STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MARK LURUE IRVIN, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a suppression order that excluded contraband found during a traffic stop of Mark Irvin's vehicle. The court holds that the subjective intent of police officers is irrelevant to the validity of a stop; only the objective basis for the stop matters. Since the vehicle was validly stopped for speeding, the subsequent search incident to arrest was lawful despite the officers' possible intention to detain Irvin for drug-related questioning.
The court reverses the suppression order, holding that only the objective basis for police conduct matters, not the officers' subjective intent. Since Irvin was validly stopped for speeding and subsequently arrested for driving with a suspended license, the search incident to arrest was lawful regardless of officers' possible ulterior motives.
[1] The legality of police conduct is determined by the objective basis supporting the action, not the officer's subjective intent or belief.
[2] A traffic stop is valid if based on an observed violation, regardless of the officer's intent to investigate other potential offenses.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“only the objective basis which may support particular police conduct, rather than the officer's subjective intent or belief, is pertinent to determining the propriety of the action in question”
Establishes the core legal principle that governs evaluation of police conduct
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice stopped Mark Irvin's vehicle for traveling 70 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone. During the stop, officers discovered Irvin was driving…
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SCHWARTZ, A.R., Associate Judge.
It is an established principle that only the objective basis which may support particular police conduct, rather than the officer’s subjective intent or belief, is pertinent to determining the propriety of the action in question. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); Brezial v. State, 416 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. Perera, 412 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 419 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1982); Thomas v. State, 395 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
Thus, that the police may have wished or even intended to detain a suspect for another reason does not invalidate an apprehension which follows the commission of a traffic or other offense which would subject any member of the public to a similar detention.1 Bascoy v. State, 424 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Crummie v. State, 367 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); State v. Turner, 345 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State v. Holmes, 256 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971).
Applying these principles, we reverse the order under review which, on the finding that the officers would have (unjustifiably) detained the appellant driver for questioning on drug charges in any event, suppressed contraband found in the car after it was stopped for going 70 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone.2-3 See also Mahla v. State, 383 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 389 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.1980); TJrquhart v. State, 261 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971), cert. denied, 266 So. 2d 349 (Fla.1972).
The law rarely, if ever, ascribes consequences .to bad thoughts alone. In this situation, the officers’ putatively unlawful intentions, like the proverbial tree falling in the unoccupied forest, had no cognizable effect. Regardless of what they would have done, the police could validly have stopped the defendant only if he committed an illegal act. On the other hand, since Irvin in fact did so, he may not be excused from that misconduct merely because the officer might have arrested him anyway.4 Holmes.
REVERSED.
ORFINGER and COWART, JJ., concur. . See infra note 2.
. The apprehending officer testified, and there is otherwise no dispute that the extent of the excess speed was such that, in the formulation of the Holmes opinion, “any citizen would routinely be stopped” for the offense. (Emphasis added.) 256 So. 2d at 34. We thus need not decide whether the “objective basis” rule {see infra note 4) we apply here would also control if, as in the case of doing 56 on an interstate, one would not ordinarily be stopped but there is an appropriate basis upon which he lawfully could be.
. After the vehicle was pulled over, it was discovered that Irvin was driving with a suspended license and he was thereupon properly arrested for that crime. Our approval of the initial stop thus itself validates the search which uncovered the contraband as one properly undertaken incident to the arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).
Because of this, we do not pass on whether the search might have been sustained on other grounds suggested by the record, even if we agreed that the stop was ««justified. Specifically, we express no opinion as to whether an invalid stop would have tainted the express consent to search allegedly given by the owner of the vehicle, who was a passenger at the time; see Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1980); State v. Scott, 481 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); or whether, even if it did, Irvin had standing to challenge the validity of the consent. Cf., State v. Scott, supra.
. We have quite deliberately avoided putting the issue before us in the familiar terms of whether the stop was "pretextual” in nature. This is because we fully agree with Judge Mann’s views in Holmes that such an inquiry is not only essentially irrelevant to the proper ones, which are the existence and validity of any asserted objective grounds for the detention, cf. Diggs v. State, 345 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 679 (Fla.1977), but that even phrasing the question in that subtly pejorative fashion may skew the result.
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State v. Fernandez, 526 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…8 (1981). Moreover, since the officers almost immediately saw marijuana on the front seat, the search of the rest of the vehicle was also justified by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). . See State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), review denied, 491 So. 2d 279 (Fla.1986).…
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Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…only essentially irrelevant to the proper ones, which are the existence and validity of any asserted objective grounds for the detention, ... but that even phrasing the question in that subtly pejorative fashion may skew the result.” State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461, 463 at n. 4 (Fla. 5th DCA), pet. for rev. denied, 491 So. 2d 279 (Fla.1986). But even were we to agree with the legal principles espoused in Smith, the facts in this case are quite different. In Smith, the officer clearly intended to stop the car…
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Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…995 WL 72299 (6th Cir.1995) (upholding search incident to arrest for traffic violation); State v. Landry, 543 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (upholding search of vehicle and duffel bag after arrest for driving with suspended license); State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461, 463 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding initial stop for driving with suspended license validates search incident to arrest). Although Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004), presented the Supreme Court with…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (18 total)
- New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1981)
- Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980)
- Thomas v. State, 395 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- State v. Holmes, 256 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- Urquhart v. State, 261 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- State v. Barnabe I. Perera, 412 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Davies v. State, 345 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- State v. Scott, 481 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Bascoy v. State, 424 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)