ANGEL TORO A/K/A SAMMY TORO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Angel Toro appealed his conviction, claiming he was entitled to dismissal because he was not scheduled for trial within the 120-day period required by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that delays resulted from Toro's own efforts to obtain counsel and a continuance for good cause, and that Toro acquiesced in the trial date.
Toro was not entitled to dismissal because the delays resulted from his own efforts to obtain counsel and the trial date was set pursuant to a continuance for good cause as authorized by the IAD statute. Additionally, the defense acquiesced in fixing the trial date beyond the statutory period and therefore could not complain.
[1] A defendant's request for final disposition of untried charges, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, triggers a 180-day speedy trial period.
[2] A trial court may grant a continuance for good cause shown, even if it extends the speedy trial period, provided the prisoner or counsel is present.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance”
The statutory requirement under the IAD that allowed for continuances for good cause
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceToro was brought to Florida pursuant to a detainer while serving a federal sentence. He sought to obtain counsel, which extended the period before tri…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The defendant’s sole contention, preserved through the entry of a nolo plea, is that he is entitled to dismissal because he was not scheduled for trial within the 120 day period provided by Article IV(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, § 941.-45(4)(c), Fla.Stat. (1983).1 We disagree.
Applying the body of federal law which controls the interpretation of the IAD, Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42, 101 S.Ct. 703, 706-09, 66 L.Ed.2d 641, 647-50 (1980), we find that the delays complained of resulted from (a) Toro’s own extended efforts to obtain counsel, Naughton v. State, 453 A. 2d 796 (Del.1982); see United States v. Scheer, 729 F. 2d 164 (2d Cir.1984); and (b) the lower court’s setting the trial on a date which coincided with that requested by and already set for a co-defendant and which afforded Toro’s finally retained attorney sufficient time to prepare; it thus represented an entirely appropriate continuance for good cause as specifically authorized by Article IV(c). Naughton v. State, supra; see United States v. Odom, 674 F. 2d 228 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2946, 73 L.Ed. 1341 (1982). Hence, there was no violation of the defendant’s rights under the statute. See cases collected, An-not., Validity, Construction, and Application of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 98 A.L.R.3d 160 § 28[b] (1980).
In addition, it appears that the defense acquiesced in fixing the trial date beyond the statutory period and therefore may not now be heard to complain.2 Foran v. Metz, 463 F.Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y.1979), aff’d mem. 603 F. 2d 212 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830, 100 S.Ct. 58, 62 L.Ed.2d 38 (1979); Pethtel v. State, 427 N.E. 2d 891, 893-95 (Ind.App.1981).
Affirmed.
. Sec. 941.45(4)(c) provides:
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this subsection, trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
This section of the IAD applies because Toro was brought here pursuant to a Florida detainer lodged against him while he was serving a federal sentence.
. A different result on this point would be required by the Florida speedy trial law. See Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1978).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1981)
- Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
- Darks v. United States, 457 U.S. 1125 (U.S. 1982)
- Perkins v. United States, 457 U.S. 1125 (U.S. 1982)
- Boise Cascade Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 444 U.S. 830 (U.S. 1979)
- Foran v. Metz, 444 U.S. 830 (U.S. 1979)
- United States v. Odom, 674 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1982)
- United States v. Scheer, 729 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1984)