ANN WESTON, APPELLANT,
v.
KYLE WESTON, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the court addresses whether a remarriage between former spouses nullifies both future child support obligations and arrearages accumulated under the prior dissolution judgment. The court held that while reconciliation terminates future support obligations, it does not extinguish arrearages already accrued.
While reconciliation terminates the obligation to pay future child support under the original judgment, it does not eliminate arrearages that accrued prior to the remarriage. The wife was entitled to a judgment for the $4,065 in child support owed as of July 1, 1984, despite the parties' agreement that reconciliation would have no effect.
[1] A subsequent marriage between parents who previously divorced does not extinguish the obligation to pay child support arrears that accrued prior to the remarriage.
[2] A provision in a property settlement agreement stating that reconciliation shall not affect its terms is operative with respect to pre-existing child support arrears, eve…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The subsequent marriage between the parties herein renders null and void all matters concerning child support, child custody and child support arrearages in connection with that certain Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage dated October 31,1980.”
The trial court's ruling that remarriage extinguished all child support obligations and arrearages, which the appellate court partially reversed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' first marriage was dissolved on October 31, 1980, with a judgment incorporating a property settlement agreement requiring the father to p…
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PER CURIAM.
The first marriage between the parties was dissolved on October 31, 1980. The judgment of dissolution incorporated a property settlement agreement which provided, inter alia, that the father pay certain weekly child support payments and that “[rjeconciliation shall not effect [sic] the provisions of this agreement .... ” When the parties remarried on July 1, 1984, the father owed $4,065 in child support. In 1985, the parties separated again; the wife, in a proceeding unrelated to her new petition for dissolution, moved for a judgment for the child support arrears and to have the husband held in contempt for his failure to pay. In an order dated August 16, 1985, the trial court denied the relief requested, finding that “[t]he subsequent marriage between the parties herein renders null and void all matters concerning child support, child custody and child support arrearages in connection with that certain Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage dated October 31,1980....” The wife appeals.
There is little question that, contrary to the wife’s contention, she was not entitled to continue to receive child support payments under the 1980 judgment after the parties remarried on July 1, 1984. Such reconciliation put an end to the husband’s responsibilities to further pay moneys pursuant to the 1980 judgment, see Weeks v. Weeks, 143 Fla. 686, 197 So. 393 (1940); Mills v. Mills, 460 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Zullo v. Zullo, 317 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), notwithstanding the parties’ agreement that reconciliation shall have no effect. In our view, however, the 1984 remarriage had no effect on the husband’s obligation to pay moneys already due under the 1980 judgment. The wife was thus entitled to a judgment for $4,065 in child support owed as of July 1, 1984, and, in this respect, the parties’ express agreement that reconciliation shall have no effect is fully operative.
The order of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects, including that part of the order denying the wife’s motion for contempt.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, with directions to enter judgment for the wife on account of child support arrears due as of July 1, 1984.
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COX v. Kimi Lea COX, 659 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1995)…otherwise); Delgado v. Cotta de Lopez, 546 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (concluding that the parties’ remarriage to each other rendered the elective-share waiver provision of a prior property settlement agreement unenforceable); Weston v. Weston, 483 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (concluding that a wife was not entitled to continue to receive child support under the terms of a prior property settlement agreement after the wife remarried her former husband); Zullo v. Zullo, 317 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…
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Thomas v. Randell D. Thomas, 571 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…60 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Zullo v. Zullo, 317 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), writ discharged, 342 So. 2d 77 (Fla.1977). The Delgado court noted “[t]his court has held that Weeks applies when the parties remarry each other, Weston v. Weston, 483 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Carter v. Carter, 309 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and that the Weeks rule is applicable when the property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution.” 546 So. 2d at 1076. Accordingly, the…
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Delgado v. de Lopez, 546 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…See also Mills v. Mills, 460 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Zullo v. Zullo, 317 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), writ discharged, 342 So. 2d 77 (Fla.1977). This court has held that Weeks applies when the parties remarry each other, Weston v. Weston, 483 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Carter v. Carter, 309 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and that the Weeks rule is applicable when the property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution. Weston. Applying these principles, we…
Authorities Cited
- Weeks v. Lotta N. Weeks, 143 Fla. 686 (Fla. 1940)
- Mills v. Mills, 460 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Harrington v. Harrington, 317 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Gertrude S. Zullo v. Zullo, 317 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)