ANTHONY WAYNE GOODLING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed probation conditions imposed on an indigent defendant requiring restitution payment at a rate to be determined by a probation officer and repayment of public defender fees without a hearing. The court held that trial courts cannot delegate the responsibility to determine a defendant's ability to pay restitution and must provide a hearing before requiring repayment of public defender fees.
Both probation conditions are impermissible. Trial courts cannot delegate to probation officers the responsibility to determine a defendant's ability to pay restitution; the court must make this determination at sentencing. Additionally, due process requires a hearing with the opportunity to object before a court may require repayment of public defender fees.
[1] A trial court may not delegate its responsibility to determine a defendant's ability to pay restitution.
[2] The determination of a defendant's ability to pay restitution is a non-delegable judicial responsibility.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court may not delegate its responsibility to determine a defendant's ability to pay restitution.”
Establishes the core holding that probation officers cannot determine payment schedules based on future ability to pay.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnthony Wayne Goodling, an indigent defendant, was ordered to repay $5,365.90 as restitution over an eleven-year probation period. The trial court imp…
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PER CURIAM.
This appeal tests the propriety of two conditions of probation which were imposed after the trial court had determined that an indigent defendant should repay $5,365.90 as restitution during an eleven-year period of probation. The first condition mandated that restitution be made “in an amount and at a rate as determined by the probation officer.” The second condition required the defendant to repay the public defender for her services. In imposing this condition, the court stated, “[The public defender] will furnish a statement as to those costs.” Both conditions are impermissible and, accordingly, we reverse.
A trial court may not delegate its responsibility to determine a defendant’s ability to pay restitution. The rationale for this limitation was articulated in Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), where the court stated:
We must ... reverse that portion of the trial court’s order requiring the defendant to comply with a payment schedule to be formulated by the probation officer based upon the latter’s future determination of the defendant’s ability to pay all or a part of the restitution amount set by the court. At the restitution hearing, the court determined that the defendant did not have the present ability to pay any of the restitution amount ordered. There was nothing wrong with the court’s keeping the defendant “on the hook,” so to speak, for payment of the restitution at some appropriate period during the-term of his probation depending upon his ability to pay. However, just as the determination of the amount of restitution is a non-del-egable judicial responsibility, so also is the determination of the defendant’s ability to pay.
Id. at 976 (citations omitted).
Turning next to the condition which requires repayment of an unspecified sum for the public defender’s services, it is now clear that due process requires a hearing, with the opportunity to object, before the court may require the repayment of such fees. See Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984).
Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate the two conditions of probation in question and to take such further actions as may be consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
HERSEY, C.J., and ANSTEAD and HURLEY, JJ., concur.
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James v. State, 499 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…ution. Cf. Masslieno v. State, 498 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However, in order to avoid such error, the cause is remanded for the court to hold a prompt hearing to establish the amount and to amend the order accordingly. See Goodling v. State, 482 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); J.J.S. v. State, 465 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); and Hamm v. State, 403 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). SMITH, THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.…
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Tracy v. State, 673 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…order which he allegedly violated required him to pay costs at a rate per month to be determined “through the Department of Corrections.” The amount of restitution cannot be delegated by the court to a probation officer. See e.g., Goodling v. State, 482 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). That principle has been applied to costs and fees. Moore v. State, 623 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Second, because the order placing him on community control did not specify either a payment schedule or a time limit for payi…
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Anderson v. State, 549 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…between the ages of twelve and eighteen to engage in sexual activity with such child. . § 948.03(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1985); McCaskill v. State, 520 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); James v. State, 499 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Goodling v. State, 482 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). . Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959); cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); see also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985). . For example, on…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)