JOHN LAVERNE BEATY AND DOROTHY M. BEATY, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
DELPHIA E. MILLER, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF EARL H. BEATY, DECEASED, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1985-12-19
No. BF-494
SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
480 So. 2d 196 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

John and Dorothy Beaty appealed a judgment imposing a constructive trust on real property in favor of Earl Beaty's estate. The court reversed, holding that no constructive trust could be imposed because there was no fraud, abuse of confidence, or other misconduct in the property transfers.


Holding

The court reversed the imposition of the constructive trust. A constructive trust can only be imposed under specific circumstances—fraud, abuse of confidence, or other questionable means—which did not exist here. The trial court either overlooked that John and Dorothy were the sole owners of the two-acre tract included in the sale or that the estate failed to prove fraud or undue influence.


Headnotes

[1] A quitclaim deed conveying an interest in property is effective as between the parties to the deed.

[2] A warranty deed is void as to the interest of a grantor if the grantor's signature is not subscribed by two witnesses.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A constructive trust can only be imposed under certain circumstances which do not exist here. Those circumstances are outlined in the case of Kramer v. Freeman, 272 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). There is no clear and convincing evidence in the present case that John and Dorothy acquired the two-acre parcel through fraud, abuse of confidence or any other questionable means.”

Establishes the legal standard for imposing a constructive trust and applies it to the facts, finding the standard not met.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

J.M. Beaty died intestate, leaving his three heirs (wife Margaret and sons John and Earl) each with a one-third interest in a ten-acre parcel in Duval…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
MILLS, Judge.

MILLS, Judge.

John and Dorothy Beaty appeal from a final judgment which the Estate contends established a constructive trust in favor of the Estate to a certain parcel of land here at issue and awarded it proceeds allegedly owed to the Estate from the sale of the parcel. We reverse. The original owner of the land in question, J.M. Beaty, died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Margaret, and two adult sons, John and Earl. In accordance with the intestate laws enacted at that time, each of the heirs received a one-third interest in the property, which consisted of approximately ten acres in Duval County.

On 18 May 1972, John and Dorothy joined with Earl to convey by quitclaim deed a two-acre parcel on the southerly part of the property to their mother, Margaret. Margaret lived in a trailer home on this parcel. However, by warranty deed dated 10 March 1977, Margaret reconveyed this two-acre tract to her son John and his wife, Dorothy. The trial court found this conveyance was made freely and voluntarily and vested title in John and Dorothy.

The next transaction involving the subject property took place on 14 September 1977, when Margaret and her son, Earl, purported to convey the remainder of the property to John and Dorothy. The signature of Earl was not subscribed to by two witnesses however, and consequently the warranty deed was void as to his interest. The transfer was effective as to Margaret.

The next relevant event occurred in October of 1979. By warranty deed, John and Dorothy conveyed a rectangular section of the northern portion of the realty to a Maggie M. Lee. Earl received one-third of the net proceeds from the sale, as he was entitled to.

Thereafter, in July of 1980, John contracted to sell the remaining portions of the subject property, including the two-acre tract deeded to him by Margaret, for the aggregate amount of $144,689.14. From these proceeds John and Dorothy paid to, or on behalf of Earl or his estate, the total sum of $27,235.88.

In the final order, the trial court concluded that Earl’s estate was entitled to one-third of the proceeds from the entire sale. By dividing $144,689.14 by one-third and not deducting any closing costs, the court reached the sum of $48,229.71. Subtracting the payments previously made by John to Earl, which were attributable to the sale, the court concluded that Earl’s estate was entitled to recover an additional $21,951.73 plus interest from John and Dorothy Beaty.

While appellate courts generally will not disturb the findings of fact by a trial judge if there is sufficient competent evidence to support such findings, when the weight and competency of the evidence is clearly contrary to the findings of fact it is the duty of the appellate court to reverse the trial court. Heath v. First National Bank in Milton, 213 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). In the present case, the trial court either overlooked the fact that the two-acre tract deeded to John and Dorothy was included in the total sale or the fact that they were its sole owners. In either event, the court’s holding that the Beatys “have legal title to the sum of $21,951.73, in trust for the use and benefit of the Estate of Earl H. Beaty” must be reversed.

A constructive trust can only be imposed under certain circumstances which do not exist here. Those circumstances are outlined in the case of Kramer v. Freeman, 272 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). There is no clear and convincing evidence in the present case that John and Dorothy acquired the two-acre parcel through fraud, abuse of confidence or any other questionable means. Indeed, the trial court in its order found that Margaret signed the deed freely and voluntarily and that the Estate did not carry “the burden to prove fraud or undue influence on Mrs. Beaty.”

Accordingly, we reverse.

SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Donald v. Bauer, 609 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
    …e he “couldn’t afford to lose his job.” By doing so, we conclude that the State did raise the benefit issue, albeit somewhat unartfully. We therefore reject the trial court’s finding to the contrary as unsupported by the record. See Beaty v. Miller, 480 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Finally, although we disagree with the trial court’s reasoning, we affirm the trial court’s order as “right for the wrong reason.” See Owens v. State, 354 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and LETTS and WARNER, J…
  • Cozette R. Drake v. Walton Cnty., 6 So. 3d 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
    …y take Appellant’s property. Analysis We review the trial courts factual findings to determine whether they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. When they are not, it is the duty of the appellate court to reverse. See Beaty v. Miller, 480 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). We review the court’s legal conclusions de novo. See S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Welker, 908 So. 2d 317, 319-20 (Fla.2005). The critical undisputed fact in this case is that before the Hembys purchased the subject pr…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw