ROBERT PAUL PATTERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Patterson appealed his conviction and sentencing for manslaughter by reckless driving, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing a split sentence (7 years prison + 3 years probation totaling 10 years) that exceeded the sentencing guidelines maximum. The court affirmed, finding the error harmless because amended guidelines effective after sentencing would have permitted such a sentence.
The court affirmed the sentence, finding that although the trial court erred in departing from the guidelines without meeting formal requirements and providing clear and convincing reasons, the error was harmless because the guidelines were amended on July 1, 1984, to permit split sentences where the total sanction does not exceed the maximum sentence under general law, and Patterson's ten-year sentence complies with the current guidelines.
[1] A trial court departs from sentencing guidelines when the total sanction imposed, including probation, exceeds the maximum recommended guideline range.
[2] A departure from sentencing guidelines requires formal compliance with procedural requirements and justification by clear and convincing reasons.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial judge clearly departed from the guidelines sentence... the total sanction of ten years (seven years of prison followed by three years of probation) exceeded the seven-year maximum recommended guidelines sentence.”
Establishes the core sentencing error: the split sentence exceeded the guideline maximum in effect at the time of sentencing.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatterson was charged with violating section 782.071, Florida Statutes, for recklessly operating an automobile resulting in death. He pled guilty to t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Split Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
BOARDMAN, EDWARD F„ Associate Judge (Retired).
The opinion of this court filed on January 22, 1986, is withdrawn and the following opinion substituted in its place.
The appellee, the State of Florida, in its motion for rehearing alleges that our original opinion overlooked the decision rendered by our supreme court in State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.1985). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The information alleged that the appellant violated section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1975), by recklessly operating an automobile resulting in the death of another human being. The appellant pled guilty to manslaughter-D.W.I., and was convicted of that lesser charge. The court sentenced Patterson to seven years’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ probation. Patterson’s guidelines score fell within the recommended guidelines range of three to seven years' imprisonment.
The trial judge clearly departed from the guidelines sentence. In February, 1984, the date the defendant committed the crime, the sentencing guidelines proscribed the imposition of a split sentence (a combination of state prison and probation supervision) the total sanction of which exceeded the maximum guideline range. See Committee Note to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(12); Tisdale v. State, 475 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, No. 67,787 (Fla. Feb. 6,1986); Hurst v. State, 474 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Here, the total sanction of ten years (seven years of prison followed by three years of probation) exceeded the seven-year maximum recommended guidelines sentence.
The trial court erred when it departed from the recommended guidelines sentence because it did not meet the formal requirements for departing from the guidelines, see Boynton v. State, 473 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th DCA), approved, 478 So. 2d 351 (Fla.1985); nor did it justify its departure from the guidelines by clear and convincing reasons. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(ll).
Ordinarily, having found a sentencing error, we would reverse and remand for new sentencing. However, upon resentencing, the trial judge would be required to use a scoresheet prepared in accordance with the guidelines now in effect, not the guidelines in effect at the time the sentence was originally imposed in this case. See State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.1985); Boston v. State, 481 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).1 On July 1, 1984, the supreme court amended the guidelines. The current committee note to section 3.701(d)(12) provides that when a split sentence is imposed “[T]he incarcerative portion imposed shall not be less than the minimum of the guideline range nor exceed the maximum of the range. The total sanction (incarceration and probation) shall not exceed the term provided by general law.” Committee Note, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(12); see The Florida Bar Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (3.701-3.988 — Sentencing Guidelines), 451 So. 2d 824 (Fla.1984). The appellant’s ten-year sentence is not a departure sentence under the present guidelines because the maximum sentence under general law for a second degree felony is fifteen years. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1983). Therefore, under the circumstances, we conclude that the error was harmless. See Boston v. State, 481 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
AFFIRMED.
DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur. . We construe the holding of our supreme court in Jackson to be applicable here. Other courts uniformly support our position. We point out that two of our sister courts have expressed concern over the breadth of Jackson. See Carter v. State, 483 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), and Wilkerson v. State, 480 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). (both courts certified to the Florida Supreme Court the issue of whether guidelines amendments, though they are considered procedural in nature, should be applied at the time of sentencing without regard to the ex post facto doctrine). By this opinion, we also certify the above question, as applied to the facts in the instant case, as one of great public importance.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Woodie v. Campbell, 960 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…(Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (reversing the appellant’s conviction for direct criminal contempt because the judge did not hear the appellant call him a son-of-a-bitch; only the bailiff brought the appellant’s comment to the court’s attention); Payne v. State, 486 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (reversing a direct criminal contempt conviction when the judge heard a one-word expletive, not the alleged comment which two witnesses claimed to have heard). Additionally, “[cjriminal contempt requires some willful act or omis…
-
Davila v. State, 100 So. 3d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…uttered a short profanity that was not heard by the judge, it did not interrupt any proceeding, and it was clear that the administration of justice was not hindered because the court moved on to the next case without hesitation.2 See Payne v. State, 486 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (reversing a direct criminal contempt conviction when the judge heard a one-word expletive, not the alleged comment which two witnesses claimed to have heard); Barr v. State, 334 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (reversing contempt…
-
Patterson v. State, 513 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1987)…7): WHETHER ALL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENTS ARE TO BE CONSIDERED PROCEDURAL IN NATURE SO THAT THE GUIDELINES AS MOST RECENTLY AMENDED SHALL BE APPLIED AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING WITHOUT REGARD TO THE EX POST FACTO DOCTRINE. Patterson v. State, 486 So. 2d 74, 76 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). We approved the result of the district court’s opinion, finding that, on the authority of Jackson, we had answered the certified question in the affirmative in Wilkerson. Patterson v. State, 499 So. 2d 831 (Fla.), vaca…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1985)
- THE Fla. BAR: Amendment to Rules of Crim. Procedure (3.701, 451 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1984)
- Boynton v. State, 473 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- State v. Boynton, 478 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1985)
- Carter v. State, 483 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- McKISSICK v. Bilger, 480 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Boston v. State, 481 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Hurst v. State, 474 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Tisdale v. State, 475 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)