GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PETITIONERS STATE OF FLORIDA, ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION AND FLORIDA LAND AND WATER ADJUDICATORY COMMISSION; THE FLORIDA. ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION; THE FLORIDA LAND AND WATER ADJUDICATORY COMMISSION; AND STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, PETITIONERS,
v.
COMMISSIONER EDWIN O. SWIFT, III, RESPONDENT
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reviewed whether Commissioner Edwin O. Swift, III had standing to seek a declaratory judgment challenging the validity of administrative rules governing development in the Florida Keys. The court held that public officials lack standing to challenge the validity of laws or regulations they are charged with enforcing unless prevented from performing their duties by others.
A public official lacks standing to seek a declaratory judgment challenging the validity of rules or regulations he is required to enforce, unless he is willing to perform his duties but is prevented from doing so by others. Commissioner Swift had no such standing because he was not prevented from performing his duties under the challenged rules.
[1] A public official may not seek a declaratory judgment as to the nature of their duties unless they are willing to perform those duties but are prevented from doing so by…
[2] Public officials lack standing to sue for the purpose of determining that a law, regulation, or rule is invalid.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a public official may not seek a declaratory judgment as to the nature of his duties unless he "is willing to perform his duties, but is prevented from doing so by others."”
Establishes the foundational rule limiting public officials' standing to seek declaratory judgments
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCommissioner Swift, in his official capacity, challenged the validity of Chapter 27-F-8 of the Florida Administrative Code, which contained revised Pr…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners, the Florida Administration Commission, the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, the Florida Department of Community Affairs, and Governor Bob Graham (as Chairman of the Florida Administration Commission and of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission), seek review of an order of the trial court determining that Commissioner Swift had the necessary standing to litigate in a declaratory judgment action the effect of certain rules promulgated by the Administration Commission. For the reasons which follow, we grant certiorari and quash the trial court’s order. In their official capacities, Senator Lawrence H. Plummer, Representative Joseph B. Allen, Jr., and Commissioner Edwin 0. Swift, III, questioned the validity of Chapter 27-F-8 of the Florida Administrative Code and sought a declaratory judgment. Chapter 27-F-8 contains the revised Principles for Guiding Development for the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. Though the circuit court dismissed Plum-mer and Allen from the suit, it found that the decisions of Commissioner Swift were substantially affected and held that he had standing to seek a declaratory judgment. We disagree. By holding that Swift had standing, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law. Certio-rari is appropriate. See Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla.1983).
In Florida, the general rule is that a public official may not seek a declaratory judgment as to the nature of his duties unless he “is willing to perform his duties, but is prevented from doing so by others.” Reid v. Kirk, 257 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla.1972); see Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1981). The validity of the law is to be assumed by the public official who is to carry it out. By the same token, that official does not have standing to sue for the purpose of determining that the law is not valid. Department of Education v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla.1982); Miller v. Higgs, 468 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The foregoing principles are equally applicable when a public official questions the validity of a regulation or rule because a valid rule or regulation of an administrative agency has the force and effect of law. See Florida Livestock Board v. Gladden, 76 So. 2d 291, 293 (Fla.1954); Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 416 So. 2d 1133, 1142 n. 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), rev. denied, 429 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1983); see also Markham, 396 So. 2d at 1121 (court held property appraisers lacked standing to contest Department of Revenue regulations). Because Commissioner Swift has not been prevented from performing his duties under the Florida Administrative Code and because those rules are to be presumed valid, declaratory judgment is inappropriate.
Accordingly, the order under review is quashed, and this action is remanded with directions to dismiss.
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Branca v. City OF Miramar, 634 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1994)…t have standing to attack the constitutionality of its ordinance. As a gen [*606] eral rule, a public official does not have standing to sue for the purpose of determining whether or not the law which sets forth his duties is valid. Graham v. Swift, 480 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). However, there appears to be an exception to this rule when the law requires an expenditure of public funds. Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138 So. 2d 505 (Fla.1962). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the city was precluded from see…
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Santa Rosa Cnty. v. Admin. Comm'n, 642 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…ciable controversy or provide an occasion to give an advisory judicial opinion”). Legislation which affects the duties of state officers and agencies is presumed valid, and such parties do not have standing to assert otherwise. Id.; Graham v. Swift, 480 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Exceptions to this rule exist where “the objecting party can show that he will be injured in his person, property or other material right by virtue of the statute in question,” Green v. City of Pensacola, 108 So. 2d 897, 900 (Fl…
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Authorities Cited
- Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)
- Dep't OF Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982)
- Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y OF the United States, 416 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Dep't OF Revenue OF the State OF Fla. v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981)
- Fla. Livestock Bd. v. Gladden, 76 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954)
- Reid v. Kirk, 257 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972)
- Miller v. Ervin Higgs, 468 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)