things enjoined against, and is therefore overly broad if it fails to do so.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An injunctive order should never be broader than is necessary to secure the injured party, without injustice to the adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the particular case. The order should be adequately particularized, especially where some activities may be permissible and proper.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that injunctions must be narrowly tailored and clearly particularized
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involved a dispute over motorized exercise equipment, including sand bag machines, waist-tummy-hip machines, leg machines, stretch machines, …
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SHARP, Judge.
The defendants appeal from a final judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages, a permanent injunction, and a judgment awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm all the orders except the permanent injunction which is overly broad.
Paragraph one of the first portion of the permanent injunction enjoined the defendants for a period of forty-eight months from:
1. Making, using or selling (or offering to sell) motorized exercise equipment in any of the five categories in this lawsuit; e.g., sand bag machine, waist-tummy-hip machine, leg machine, stretch machine or vibrator machine.
This provision is hopelessly broad. Moreover, it does not restrict its application to a specific geographical area.
Also defective is the second part of the permanent injunction which permanently enjoins the defendants from:
1. Making, using or selling any motorized equipment incorporating a)The so-called “Clark improvements,” b) The measurements made by Defendant Clark on or about May 12, 1981,
c) The frame construction developed by Defendant Clark for Plaintiff,
d) The so-called “Moneo” designed equipment which was developed from the disclosure by Defendant Clark of the machines directly copied from Plaintiff’s designs, or e) The over-all distinctive and nonfunctional appearance of Plaintiff’s motorized exercise equipment.
This language fails to designate with sufficient particularity the acts, machines or things enjoined against and it is therefore also overly broad. Compare For Adults Only, Inc. v. State Ex Rel Gerstein, 257 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1972), cert. denied, 292 So. 2d 592 (Fla.1974).
Finally, we strike the last portion of the permanent injunction ordering the defendant to deliver drawings, materials, photographs, and machines to the plaintiff. Equity will not injunctively command return of personal property unless it is of peculiar value and character and unless its loss or retention by one not entitled to it cannot be fully compensated in damages. Price v. Gordon, 129 Fla. 715, 177 So. 276 (1937); Esposito v. Horning, 416 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Here, the property is not of a peculiar value and character and the money damages award adequately compensated the plaintiff. Nor were the machines ever originally the property of the plaintiff.
An injunctive order should never be broader than is necessary to secure the injured party, without injustice to the adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the particular case. The order should be adequately particularized, especially where some activities may be permissible and proper. Moore v. City Dry Cleaners and Laundry, Inc., 41 So. 2d 865, 871 (Fla.1949). Such an order should be confined within reasonable limitations and phrased in such language that its requirements can be met, without resort to portions of the record or facts outside the “four corners” of the injunction itself. One against whom an injunction is directed should not be left in doubt as to what he is required to do. Pizio v. Babcock, 76 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla.1954). Because the permanent injunction in the instant case does not satisfy these requirements, we quash it and remand to the trial court to redraft it in accordance with this opinion.
QUASHED AND REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ„ concur.
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Angelino v. Santa Barbara Enters., LLC, 2 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…ry injunction here is overly broad and cannot stand on this basis. Injunctions must be specifically tailored to each case and they must not infringe upon conduct that does not produce the harm sought to be avoided. See Clark v. Allied Assocs., Inc., 477 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). In Clark, the Fifth District stated: An injunctive order should never be broader than is necessary to secure the injured party, without injustice to the adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the particular ca…
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Smith v. Wiker, 192 So. 3d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…ction of a victim of stalking.” § 784.0485(6)(a)(1), (6)(a)(4), Fla. Stat. (2013). However, a court should not issue an injunction broader than necessary to protect the injured party under the particular circumstances. Clark v. Allied Assocs., Inc., 477 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). “The order should be adequately particularized, especially where some activities may be permissible and proper.” Id.; see also Brower v. Hubbard, 643 So. 2d 28, 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“Injunctions must be specifically tail…
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Smith v. Short, 332 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…ollowed. B. Analysis. "[A] court should not issue an injunction broader than necessary to protect the injured party under the particular circumstances." Smith v. Wiker, 192 So. 3d 603, 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (citing Clark v. Allied Assocs., Inc., 477 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)). Rather, "[t]he order should be adequately particularized, especially where some activities may be permissible and proper." Id. (quoting Clark, 477 So. 2d at 657). We readily conclude that the injunction is overbroad. A…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Moore v. City Dry Cleaners Laundry, 41 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1949)
- James v. Pizio and Arthur W. Hammond, 76 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1954)
- Price v. Gordon, 129 Fla. 715 (Fla. 1937)
- Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. State, 416 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Esposito v. Horning, 416 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- FOR Adults Only, Inc. v. State of Fla. ex rel. Richard E. Gerstein, 257 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- State v. Davis, 292 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1974)