PEGGY CARTER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Peggy Carter appeals her conviction for trafficking in cocaine, challenging the sufficiency of evidence regarding possession and the trial court's exclusion of a defense witness. The Florida appellate court affirms, finding the evidence sufficient to establish dominion and control over the cocaine and no error in excluding a witness who would invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.
The evidence was sufficient to support conviction because the jury could reasonably infer from the circumstances that Carter placed the bag in her car's trunk, thereby exercising dominion and control. The trial court properly excluded the witness because a defendant has no right to call a witness who will assert a valid privilege against self-incrimination before the jury.
[1] Evidence that a defendant's fingerprints were found on a bag of contraband, combined with evidence of the defendant's presence at a location where contraband was being pr…
[2] A defendant has no right to call a witness who intends to assert a valid privilege against self-incrimination before the jury.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that it was the defendant who came out of the cocaine-cutting house with the bag of cocaine in hand and placed the bag in the rear of the defendant's car— thereby establishing that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the cocaine in question.”
Establishes the sufficiency of evidence for the possession element of trafficking, based on circumstantial evidence and fingerprint evidence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCarter and two others were observed leaving a cocaine-cutting house. One of the three was seen carrying a large brown bag and depositing it in the tru…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine in which two points are raised as a basis for reversal. We find no merit in either point and affirm.
First, it is urged that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the defendant Peggy Carter had dominion over and the ability to control the contraband in question; it is therefore urged that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for trafficking in cocaine. We cannot agree. The defendant concedes that all other elements of the crime charged were established below — including the defendant’s knowledge of the presence and illicit nature of the cocaine in question. As to the disputed element of possession, the proofs below established that: (1) the defendant and two other people were observed by the police leaving a “cocaine-cutting” house where there were large quantities of cocaine in open view; (2) one of these three people was carrying a large brown bag (the police could not identify which of three people that person was) and was seen depositing the bag in the trunk of a nearby car titled in the name of the defendant; (3) the police followed the car, eventually stopped it, arrested the defendant who was a passenger in the car, and seized the cocaine from the trunk of the car; (4) the defendant’s fingerprints were found on the bag of cocaine. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that it was the defendant who came out of the cocaine-cutting house with the bag of cocaine in hand and placed the bag in the rear of the defendant’s car— thereby establishing that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the cocaine in question. We see no merit to the defendant’s arguments to the contrary. See Muwwakil v. State, 435 So. 2d 304, 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
Second, it is urged that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a defense witness who, admittedly, would have asserted his privilege against self-incrimination before the jury and refused to testify had he been allowed to do so by the trial court. No error is presented because a defendant, plainly, has no right to call a witness who will, in fact, assert a valid privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury. Apfel v. State, 429 So. 2d 85, 86-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Faver v. State, 393 So. 2d 49, 50-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Moreover, we disagree that the witness herein waived his privilege against self-incrimination by testifying as part of a voir dire conducted outside the presence of the jury to determine the validity of the self-incrimination claim. See Lopez v. State, 349 So. 2d 1198, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1978).
The judgment of conviction and sentence under review is in all respects affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Cited By
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Campbell v. State, 577 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1991)…1990) (“Having control over a thing with the intent to have and to exercise such control.”). While the question of whether a defendant had dominion or control over contraband is generally a factual question for the jury, see, e.g., Carter v. State, 481 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1330 (Fla.1986); Brider, a judgment of acquittal is proper where there is no evidence from which dominion or control can be inferred. We agree with the Third District that such is the case where the defendant…
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Campbell v. State, 558 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…28 grams or more of cocaine as described in s. 893.03(2)(a)4. or of any mixture containing cocaine ... § 893.135(l)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). Actual possession is the dominion over and the ability to control the contraband in question. Carter v. State, 481 So. 2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 1986). Constructive possession is established by showing that (1) the defendant had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the contraband; (2) the defendant knew the contraban…1 / 2
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Smith v. State, 634 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…. denied, 584 So. 2d 998 (Fla.1991); Perez v. State, 561 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 576 So. 2d 289 (Fla.1990); Horner v. State, 558 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Bloodworth v. State, 504 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Carter v. State, 481 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1330 (Fla.1986).…
Authorities Cited
- Kunta Muwwakil v. State, 435 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Friday v. Millard Roberts, 393 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Apfel v. State, 429 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Lopez v. State, 349 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)