MICHAEL W. HARRELL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Harrell was convicted of a crime and appealed, challenging his right to self-representation with standby counsel, Fifth Amendment issues, expert testimony, jury instructions, and sentencing. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentences on all grounds.
The court affirmed Harrell's conviction and sentences. The Faretta and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure requirements were satisfied by the trial court's inquiry and provision of standby counsel. Harrell suffered no deprivation of rights from self-representation with standby counsel. His Fifth Amendment claim was not properly preserved. Any expert testimony error was harmless given overwhelming evidence. The flight instruction and conviction were supported by sufficient evidence. The consecutive life sentences were properly imposed.
[1] A trial court satisfies the requirements of Faretta v. …
[2] A defendant is not deprived of any right by representing himself with the assistance of standby counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The continuous presence of standby counsel served as a constant reminder to Harrell of his right to counsel.”
Establishes that the trial court's provision of standby counsel satisfied Faretta requirements and Florida procedural rules.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarrell was permitted to represent himself at trial with standby counsel provided by the public defender's office. He frequently conferred with standb…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm Harrell’s conviction upon the following, briefly stated, legal analysis. (1) Prior to trial, the court conducted an inquiry in accordance with the standards established by the United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The public defender’s office was ordered to provide Harrell with standby counsel. In fact, Harrell did confer frequently with standby counsel, and standby counsel participated in the defense at trial.
We conclude that, under these circumstances, the requirements of both Faretta and the provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5) were satisfied. The continuous presence of standby counsel served as a constant reminder to Harrell of his right to counsel.1 (2) Harrell was not deprived of any right as a result of the trial court’s decision to allow Harrell to represent himself together with standby counsel. See Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984); see also Thomas v. State, 370 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1203 (Fla.1980). (3) Harrell’s claim that his fifth amendment rights were violated was not properly preserved for review. See Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1978). (4) The admission of certain “expert” testimony, if erroneous, was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. See Jones, 449 So. 2d at 262-63; Grala v. State, 414 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). (5) The evidence was sufficient to support the giving of the instruction on flight. See Hargrett v. State, 255 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). (6) The evidence was more than sufficient to support the judgment and conviction. See Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d 964 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2257, 72 L.Ed.2d 862, reh’g denied, 458 U.S. 1116, 102 S.Ct. 3500, 73 L.Ed.2d 1378 (1982); Castro v. State, 472 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also Kaufman v. State, 429 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). (7) And, finally, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive life sentences. Consecutive mandatory minimum sentences were not imposed in the instant case, and, therefore, Palmer v. State, 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1983), is inapplicable.
The judgments of conviction and sentences entered thereon are, accordingly, affirmed.
. In Sampson v. State, 466 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), a case relied upon by Harrell, the defendant was not provided with standby counsel. In addition, unlike in Sampson, where the defendant was reported to be "functioning intellectually at the borderline of mental defectiveness,” the record reflects that Harrell is very intelligent and sophisticated in legal matters.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Knight v. State, 770 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2000)…ht willingly accepted Mr. Sosa as standby counsel and consistently relied upon him. Standby counsel is a constant reminder to a self-representing defendant of his right to court-appointed counsel at any stage of the proceeding. See Harrell v. State, 486 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); see also McCarthy v. State, 731 So. 2d 778, 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Mincey v. State, 684 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Accordingly, Knight’s claim that the court erred by not renewing the offer of court-appointed counsel…
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Mincey v. State, 684 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…t, if appellant changed his mind and again wanted appointed counsel, all he had to do was ask. Appellant clearly understood this. In addition, appellant relied on standby counsel extensively, before, during and after the trial. See Harrell v. State, 486 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (holding frequent use of standby counsel by defendant sufficient to serve as constant reminder of right to counsel). Finally, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming. Our supreme court has told us “that constitutional…
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Bloodsaw v. State, 949 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…670 (Fla.2000), “[S]tandby counsel is a constant reminder to a self-representing defendant of his right to court-appointed counsel at any stage of the proceeding.” See also Mincey v. State, 684 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Harrell v. State, 486 So. 2d 7, 7-8 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253, 258 (Fla.1984). Additionally, Bloodsaw’s waiver at the pretrial hearing at which the trial court appointed standby counsel was knowing and intelligent. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct.…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (15 total)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978)
- Dean v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983)
- Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1981)
- Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Swedberg, 456 U.S. 984 (U.S. 1982)
- Jacks v. Duckworth, 456 U.S. 984 (U.S. 1982)
- Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1984)
- Grala v. State, 414 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Hargrett v. State, 255 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Alcides Castro v. State, 472 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)