AL MANCUSO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES SCULLY, SUPERINTENDENT, GREEN HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ROBERT ABRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF KINGS COUNTY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

2d Cir. | 1987-04-30
Nos. 1025, Docket 86-2451
Before KAUFMAN, MESKILL and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges.
818 F.2d 1 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that a federal habeas petition containing unexhausted claims must be dismissed entirely, even if other claims have been previously adjudicated.


Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief, raising two issues: one based on an intervening Supreme Court decision and another regarding jury inst…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM:

In Mancuso v. Harris, 677 F. 2d 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019, 103 S.Ct. 382, 74 L.Ed.2d 514 (1982), we held that the jury instructions at petitioner-appellant’s New York criminal trial for felony murder did not violate Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). Accordingly, we reversed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus by the district court.

Thereafter, petitioner-appellant commenced new federal habeas proceedings, contending that: (1) the intervening decision in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), required reconsideration of the Sandstrom issue; and (2) a jury instruction that permitted the jury to impute the intent of one co-felon to all co-felons was unconstitutional. The district court reached the merits of both issues, and held that both were foreclosed by our prior decision.

The second issue, however, has never been exhausted in the state courts. Petitioner-appellant explicitly conceded in his brief to this court on the prior appeal that this issue was unexhausted.1 There have been no state court proceedings since then. Accordingly, the claim is not ripe for adjudication in the federal courts.

Under those circumstances, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), requires that the entire petition be dismissed without consideration of its merits. See Petrucelli v. Coombe, 735 F. 2d 684, 687 (2d Cir.1984).

We therefore vacate the decision of the district court and remand with directions to dismiss the petition without prejudice for lack of exhaustion.

. Confronted with this fact on oral argument, present counsel for petitioner-appellant took the position that this concession had been erroneous. Assuming without deciding that the question is open to re-examination now, we disagree. Petitioner-appellant’s generalized request to the New York Court of Appeals to "clarify the area of ‘intent’ in a jury charge” was insufficient to fairly present to that court the point sought to be raised here. See generally Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F. 2d 186, 191-92 (2d Cir.1982) (en banc).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw