KEYES INVESTORS SERIES 20, LTD., APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, APPELLEE
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Keyes Investors Series 20, Ltd. challenged the Department of State's authority to impose a filing fee on an amendment to its certificate of limited partnership. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the Department's order, holding that the Department had statutory authority under Florida law to charge such fees.
The Department of State was empowered to impose a filing fee on the amendment because Section 620.02(2)(b) expressly authorized filing fees for papers "provided for" by Chapter 620, and Section 620.24(2) required that certificates of limited partnership be amended when specified changes were made, making the amendment a document "provided for" by Chapter 620.
[1] The Department of State is empowered to impose a filing fee upon receipt of an amendment to a certificate of limited partnership if the amendment is a document provided f…
[2] A subsequent amendment to a statute that provides a more explicit fee schedule does not necessarily indicate a lack of authority under the prior statute.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since section 620.02(2)(b) expressly authorized a filing fee as to papers "provided for" by Chapter 620, we conclude that the Department of State was empowered to impose such a fee in the present case.”
This establishes the core holding that the Department had authority to charge the filing fee based on the plain language of the statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1982, Keyes Investors filed an amendment to its certificate of limited partnership deleting a provision regarding removal of the individual general…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of an administrative order which determined that the Department of State was empowered to impose a filing fee upon receipt of appellant’s amendment to its certificate of limited partnership. We affirm the order appealed.
Appellant asserts that when it filed an amendment to its certificate of limited partnership in 1982, deleting a provision regarding the removal of the individual general partner, the Department of State lacked authority to impose a filing fee. Section 620.02(2), Florida Statutes, as then effective, provided that:
The fees of the Department of State under this chapter shall be as follows:
(b) For receiving, filing and indexing certificates, statements, affidavits, decrees or any other papers provided for by this chapter, a filing fee in each case to be paid at the time of first filing....
Section 620.24(2) required that a certificate of limited partnership be amended if a change were made with regard to a statement in the certificate. As appellant’s petition for an administrative hearing conceded, the amendment to its certificate of limited partnership was thus a document “provided for” by Chapter 620, Florida Statutes. Since section 620.02(2)(b) expressly authorized a filing fee as to papers “provided for” by Chapter 620, we conclude that the Department of State was empowered to impose such a fee in the present case.1
As appellant notes, section 620.-02(2) was subsequently amended so as to provide a schedule of filing charges for specified documents including certificates of amendment. Appellant argues that this legislative action evidences a lack of such authority under the earlier statute. But as Ocala Breeder Sales Co. Inc. v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Department of Business Regulation, 464 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), indicates, a change in statutory language does not always embody an intent to change the law, and will sometimes merely effect a clarification of existing authority. We find the statutory change in the present case to be a clarifying and organizational amendment, providing a more explicit fee schedule, consistent with the Department’s existing statutory authority to impose filing fees as to documents “provided for” by Chapter 620. We thus conclude that the subsequent amendment does not evidence any lack of such authority under the earlier statute.
The order appealed is affirmed.
BOOTH, C.J., and SMITH, J., concur. . The Department’s interpretation of the law is consistent with its long-standing position, and as such is entitled to be given great weight by a reviewing court. Cf., Walker v. State Department of Transportation, 366 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 541 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…ory change of language does not necessarily indicate an intent to change the law, for the intent may be to clarify what was doubtful and to safeguard against misapprehension as to existing law. Keyes Investors Series 20, Ltd. v. Department of State, 487 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Ocala Breeder Sales Co. v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Department of Business Regulation, 464 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). In view of the statements made contemporaneously with the enactment of this amendment…
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Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. P.H., 659 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…ubsequent clarifying language ought not be read as evidence of a lack of authority to grant a petition for [*1378] dependency based upon the conduct of one parent under the earlier statute. See Keyes Investors Series 20, Ltd. v. Department of State, 487 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The underlying facts in this case demonstrate that such a construction gives effect to the plain meaning of the language used by the legislature. The mother, P.H., has never been married to either father of her children, an…
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Deason v. State, 688 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…nt of Corrections, be released under supervision subject to specified terms and conditions, ... We conclude that this amendment was likely intended to clarify, rather than change, the law. See Keyes Investors Series 20, Ltd. v. Department of State, 487 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In light of the above, we hold that a person subject to habitualized sentencing in 1990, as now, is eligible for conditional release under the terms of section 947.1405(2), regardless of the status of the conviction itself…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lyman Walker, III v. State, 366 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Ocala Breeder Sales Co., Inc. v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 464 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)