WILLIAM BOYD TUCKER, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

v.

RALPH KEMP, WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION CENTER, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Presnell v. Kemp, 835 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988)
  …d, petitioner’s second argument, that his claim was novel at the time of his first state habeas petition, provided the basis for the district court’s grant of habeas relief. We are not persuaded, however, that the claim was novel. In Tucker v. Kemp, 819 F. 2d 978 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam), the petitioner made the same argument in an attempt to justify his successive federal petition which, the state contended, had been filed in violation of Rule 9(b), Fed.R. Governing Sec. 2254 Cases. We concluded: The d…
• Gunn v. Lanson Newsome, 881 F.2d 949 (11th Cir. 1989)
  …seled when he prosecuted his prior habeas petition, his failure to raise the Franklin/Sandstrom claim would constitute an abuse of the writ, unless he were able to present some other “justifiable reason” for omitting the claim. E.g., Tucker v. Kemp, 819 F. 2d 978 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1073, 107 S.Ct. 2472, 96 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987).” The court has discovered that a petitioner’s pro se or counseled status is crucial.2 [*968] In so doing, the court comes to the rather astonishing conclusion that…

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• Richardson v. Thigpen, 883 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1989)
  …d no excuse for his failure to present the Hitchcock claim in his amended first federal habeas petition. Consequently, we conclude that Richardson has abused the writ by failing to present this claim in his prior petition. See, e.g., Tucker v. Kemp, 819 F. 2d 978 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1073, 107 S.Ct. 2472, 96 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). See generally Demps v. Dugger, 874 F. 2d at 1391. When a petitioner has abused the writ, a federal court should dismiss the petition unless the “ends of justice” requi…