WILLIAM JEFFREY RASKE, APPELLANT,
v.
LOUIS WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE
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William Raske appealed a denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his sentences for three counts of robbery with a firearm. Although the trial court's judgments contained an erroneous notation designating the crimes as 'life felonies,' the appellate court affirmed the denial because the operative portions of the judgments clearly identified the actual crime and imposed sentences consistent with first-degree felony sentencing, not life felony sentencing.
The erroneous 'LF' notation on the judgments does not render the judgments or sentences void or voidable. The operative portions of each judgment clearly establish the adjudicated crime and its legal classification, and the 25-year sentences imposed are consistent with first-degree felony sentencing, not life felony sentencing, which would require a minimum mandatory sentence of 30 years under Florida law.
[1] An erroneous notation on a judgment does not render the judgment or sentence void or voidable if the operative portions of the judgment clearly identify the adjudicated c…
[2] A sentence imposed for a first-degree felony is not rendered illegal by a notation of 'life felony' if the sentence imposed is less than the statutory minimum for a life…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the operative portions of each judgment clearly show the specific crime which was adjudicated and that such crime, is, as a matter of law, a first degree felony punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment”
Establishes that despite the erroneous notation, the substance of the judgment clearly identifies the crime and its legal classification
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRaske pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery with the use of a firearm under Florida Statute Section 812.13(1)(2)(a) in June 1983. He was sentenced…
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NIMMONS, Judge.
Raske appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Leon County denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm the order although not for the reason stated in the order. From the petition and copies of judgments attached thereto, it appears: (1) that, pursuant to guilty pleas, Raske was adjudicated guilty on June 10, 1983 in the Broward County Circuit Court in each of three cases of robbery with the use of a firearm, a violation of Section 812.13(1), (2)(a), Florida Statutes; (2) that Raske was sentenced in each case to a term of 25 years (concurrently with each other), the sentencing court also imposing the requirements of Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes, precluding eligibility for parole or statutory gain time during the first three years of the sentences.
Although each judgment clearly shows that the crime for which Raske was adjudicated and sentenced was robbery with a firearm under Section 812.13(1), (2)(a), which is clearly a first degree felony punishable by a maximum term of life imprisonment, the judgment erroneously bears the notation “LF,” indicating life felony. Consequently, according to Raske’s petition, his sentences were imposed illegally and he is entitled to have his sentences vacated and to be resentenced under the sentencing guidelines which had not yet taken effect when he was originally sentenced in June, 1983.
We hold that Raske’s petition fails to state grounds supporting habeas corpus. The above referred erroneous notation of LF on the judgments does not render the judgments or sentences void or voidable. The operative portions of each judgment clearly show the specific crime which was adjudicated and that such crime, is, as a matter of law, a first degree felony punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment. Moreover, it is apparent that the sentences imposed were not for life felonies because, under Section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes, a life felony requires a minimum mandatory sentence of 30 years. Raske’s sentence in each case, as above noted, was only 25 years.
The fact that the court below denied Raske’s petition on the erroneous ground that “robbery with a deadly weapon is a life felony pursuant to F.S. 812.13(1), (2)(a)” does not entitle Raske to habeas relief inasmuch as the order is otherwise sustainable as indicated above.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, C.J., and ZEHMER, J., concur.
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Williams v. State, 627 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Raske v. Wainwright, 478 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).…