DANNY LEE SPIKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Danny Spiker appeals his conviction for burglary and related offenses, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress a confession obtained during police interrogation. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that Spiker's confession was voluntary despite his initial refusal to speak and the fact that he remained handcuffed throughout the two-hour interrogation.
The confession was voluntary because the state met the burden of showing Spiker knowingly waived his Miranda rights and that his subsequent response to resumed interrogation flowed from his own desire to make a statement. Handcuffing alone does not establish coercion, and an accused need not be continually reminded of Miranda rights once he has knowingly waived them.
[1] A defendant's nolo contendere plea generally does not preserve for appeal the denial of a motion to suppress a confession, unless the trial court explicitly found suppres…
[2] The state bears the burden of proving that an accused knowingly waived Miranda rights after initially refusing to speak, and that any subsequent statement was voluntary a…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when an accused refuses to discuss the crime but subsequently utters an incriminating statement, the state bears the burden of showing that the accused knowingly waived the constitutional rights specified in Miranda”
Establishes the legal standard for voluntariness when an initial refusal to speak is followed by confession
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSpiker was arrested and given Miranda warnings, which he declined. After being taken to the police station and placed handcuffed in an interrogation r…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FRANK, Judge.
Danny Spiker was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, armed burglary, possession of burglary tools, and grand theft. He has appealed his judgment and sentence contending that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress his confession.
At the moment of his arrest, Spiker was given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He declined making a statement. He was taken to the Bartow police station where he was placed in an interrogation room and handcuffed to a chair. Spiker, after being in the interrogation room for five to ten minutes, was again advised of his Miranda rights and was then asked if he would make a statement in connection with the crimes. Spiker answered affirmatively and a statement in the nature of a confession was taken from him. The interrogation lasted approximately two hours and during that time he remained handcuffed. Spiker did not request an attorney either at or at anytime following his arrest.
Spiker subsequently sought to suppress his inculpating statement on the ground that it was not voluntary. His claim to a lack of voluntariness is based upon the fact that at the time of arrest he elected to remain silent in the face of having been accorded the Miranda requirements. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and Spiker entered nolo pleas stating that he reserved the right to appeal denial of the motion. We reject the contention that Spiker’s statement was not voluntarily expressed and we affirm his conviction.
As a threshold matter, we briefly consider whether the order denying suppression is appealable. In State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1971), the supreme court determined that a dispositive matter of law can be reserved for appeal in the circumstance of a defendant’s nolo plea. Subsequently, however, in Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla.1979), the Supreme Court concluded “that as a matter of law a confession may not be considered dispositive of the case for purposes of an Ashby nolo plea.” 376 So. 2d at 385. In spite of the seeming absoluteness of the supreme court’s statement in Brown, we have held that in the circumstance where the trial court has found that suppression would be dispositive of the case and has approved an agreement preserving for appeal the refusal to suppress a confession, appellate review is appropriate. Oesterle v. State, 382 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In the matter at hand, however, the record, at best, is murky both with respect to whether there was an agreement that an appeal could be taken in the face of the nolo plea and the trial court’s grant of approval to such an agreement. In any event, giving Spiker the benefit of any uncertainty as to the appealability of the order denying his motion to suppress, we affirm.
Spiker’s reliance on Bowen v. State, 404 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) is mistaken. We held in Bowen that when an accused refuses to discuss the crime but subsequently utters an incriminating statement, the state bears the burden of showing that the accused knowingly waived the constitutional rights specified in Miranda. Moreover, to establish voluntariness of the waiver in the context of an initial declination to “talk,” the state must also demonstrate that the response to resumed interrogation flowed from the accused’s desire to make a statement. Here, Spiker chose to remain silent immediately upon arrest, after warning, because he “just felt it wasn’t right to talk right then.” When he was at the police station, however, following the second Miranda warnings, he expressed a willingness to provide a statement, a fact he confirmed at the suppression hearing. Thus, based upon the record before us, the Bowen standards were met by the state.
Finally, to the extent that the handcuffing of Spiker is ascribed any significance affecting the voluntariness of his admissions, we adopt the view of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that “[t]he use of handcuffs does not establish coercion, and an accused does not have to be continually reminded of his Miranda rights once he has knowingly waived them.” Shriner v. Wainwright, 715 F. 2d 1452, 1456 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1328, 79 L.Ed.2d 723 (1984); United States v. Ogden, 572 F. 2d 501 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 979, 99 S.Ct. 564, 58 L.Ed.2d 650 (1978).
Affirmed.
OTT, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Morgan v. State, 486 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…nolo plea. The post-Brown cases which have qualified the Brown holding with the "stipulation of dis-positiveness" exception have ail been district court of appeal decisions. See S.T.N. v. State, 474 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Spiker v. State, 477 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985). One judge has characterized this development in the post-Brown DCA opinions as "a welcome retreat from Brown" (e.s.). Finney v. State, 420 So. 2d 639, 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (Pearson, Daniel S., concurring specially). . One cou…
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Everett v. State, 535 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…stant appeals. We have determined not to follow that course, however, because the record of the plea hearing is “murky” and suggests that the trial court’s comments gave tacit approval to the appealability of the reserved questions. Spiker v. State, 477 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (confession reviewed notwithstanding an unclear record as to the ap- [*669] pealability of the order denying the motion to suppress); see also Jackson v. State, 382 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), affirmed, 392 So. 2d 1324 (Fla.19…
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England v. State, 46 So. 3d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…ppellants the benefit of any uncertainty as to the appealability of orders denying motions to suppress and we have proceeded to discuss the merits of the cases. See, e.g., Everett v. State, 535 So. 2d 667, 668-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Spiker v. State, 477 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).2 Turning to the merits, it is clear that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress England’s statements. Once the deputy located the baggie of marijuana on the passenger-side floorboard of the car, the deputy…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971)
- Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1979)
- Griffin v. Texas, 465 U.S. 1051 (U.S. 1984)
- Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 465 U.S. 1051 (U.S. 1984)
- Shriner v. Louie L. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1983)
- Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 439 U.S. 979 (U.S. 1978)
- Mayes v. United States, 439 U.S. 979 (U.S. 1978)
- Oesterle v. State, 382 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- United States v. Doyle Kent Ogden, 572 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1978)