JAMES REAVES, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court vacated its jurisdiction and dismissed Reaves's petition, holding that while the district court correctly applied law regarding impeachment use of Miranda-suppressible statements, there was no direct and express conflict with precedent sufficient to support the Court's initial assertion of jurisdiction.
The district court correctly held that Miranda-suppressible statements may be used for impeachment purposes, consistent with Harris v. New York and Oregon v. Hass. However, the Court dismissed the petition because no direct and express conflict with Nowlin appears within the four corners of the majority district court decision.
[1] A defendant's prior inconsistent statement, even if obtained without Miranda warnings, may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility when the defendant testifies at…
[2] A trial court's failure to determine the voluntariness of a pre-trial statement used for impeachment purposes is not reversible error if the statement is admissible under the Harris v. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Conflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision. Neither a dissenting opinion nor the record itself can be used to establish jurisdiction.”
Establishes the strict standard for conflict jurisdiction under Florida Constitution Article V, section 3(b)(3)
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReaves was arrested following a lethal stabbing. He initially invoked his Miranda right to remain silent but then agreed to talk with a second officer…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
We accepted jurisdiction of Reaves v. State, 458 So. 2d 53 (Fla.3d DCA 1984), based on asserted conflict with Nowlin v. State, 346 So. 2d 1020 (Fla.1977).
Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. On closer examination, it is clear that there is no direct and express conflict and that review was impro-videntially granted. The facts of the case are drawn from the district court opinion below. When first arrested following a lethal stabbing, petitioner received and invoked his Miranda1 right to remain silent. When approached by a second officer shortly thereafter, petitioner agreed to talk and made several inculpatory admissions. Thereafter, petitioner received additional Miranda warnings enroute to and upon arrival at the police station and made another statement after the latter (fourth) Miranda warning.
The trial court suppressed the statements as involuntary and the state was not permitted to use them in its case-in-chief.
However, at trial, petitioner took the stand and testified contrary to the admissions he had made to the second police officer. Upon motion of the state, the trial court ruled that its earlier use of “involuntary” in suppressing the statements had been inadvertent and that the statements had been suppressed because the police had violated Miranda by persisting in their questioning after petitioner invoked his Miranda rights.
Accordingly, the state was permitted to use the suppressed admissions to the second police officer to impeach petitioner’s trial testimony.2 The district court reviewed the record, recited the facts it found pertinent, and held that the admissions were voluntary, even though suppressible under Miranda from use in the casein-chief, and that the trial court did not err in permitting their use in impeachment. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1974).
The district court decision correctly states and applies the law based on the facts given.3 However, in dissent, Judge Hendry canvassed the record and concluded, contrary to the majority, that the statements were in fact involuntary and could not be used in impeachment. Petitioner is asking that we find conflict with Nowlin. In order to do so, it would be necessary for us either to accept the dissenter’s view of the evidence and his conclusion that the statements were involuntary, or to review the record itself in order to resolve the disagreement in favor of the dissenter. Neither course of action is available under the jurisdiction granted by article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Conflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision. Neither a dissenting opinion nor the record itself can be used to establish jurisdiction. See Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.1980), where we examined at length the effect of the 1980 constitutional amendment on our conflict jurisdiction.
Having determined that there is no direct and express conflict, we deny the petition for review.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., concurs in result only.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
.
Petitioner claimed defense of others and testified at trial that he stabbed the victim in order to prevent him from harming a third person. This was contrary to his admission that he killed decedent in a fit of anger. . This case illustrates a common error made in preparing jurisdictional briefs based on alleged decisional conflict. The only facts relevant to our decision to accept or reject such petitions are those facts contained within the four corners of the decisions allegedly in conflict. As we explain in the text above, we are not permitted to base our conflict jurisdiction on a review of the record or on facts recited only in dissenting opinions.
Thus, it is pointless and misleading to include a comprehensive recitation of facts not appearing in the decision below, with citations to the record, as petitioner provided here. Similarly, voluminous appendices are normally not relevant.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2014)…of the Florida Constitution requires that the decision on [*96] review “actually ‘expressly and directly1 conflict[ ]” with a decision from this Court or another district court. State v. Vickery, 961 So. 2d 309, 312 (Fla.2007); see Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986) (“Conflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision.”). That is, the courts must reach opposite holdings based on the same or closely similar controlling fact…
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Linn v. Basil D. Fossum, M.D., 946 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2006)…the majority relies upon Judge Kahn’s dissent. Majority op. at 1036. This is contrary to the repeated holdings of this Court that conflict must be determined within the four corners of the district court’s majority decision. Reaves [*1042] v. State, 485 So. 2d 829 (Fla.1986). The majority here fails to explain how my recitation of the First District’s issue was incorrect and not based on the four corners of the district court’s majority decision. This Court’s majority opinion only cites to what the district c…
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Rodrigo Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2005)…stion of law.” (Emphasis added.) In order for this Court to exercise its conflict jurisdiction under this provision, the conflict must be express and direct and contained within the four corners of the opinion sought to be reviewed. Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829 (Fla.1986). In this case, there is no express and direct conflict between Aguilera and Sibley because the cases concern two different questions of law. In Aguilera, the Third District expressly held that “the allegations in the present case are insu…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (U.S. 1971)
- Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (U.S. 1954)
- Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (U.S. 1975)
- Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980)
- Nowlin v. State, 346 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1977)
- In the Interest of S. L. M., 346 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1977)
- Reaves v. State, 458 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)