PETER M. MASON, APPELLANT,
v.
LEONARD M. YARMUS AND EDITH L. YARMUS, APPELLEES
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Mason appealed a judgment against him for breach of an oral obligation to pay a debt. The court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations on an oral debt obligation does not begin to run until demand for payment is made and the debtor fails to pay.
The statute of limitations on an oral obligation to pay a debt on demand does not accrue until demand for payment has been made and the debtor fails to pay. No cause of action arises before there is a breach, which occurs only after demand and non-payment.
[1] A cause of action on an obligation to pay a debt on demand does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until demand for payment has been made a…
[2] The accrual of a cause of action on a contract occurs upon the breach of that contract.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a cause of action on a contract accrues upon breach of the contract”
Establishes the fundamental principle that limits when a statute of limitations begins to run—only upon breach, not upon formation of the contract.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMason entered into an oral agreement to pay a debt. A demand for payment was made, and Mason failed to pay. The trial court entered judgment against M…
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LEHAN, Acting Chief Judge.
We affirm the final judgment against defendant for breach of an oral obligation to pay a debt on demand.
We agree with the trial court that the cause of action in this case did not accrue, and the statute of limitations on the obligation did not begin, until there had been a demand for payment and a failure by the debtor to pay. Although it appears that there is no Florida case law in point, we see no difference in principle or policy between this situation and the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, section 673.122, Florida Statutes (1983), which was enacted in 1977 as an amendment to prior law, that a cause of action on a note accrues as provided in section 95.031(1), which provides that the cause of action accrues upon written demand. See Ruhl v. Perry, 390 So. 2d 353 (Fla.1980); Jones v. Rainey, 386 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Indeed, the 1977 amendment appears to have made the statute consistent with the principle that a cause of action on a contract accrues upon breach of the contract. See Fradley v. Dade County, 187 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). There was no breach in this case of the oral contract to pay the debt until the creditor had made demand for payment and the debtor did not pay.
We acknowledge that there is apparently case law in other jurisdictions to the contrary. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.4th 1385 (1982). But we decline to accept appellant’s well-presented argument that the cause of action accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, on the date the obligation arose. At that time there was no obligation by the debtor to pay and, therefore, no breach by the debtor of the obligation and, therefore, no accrual of a cause of action against the debtor. Affirmed.
FRANK and HALL, JJ., concur.
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Dickie E. Murphy and Marsha Murphy v. Tucker, 689 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…ve appealed that judgment and the lower court’s award of attorney’s fees to Judy Tucker. We hold that the trial court did not err in applying the provisions of section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1995), to the facts of the case. See Mason v. Yarmus, 483 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment in favor of Ms. Tucker. We hold, however, that the trial court erred in entering its order granting Ms. Tucker’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, based on her offer of judgment. The…
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The Sw. Fla. Ret. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 682 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…therefore timely filed within the five-year limitation period. 574 So. 2d at 286. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 678 So. 2d 818 (Fla.1996); Roth v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Mason v. Yarmus, 483 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Pinellas County, 195 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Fradley v. County of Dade, 187 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). [*1135] We reverse the judgment on the pleadings and remand t…
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Anderson v. Mosher, 758 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…ime analogous to the statute of limitations, and, as to the loans in which the demand was beyond that period, the claims were barred. DeSouza v. DeSouza, 708 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The creditor argues that we should follow Mason v. Yarmus, 483 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), which also involved an oral loan to be repaid on demand. Although there was no written instrument, the second district relied on Uniform Commercial Code(UCC) law to the effect that “a cause of action on a note accrues ... upon wr…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fradley v. Cnty. OF Dade, 187 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Ruhl v. Perry, 390 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1980)
- Jones v. Odessa Rainey and Phil Gotti, 386 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)