DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT,
v.
EARL CHARLES, APPELLEE
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The Florida Department of Transportation appealed a workers' compensation award to Earl Charles for an automobile accident while exiting his employment as a bridge tender. The court affirmed the compensability finding but amended the order by striking penalty reductions based on alleged safety regulation violations that were not properly promulgated by the authorized Division.
The court affirmed that the accident was compensable as occurring in the course and scope of employment, but amended the order by striking the 25% penalty reduction because the memoranda at issue were not safety regulations 'required by statute or lawfully promulgated by the Division' of Workers' Compensation as required by statute.
[1] An injury sustained by an employee while entering or exiting the employer's premises is generally considered to be within the course and scope of employment.
[2] Memoranda issued by a department that are not "required by statute or lawfully promulgated by the Division of Workers’ Compensation" do not constitute safety regulations…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an injury received by accident by a bridgetender entering or exiting the north beach bridge is compensable under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act. It has long been held that entering and exiting a place of employment is part and parcel of any employment.”
Establishes the core principle supporting compensability of injuries during work entry/exit
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEarl Charles, employed as a bridge tender, suffered an automobile accident on March 30, 1984, while departing the north beach bridge at the end of his…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
The appellant employer, Florida Department of Transportation, contends that the evidence before the deputy commissioner in this workers’ compensation case does not support his determination that the automobile accident suffered by claimant on the bridge from which he was departing his employment as a tender was compensable. We find no reversible error on the factual and legal argument as to course of employment,1 but we amend the order in accord with the fourth issue which is stated by appellant as follows:
The memoranda of February 23, 1983 and November 8, 1983 were not safety regulations within the meaning of Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes.
The parties agree that the Department of Transportation rules in question were not, as required by the cited statute, rules “required by statute or lawfully promulgated by the Division,” the latter referenced agency being clearly defined in § 440.-02(10), Florida Statutes, as “the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the Department of Labor and Employment Security.”
The order is accordingly amended by striking the words “less 25% or 92.29 a week” from paragraph one of the decretal portion, and the words “thus, his compensation must be reduced by 25%,” from paragraph 3 of the findings. As amended, the order is affirmed.
JOANOS, J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., dissents.
. The order states in part:
... [A]n injury received by accident by a bridgetender entering or exiting the north beach bridge is compensable under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act. It has long been held that entering and exiting a place of employment is part and parcel of any employment. Here, the claimant was injured on the employer's premises while in the process of exiting his employment. The method of exiting was customary and known to the employer.... The real crux of the compensability of this case is that the claimant had to be relieved from his duty and exit the employment premises. Any procedure suggested by the employer or any that I could envisage would involve a risk or special hazard of serious injury. Therefore, the claimant’s accident of March 30, 1984, occurred in the course and scope of his employment.
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