ANTOINETTE JUDSON, ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
NICSON ENGINEERING COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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ANSTEAD, Judge.
We grant the appellee’s petition for rehearing, withdraw our opinion of June 26, 1985, and now affirm the trial court’s order refusing to grant appellants’ permission to interview an alternate juror after that juror was excused from service and the regular jurors entered a verdict for appellee.
Our affirmance is predicated upon what we now perceive to be the policy implications of excepting an alternate juror from the provisions controlling post-judgment interviews of jurors contained in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431(g), a position that has some attraction in view of the fact that alternate jurors do not actually participate in the jury’s deliberations and decision-making process. While we agree that there may be a difference in the degree of concern between invading the privacy of the jury’s deliberations as compared to an inquiry as to the jurors’ interactions before deliberations begin, we believe that Rule 1.431(g) was intended to establish a single, uniform standard for controlling interviews with all jurors, including alternates who do not participate in the decision-making function. Compare National Indemnity Co. v. Andrews, 354 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) with Sentinel Star Co. v. Edwards, 387 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
To construe the provision otherwise would exempt an important class of jurors from the rule and leave no standard for determining when an interview of alternates would be appropriate. We do not believe that was the intent of the Supreme Court in enacting the rule controlling the post-trial interview of jurors. Under this interpretation of the rule we will have a single, uniform standard and the fact that the juror was an alternate will merely be one factor for the trial court to consider in exercising its discretion under the rule.
Applying the provisions of the rule, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow an interview in the face of appellants’ claims that the jury returned a verdict after only five minutes of deliberation and that the alternate juror had commented to appellants’ counsel that she would find it difficult to deliberate with the other jurors. Neither of these contentions, in our view, sufficiently undermines confidence in the jury’s verdict to mandate an interview with the alternate juror. DOWNEY and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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Eve Taylor v. Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty., 546 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…the denial of the post-trial motion to interview jurors because no juror misconduct was shown on this record to merit such an interview, Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); see Judson v. Nicson Eng’g Co., 478 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. dismissed, 496 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1986); Dover Corp. v. Dean, 473 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 475 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1985); Cummings v. Sine, 404 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), or in the closing argum…
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Dennis J. Egitto, M.D. v. Wittman, 980 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…ided an affidavit asserting that D’Amico failed to disclose that his father was a physician. See id. We review the order granting the Witt-mans’ amended motion to conduct a juror interview for an abuse of discretion. See Judson v. Nicson Eng’g Co., 478 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). A post-trial juror interview is never permissible unless the moving party has made sworn factual allegations that, if true, would require a trial court to order a new trial. Baptist Hosp., 579 So. 2d at 100. In determining whet…
Authorities Cited
- Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Sue L. Andrews et vir., 354 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Sentinel Star Co. v. The Honorable Claude R. Edwards, 387 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)