DARRYL PIERCE BURROW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1986-04-16
No. 85-940
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
487 So. 2d 77 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1986) Negative Treatment
Cited by 16 cases
Topics
Assessment Of Costs Indigent Defendants

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Opinion of the Court
DANAHY, Judge.

DANAHY, Judge.

In this Anders1 appeal we find no reversible error and therefore affirm appellant’s judgments and sentences. Nevertheless, we do find error in the assessment of costs entered against appellant in his judgments.

In each judgment appellant was ordered to pay $10 pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1983) (Crimes Compensation Trust Fund) and $2 pursuant to section 943.25(4), Florida Statutes (1983) (Law Enforcement Training and Correctional Officer Training Trust Funds). Of course, these costs may properly be taxed against an indigent defendant, as appellant is, upon due notice and hearing. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). However, in this case, appellant was given no opportunity to be heard and object to the assessment of these costs. Consequently, we strike that part of each judgment assessing payment of these costs and remand for a hearing in accordance with the requirements of Jenkins if costs are to be reassessed. The judgments and sentences are, in all other respects, affirmed.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur. . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Stone v. State, 500 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
    …out notice or a hearing. Stone was declared indigent four months prior to the imposition of the sentence. As an indigent, he should have been afforded a hearing before costs were imposed. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984); Burrow v. State, 487 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). We reverse the trial court’s imposition of costs pursuant to these sections and remand for a hearing in accordance with Jenkins. Stone’s third point on appeal is that section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985), as applied to him v…
  • Campbell v. State, 517 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …d does not reflect that the judge imposed these costs at sentencing, nor that Campbell was given [*698] notice as required by Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). See also Thompson v. State, 508 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Burrow v. State, 487 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). We therefore strike the costs without prejudice to the state in accordance with Jenkins. We have considered Campbell’s remaining argument that imposition of the $50,000 mandatory fine pursuant to section 893.135(l)(c)l is uncons…
  • Dilla v. State, 503 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …o sections 27.-3455. Dilla’s third point on appeal, trial court erred in assessing court costs against him without prior notice, also has merit. Costs may properly be taxed against an indigent defendant upon due notice and hearing. Burrow v. State, 487 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Lawton at 406; Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). However, in this case, Dilla was given no opportunity to be heard and to object to the assessment of these costs. Consequently, we strike that part of the judgment asses…

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