GREGORY W. JOHNSON AND JEAN M. JOHNSON, HIS WIFE, PETITIONERS,
v.
ARNOLD KANNWISCHER AND NELLIE D. KANNWISCHER, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida District Court of Appeal granted a petition for common-law certiorari and held that petitioners' demand for jury trial was timely because it was served within ten days (extended to fifteen by mail) after the respondents' November 26, 1984 pleadings, which were directed to a legal issue on which jury trial was available.
The demand for jury trial was timely because the respondents' November 26, 1984 pleadings were directed to a legal issue on which petitioners are clearly entitled to a jury trial, and the demand was served within fifteen days (the ten-day period extended to fifteen days for mail service).
[1] A demand for jury trial is timely when served within ten days after the service of the last pleading directed to the issue for which a jury trial is demanded.
[2] When pleadings are served by mail, the ten-day period for demanding a jury trial is enlarged to fifteen days.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the denial of their demand for a jury trial as untimely was a departure from the essential requirements of law”
Statement of the core legal error addressed in the petition for certiorari
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRespondents served an answer and reply on November 26, 1984, that incorporated by reference Count III for money damages from earlier pleadings. Petiti…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us by petition for a writ of common-law certiorari. Petitioners contend that the denial of their demand for a jury trial as untimely was a departure from the essential requirements of law. We agree.
Respondents’ answer to petitioners’ third amended counterclaim and respondents’ reply to petitioners’ fifth and sixth affirmative defenses, which were served on November 26, 1984, incorporated by reference Count III for money damages,1 a legal issue contained in the earlier pleadings. Thus, the pleadings were directed to the legal issue as required by Rule 1.430, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Because the pleadings of November 26, 1984, were directed to this legal issue, on which petitioners are clearly entitled to a jury trial, the demand for jury trial served by mail December 7, 1984, and filed December 10, 1984, was timely.3
We do not address the question of which of the numerous potential issues in this case should be tried by a jury; nor do we determine the order in-which these jury and nonjury issues should be tried. These are matters for the trial court and are not properly before us on this appeal.
Accordingly, the writ is granted, the order denying petitioners’ demand for a jury trial as untimely is quashed, and the cause is remanded so that a jury trial can be held on all issues so triable and for which demand was made.
BOOTH, C.J., and WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . The respondents’ answer to the third amended counterclaim, served by mail on November 26, 1984, contains the following paragraph:
35. For additional affirmative defenses here, the plaintiffs incorporate by reference all applicable allegations of their first amended complaint.
The first amended complaint referred to contains Count III for monetary damages.
. Rule 1.430, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, in pertinent part:
Demand for Jury Trial; Waiver
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other party a demand therefor in writing at any time after commencement of the action and not later than ten days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. The demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party.
.The ten-day limit under Rule 1.430, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, is enlarged to fifteen days by Rule 1.090(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, as the pleadings of November 26, 1984, were served by mail.
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Zambrano v. Quintana (Fla. 3d DCA 2026)…last pleading directed to the issue, see Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.430(b), and no responsive pleading has been filed to date, we likewise reverse the orders striking the jury trial demand as procedurally improper. See Johnson v. Kannwischer, 477 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).2 Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. 2 As in Johnson, we do not address which of the numerous potential issues here should be tried by a jury, which is a matter f…