STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
CARL LEE HICKS, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a person subject to probation revocation has an absolute right to counsel in such proceedings, unless there is an informed waiver, and this right must be afforded before the person is required to respond to revocation charges. The Court adopted a uniform rule requiring counsel in all probation revocation hearings as a matter of state law policy, even though the U.S. Constitution does not mandate it.
A person subject to probation revocation is entitled to counsel unless there has been an informed waiver thereof, and counsel must be afforded before the person is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.
[1] A person subject to probation revocation is entitled to counsel unless there has been an informed waiver of that right.
[2] Counsel must be afforded to a person subject to probation revocation before they are required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges”
States the holding that counsel must be appointed in probation revocation proceedings unless waived, and timing requirement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCarl Lee Hicks was subject to probation revocation proceedings. The case arose from a conflict between two district courts of appeal regarding whether…
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McDonald, justice.
We accepted jurisdiction of Hicks v. State, 452 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), because of conflict with Sanderson v. State, 447 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we approve Hicks.
The issue in this case is whether a person subject to probation revocation has an absolute right to counsel in such a proceeding, and, if so, whether the right must be afforded him before he is required to admit or deny the revocation charges. We hold that unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.
We note at the outset that there is no constitutional requirement for the appointment of counsel in all probation revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). We predicate our decision here on the ground that a uniform rule in all probation revocation hearings is more easily understood and easier to administer than requiring attorneys in some cases but not in others. We do not believe that a uniform requirement will unduly tax the resources of the public defender system; we believe it will result in a more orderly and uniform administration of the criminal justice system.* Judge Downey, writing for the district court, has cogently stated reasons to adopt the ruling we make. We doubt that we could improve upon his opinion and therefore adopt it as the opinion of this Court.
The opinion of the district court of appeal is approved.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS and ALDERMAN, JJ., dissent.
*
Further, a probation revocation usually leads to sentencing; an attorney is required at a sentencing proceeding. It seems illogical not to mandate an attorney when revocation is likely to lead to incarceration and to require an attorney only when the length of that incarceration is being decided.
PER CURIAM.
On rehearing we are asked to decide whether this decision, which related to a probation violation, is also applicable to a parole violation hearing. We should not address on rehearing an issue that was not presented, essential, or directly germane to the case under review and therefore decline to decide the applicability of our holding to parole violations.
We do feel that it is appropriate to determine whether our holding relative to probation violations is retroactive or prospective in its application to other probation violation hearings. We hold that it has prospective application only.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDonald, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (22 total)
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White v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 483 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…stages or hearings: arraignment, adjudication and disposition. . This principle has frequently been applied in cases involving counsel in probation revocation proceedings. See Hicks v. State, 452 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), expressly approved, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1985). . The performance agreement in this case required the parents to earn a minimum of $618 per month. Had the parents been counseled when they executed the performance agreement, they might have reconsidered the reasonableness of such a re…
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Peters v. State, 984 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2008)…placing the defendant on probation or into community control. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2003);7 see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.790(b)(1). The interrelated nature of probation revocation and sentencing was a direct concern of this Court in State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1985), where, unlike the Court in Scarpelli, we held that counsel must be appointed to probationers in all revocation proceedings: “Further, a probation revocation usually leads to sentencing; an attorney is required at a sentencing proceeding.…
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White v. State, 606 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ite was not accorded an essential right in that the record does not show that White, who appeared without counsel, made an informed waiver of her right to counsel before being required to respond to the charge of violating probation. State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1985).1 REVERSED. ERVIN and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . The supreme court stated in that case: The issue in this case is whether a person subject to probation revocation has an absolute right to counsel in such a proceeding, and, if so, whethe…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973)
- Hicks v. State, 452 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Sanderson v. State, 447 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)