THEODORE A. ROSA, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA COAST BANK, APPELLEE
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In this appeal from a directed verdict, Rosa challenged a bank's refusal to allow assumption of his mortgage at the original interest rate after initially indicating willingness to permit assumption. The court reversed the judgment setting aside the jury verdict on breach of contract, finding sufficient evidence for jury consideration, while affirming the dismissal of the tortious interference claim.
The court reversed the directed verdict dismissing the breach of contract claim, holding that reasonable people could differ on whether the Bank's communications constituted a binding agreement or promissory estoppel, making the matter properly triable to a jury. The court affirmed dismissal of the tortious interference claim because the Bank's conduct lacked the requisite direct and intentional interference element and constituted a breach of contract rather than an independent tort.
[1] A directed verdict is only proper when the record contains no evidence upon which a jury could lawfully find for the plaintiff.
[2] A jury verdict should not be disturbed if reasonable people could differ as to the facts and inferences presented.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A directed verdict can only be granted when it is apparent that there is no evidence in the record on which a jury could lawfully find for the Plaintiff.”
Establishes the standard for when directed verdicts are permissible and forms the basis for the court's analysis of whether the trial court erred in setting aside the jury verdicts.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRosa owned dental practice premises with an assumed mortgage containing a Due On Sale clause. He contacted Florida Coast Bank to determine assumption …
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FEDER, RICHARD YALE, Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from a Final Judgment granting the defendant Bank’s Motion for Judgment in accordance with its Motion for Directed Verdict and setting aside the Judgment entered following the jury verdicts. The jury returned two separate verdicts in favor of Appellant with respect to Appellant’s claims for (a) Breach of Contract, and (b) Intentional Interference with an Advantageous Business Relationship.
This Court affirms the judgment setting aside the verdict on Intentional Interference and reverses the judgment setting aside the verdict on Breach of Contract.
Appellant was the owner of premises where he conducted an active dental practice. In order to know the terms he could offer a prospective purchaser, Appellant contacted the Bank to determine if the mortgage he had assumed when he purchased the property could be assumed by his purchaser. The mortgage contained a Due On Sale clause which provided that the mortgage would be in default if the premises were sold unless the Bank agreed to an assumption. The Bank responded by forwarding a Mortgage Information Statement which outlined the charge for an assumption and defined the conditions under which an assumption would be granted as: “Buyers must complete a commercial property loan application and be qualified by the bank.” Testimony of the bank officials corroborated that the Bank was willing to have the mortgage assumed and had communicated its willingness to the Appellant. There was no dispute that the buyers could meet the necessary qualifications.
The Appellant found the Buyers and a binding contract was entered into calling for assumption of the existing 9Va% mortgage. While the matter was proceeding, the Appellant closed his office and moved to Kansas. Suddenly the Bank advised that it had changed its policy (no doubt due to the decision holding Due On Sale clauses enforceable) and it would not permit an assumption of the mortgage except at 13% interest. The Appellant, in order to avoid a cancellation of the sale, had to alter the financial arrangements of the sale to his detriment.
A directed verdict can only be granted when it is apparent that there is no evidence in the record on which a jury could lawfully find for the Plaintiff. Stenback v. Racing Associates, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Appellant, raises sufficient facts and inferences therefrom of which reasonable people could differ as to Breach of Contract and Promissory Estoppel. See Southeastern Sales & Service Co. v. T.T. Watson, Inc., 172 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Since reasonable people could differ, the matter was properly before the jury and their verdict should not be disturbed. Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc., 160 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
As to the second verdict, the Trial Court was eminently correct in setting aside the jury verdict. One of the essential elements of a claim for intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship is that the interference be both direct and intentional. Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) cert. denied 452 U.S. 955, 101 S.Ct. 3099, 69 L.Ed.2d 965 (1981); Wackenhut Corporation v. Maimone, 389 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The record is barren of any such direct, intentional interference. In any event, the Bank’s actions did not amount to an independent tort separate from the breach of contract claim. Country Club of Miami Corporation v. McDaniel, 310 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
The matter is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part with directions to reinstate the Verdict and Judgment as to Count I on the Breach of Contract claim.
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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McCURDY v. J.C. Collis & Exxon Corp., 508 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…So. 2d at 1128. It is clear, however, that “the interference must be both direct and intentional.” (emphasis supplied). Lawler v. Eugene Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital Association, 497 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Rosa v. Florida Coast Bank, 484 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). As the supreme court made clear in Tamiami Trail Tours, the relationship at issue need not be evidenced by an enforceable contract. Thus, an action will lie where, as in the instant case, a party tor-tiously interferes with a c…
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GNB, Inc. v. United Danco Batteries, Inc., 627 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…hat the interference must be direct. McCurdy v. Collis, 508 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.1987); Ethyl Corp.; Lawler v. Wuesthoff Memorial Hosp. Ass’n, 497 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Rosa v. Florida Coast Bank, 484 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). I emphasize this requirement because the extensive record in this case contains little proof that GNB directly contacted or otherwise attempted to directly influence any of Daneo’s customers or suppliers. [*494] This dissent wil…1 / 2
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Tanfield C. Miller and Helen A. Miller v. Bruce S. Selden, M.D., 591 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…dants; and, (3) damage to plaintiff as a result of the breach of the business relationship. Fort Lauderdale Riverwalk Properties, Inc. v. White, 531 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.1989); Rosa v. Florida Coast Bank, 484 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1371 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 955, 101 S.Ct. 3099, 69 L.Ed.2d 965 (1981); Insurance Field Servs. Inc. v. White & White Inspection and Audit…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Politis v. Gen. Hotel & Rest. Supply Corp., 386 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Balter v. Ethyl Corp., 452 U.S. 955 (U.S. 1981)
- Wackenhut Corp. v. Maimone, 389 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc., 160 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Se. Sales & Serv. Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc., 172 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Country Club OF Miami Corp. v. McDANIEL, 310 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Stenback v. Racing Assocs., Inc., 394 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)