GERTRUDE GROSS, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF WILTON MANORS, STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The registered owner of a vehicle used in a robbery appealed its forfeiture by claiming she did not know or should not have known the vehicle would be used for criminal activity. The court affirmed the forfeiture, finding substantial evidence that the owner knew of her son's drug problems and criminal propensities yet gave him total use of the vehicle for two months before the robbery.
The court held that forfeiture was proper. Although the owner claimed ignorance, the trial court could credit evidence that she knew of her son's drug problem and criminal propensities, yet gave him total use of the vehicle for two months before the robbery, which negated her claim that she did not know the vehicle would be used for criminal purposes.
[1] A registered owner seeking to prevent vehicle forfeiture must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they did not know, or should not have known after reasonable…
[2] A vehicle owner's knowledge of a driver's drug problem and untrustworthiness, coupled with granting the driver unrestricted use of the vehicle, can support a finding that…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“she 'knew he had his drug problem and [she] knew that [she] couldn't trust him, so [she] couldn't give him permission to use the car all the time.'”
The mother's admission of knowledge regarding her son's criminal propensities, establishing the foundation for denying her forfeiture defense.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant's mother was the registered owner of an automobile that was used to facilitate the commission of a robbery. Although the mother testifie…
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HURLEY, Judge.
This appeal challenges the forfeiture of an automobile which was used to facilitate the commission of a robbery.1 We affirm.
The defendant’s mother, the registered owner of the vehicle, sought to prevent forfeiture by invoking section 932.703(2), Florida Statutes (1985). To prevail under this section, she had to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she either did not know, or should not have known, following a reasonable inquiry, that her vehicle would be used for criminal activity. See generally In re Forfeiture of Approximately Forty-Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars, 432 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see also Wheeler v. State, 472 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); In re Forfeiture of Blue 1979 Two-Door Toyota, 441 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
Although the mother’s testimony is studded with contradictions, it does contain an admission that she “knew he had his drug problem and [she] knew that [she] couldn’t trust him, so [she] couldn’t give him permission to use the car all the time.” Despite the realization that her son was likely to use the vehicle for criminal purposes, the record also indicates that the mother gave the son “total use” of the car for two months prior to the robbery. Indeed, the vehicle had a nameplate bearing the son’s nickname. These facts, if credited by the trial judge, would negate the mother’s claim. See United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Continental Mark TV, 584 F. 2d 266 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Automobile, 560 F. 2d 897 (8th Cir.1977); see also In re Forfeiture of 1979 Lincoln Continental, 405 So. 2d 249 (Fla.3d DCA 1981).
Since the record contains substantial, competent evidence to support the trial court’s holding, the final judgment of forfeiture is
AFFIRMED.
BARKETT, ROSEMARY, and WESSEL, JOHN D., Associate Judges, concur. . See generally Duckham v. State, 478 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1985).
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Citator
Cited By
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In re Forfeiture OF 1987 Chevrolet v. Johnson, 605 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…wner” herein for purposes of section 932.703(2). However, an owner may be ordered to forfeit his property if he has actual or constructive knowledge that it was, or was likely to be, employed in criminal activity. In Gross v. City of Wilton Manors, 487 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), the court held that a registered title holder abdicated claim to her vehicle when she gave her son total use thereof before commission of the forfeiting felony. However, the title holder also “realiz[ed] that her son was likely…
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City OF Daytona Beach v. Bush, 742 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…al knowledge on the part of an owner seeking to defeat a forfeiture. Constructive knowledge is sufficient. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture of 1987 Chevrolet, VIN No. 1G1JF11W7H7159637, 605 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Gross v. City of Wilton Manors, 487 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); In re Forfeiture of 1981 Oldsmobile, 593 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Further, the 1997 statute specifically states that forfeiture can be based on evidence that the owners should have known after reasonable inquiry that the…
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In re the Forfeiture OF ONE 1984 Chevrolet S-10 Pickup Truck, 515 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…vehicle has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know nor should he have known after a reasonable inquiry that the property was employed or likely to be employed in criminal activity. Gross v. City of Wilton Manors, 487 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Pursuant to the above statutory directive, the innocent co-owner spouse has the same burden of proof. Of course, whether the non-offending co-owner has “done enough” to constitute reasonable inquiry will vary from case to case.…
Authorities Cited
- In re Forfeiture of Approximately Forty-Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($48, 432 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- United States v. ONE 1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1977)
- Duckham v. State, 478 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1985)
- In re Forfeiture of the Following Described Prop.: 1979 Lincoln Cont'l v. City OF Miami, 405 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Gailyn W. Wheeler v. State, 472 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- In re the Forfeiture OF Blue 1979 2-Door Toyota, 441 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- United States v. ONE 1976 Lincoln Cont'l Mark IV, 584 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1978)