HORACE CAIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed a drug conviction because the trial judge arbitrarily limited defense counsel's closing argument to 15 minutes instead of the requested 30 minutes, depriving the defendant of a fair trial. The court emphasized that such arbitrary time restrictions on closing argument are reversible error, particularly when the trial judge had been reversed previously for the same conduct.
The court held that Cain was deprived of a fair trial by the arbitrary 15-minute limitation on closing argument. The conviction is reversed, the sentence is vacated, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
[1] A trial judge arbitrarily limiting defense counsel to an abbreviated time for closing argument deprives the defendant of a fair trial.
[2] A trial judge's prior rulings reversing the same judge for similar arbitrary limitations on closing argument time are relevant to the egregiousness of the error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We are confronted again with the necessity to reverse a criminal conviction because the trial judge arbitrarily limited defense counsel to an abbreviated time for closing argument to the jury.”
Establishes the core issue and signals that this is a recurring problem with this judge
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCain was charged with delivery of a controlled substance to a minor and sale of a controlled substance. The trial lasted two days with 12 witnesses an…
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PER CURIAM.
We are confronted again with the necessity to reverse a criminal conviction because the trial judge arbitrarily limited defense counsel to an abbreviated time for closing argument to the jury. Had defense counsel been allowed the thirty-minute time period he requested in this case, rather than being cut off after fifteen minutes, we would have affirmed. There are no “cost savings” in insisting on this kind of courtroom efficiency. Further, the error is particularly egregious in this case because this court, in two written opinions dated five and three months prior to the trial in this case, reversed this same trial judge for making similar rulings. See, Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Stanley v. State, 453 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
Cain was charged with delivery of a controlled substance to a minor,1 and sale of a controlled substance.2 At trial, there was a substantial issue as to the identity of the person who sold the drugs. The trial took place over a two-day period, not including jury selection. Twelve witnesses testified and the transcript totaled 400 pages.
The trial judge asked counsel at the jury instruction conference whether there was any reason they could not limit closing argument to fifteen-minutes per side. Defense counsel said he had no objection to a thirty-minute limit, but he asked the court not to impose an absolute fifteen-minute limit. The trial judge refused because “I just got to run my courtroom,” and he did not think Cain’s defenses were complicated.
From the record it can be seen that defense counsel tried to cover all the facets of his case as best he could in his fifteen-minute span. At one point he told the jury, “I would like the opportunity to go through each witness with you, and to analyze each one of their testimony, I would like to say to you and be able to pick apart each one of those. But, we follow Rules of Procedure. ...” He was reminded by the trial judge three minutes before the fifteen-minute period elapsed; and he complied with the trial court’s time limits.
Under these circumstances, we think Cain was deprived of a fair trial. Cooper v. State, 106 Fla. 254, 143 So. 217 (1932); Rodriguez v. State, 472 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed, the sentence is vacated, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED.
COBB, C.J., and UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. . Violation of section 893.13(l)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1983).
. Violation of section 893.13(l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1983).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hickey v. State, 484 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…er case); Stanley v. State, 453 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (10 minutes on a charge of burglary and grand theft); Rodriguez v. State, 472 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (15 minute time limit in a burglary case); and most recently, Cain v. State, 481 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (15 minutes in a case involving violations of drug laws, where we noted that "there are no ‘cost savings’ in insisting on this kind of courtroom efficiency”). . Pittman v. State, 440 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (30 minutes on…
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Adams v. State, 585 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…3 So. 115 (1925); Stanley v. State, 453 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Pittman v. State, 440 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Rodriguez v. State, 472 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Cain v. State, 481 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Joseph v. State, 479 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Even without a bright shining rule to reveal the precise number of minutes to be allotted for closing, the cases consistently hold that closings less than thirty minutes are…
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Simmons v. State, 753 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). [*703] In this case, I think interrupting the defense presentation after 15 minutes and cutting him off after a few additional minutes, but before he had concluded his point, was unreasonable and arbitrary. In Cain v. State, 481 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), we held that it was reversible error to limit cross examination to 15 minutes. See also, Rodriguez v. State, 472 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Adams v. State, 585 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA. 1991); Joseph v. State, 479 So. 2d 8…
Authorities Cited
- Harrison v. Simpson, 106 Fla. 254 (Fla. 1932)
- Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Rodriguez v. State, 472 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Stanley v. State, 453 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)