HOWELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
ELDRIDGE V. WEAVER, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

5th Cir. | 1985-11-22
No. 84-2514
Before RUBIN, JOHNSON and JONES, Circuit Judges.
776 F.2d 1302 Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

A plaintiff has a claim under RICO § 1964(c) if injured in business or property by a violation of § 1962, without an additional 'racketeering injury' requirement.


Facts & Procedural History

The district court dismissed a suit under RICO for failure to allege injury to business or property resulting from predicate acts. The Supreme Court s…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:

in which it held:

Section 1964(c) [of RICO] authorizes a private suit by ‘[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962.’ Section 1962 in turn makes it unlawful for ‘any person’ — not just mobsters — to use money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in an enterprise, to acquire control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, or to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. §§ 1962(a)-(c). If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous “racketeering injury” requirement.

The defendants-appellees contend that dismissal is correct. They argue in addition that the complaint is also deficient because it lacks sufficient particularity.

The Court also held in Sedima:

A violation of § 1962(c), the section on which Sedima relies, requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. The plaintiff must, of course, allege each of these elements to state a claim. Conducting an enterprise that affects interstate commerce is obviously not in itself a violation of § 1962, nor is mere commission of the predicate offenses. In addition, the plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.

The complaint complies with the statute. The complaint alleges damages resulting from the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The complaint’s allegation of injury — loss of funds and injury to property and business resulting from the defendants’ fraudulent scheme to misapply funds entrusted to them to maintain their interest in the Enterprise — satisfies the requirement of § 1964(c).

The judgment of dismissal for failure to state a claim is, therefore, REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further pro ceedings consistent with Sedima and American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc. . 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.

. S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285-86, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985).

. - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3291, 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw