W.R. DANIEL, JR., AS PROPERTY APPRAISER, APPELLANT,
v.
AMERICAN CYANAMID CO., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A property appraiser appealed the classification of American Cyanamid Company's land as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that land actively used for agriculture must be classified as such regardless of the owner's future development plans.
The court held that land actually being used agriculturally must be classified as agricultural for tax purposes, regardless of the owner's future development plans or preparations. The court also held that when agricultural assessment has been granted, the assessment applies to the land itself based on its agricultural use, including the owner's entire fee interest, not merely the surface interest.
[1] Land leased for agricultural use may be classified as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes.
[2] A prior court order classifying land as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes creates a presumption of continued agricultural use for subsequent tax years, absent a sh…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It was undisputed that the land was being used agriculturally, albeit under lease.”
Establishes the critical fact that actual current use, not owner intent, controls the classification determination.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAmerican Cyanamid Company's land was being leased and used agriculturally. The same land had been classified as agricultural in the three preceding ta…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed.
Under the facts of this case we do not conclude that the trial court erred in finding that appellee’s land should be classified as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes. It was undisputed that the land was being used agriculturally, albeit under lease. See Fisher v. Schooley, 371 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The land had been classified as agricultural pursuant to court order for the three preceding tax years after litigation of substantially the same issues now raised by the property appraiser involving appellee’s plans and preparations for a nonagricultural use of the land. No subsequent substantial change was shown to have occurred in the use of the land for the subject tax year. That some of the land which had been involved in that prior litigation had been subsequently removed from agricultural classification did not mean that the remainder which is involved here became ipso facto nonagricultural. See Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 347 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
We also do not conclude that the trial court erred in providing in the final judgment that the agricultural classification should apply to the appellee’s entire fee interest and not simply to its interest in the surface of the land. Section 193.-461(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), provided, “In years in which proper application for agricultural assessment has been made and granted pursuant to this section, the assessment of land shall be based solely on its agricultural use.” (Emphasis added.) See Markham v. Blount, 175 So. 2d 526 (Fla.1965). We conclude that the appraiser’s well-presented argument to the contrary involving other provisions of chapter 193 is more appropriately addressed to the legislature.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Ridgewood Phosphate Corp. & Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Perkins, 487 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…nt, Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978); Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla.1977). Here, the lessee’s use of the 1,840 acres for grazing cattle clearly qualified this land for an agricultural classification. See also Daniel v. American Cyanamid Co., 480 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA [*42] 1985); Fisher v. Schooley, 371 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Moreover, Ridge-wood’s intention to use the leased land for mining and its preparatory activities for that future use were insufficient to deny agricultural classificat…
-
Roden v. Estech, Inc., 508 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…c Richfield Co. v. Walden, 277 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). The fact that other lands owned by Estech in the same area were used for mining does not mean that the lands involved in this litigation were so used. See Daniel v. American Cyanamid Co., 480 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). On cross-appeal, Estech contends that the trial court erred in upholding the appraiser’s valuation of other, mined-out lands at $700 per acre. Estech contends that in arriving at that valuation the appraiser disregarded the requ…
-
W.R. Daniel, Jr. v. Stone, 481 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…case was based upon a conclusion that since another portion of the property which is not involved in this case had been classified as agricultural, the portions involved here must be so classified. We disagree. See Daniel v. American Cyanamid, Co., 480 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Our basic reasoning for this reversal is the same as that used by the Florida Supreme Court in Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla.1977), to wit: Tax assessors are constitutional officers and as such their actions are cl…
Authorities Cited
- Markham v. Blount, 175 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965)
- Fisher v. Schooley, 371 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Straughn v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 347 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)