WILLIAM DUANE ELLEDGE, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD L. DUGGER, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE

11th Cir. | 1987-11-10
No. 86-5120
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges:, in which TJOFLAT, HILL and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, join:
833 F.2d 250 Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (1987) Caution
Cited by 59 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM:

Part III of our original opinion (823 F. 2d 1439) is, hereby, withdrawn. Except for this modification, the petitions for rehearing are denied. The Court having been polled at the request of one of its members and a majority of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it, the petition for rehearing en banc is denied.
Dissent
FAY, Circuit Judge,

FAY, Circuit Judge,

dissenting,

in which TJOFLAT, HILL and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, join:

Most respectfully, I dissent from the failure of the court to take this case for en banc consideration. I agree with the dissent of Judge Edmondson as to that section of the panel opinion dealing with shackling. Where guilt or innocence is in question there can be no doubt about the possible prejudice when a defendant appears in court in shackles. But to place this defendant in the same posture as one going to trial to determine guilt or innocence is simply wrong. Elledge had plead guilty. He was no longer entitled to the presumption of innocence.

Equally troubling to me are some of the other reasons stated by the majority for granting relief. The state trial court is faulted for not holding a hearing, and thus not affording the defense a reasonable opportunity to refute the information received by the trial judge.

However, no hearing was requested! The state trial court is also faulted for not affording the defendant an opportunity to speak with his attorney. Immediately after the trial judge announced what he had learned and what he was going to do, however, he announced a recess. What better time for the defendant and his counsel to confer could have been provided? The state trial court is further faulted for not affording the defendant an opportunity to explain or deny what the judge had heard. Again, the answer is that the defendant’s counsel did not request to respond.

The state court is faulted for not considering alternatives to shackling. We have no way of knowing what was or was not considered by the state trial judge. If we are going to guess, assume or presume, however, I would assume that he considered many alternatives. Common sense tells me that no judge would order a defendant shackled without very serious and deliberate consideration. The state trial court is also faulted for failing to conduct a poll of the jury as to possible prejudice. Once again, no poll was requested!

Even when reviewing a criminal trial held in a federal court, we generally try to correct prejudicial mistakes made in the trial court. Rulings are most often based upon affirmative requests of the litigants or objections to questions or actions being taken. In this instance we are reviewing, by way of a collateral attack, a case tried and reviewed in the state courts. It is my opinion that we have failed to accord the state proceedings that deference required under the law. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 854, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-38, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891-92, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984).

In addition, we are granting relief based upon the failure to do things which defendant’s counsel never requested while speculating that explanations were available that have never been subsequently alleged. For these reasons, I dissent.


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Citator

Cited By (29 total)

  • Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2000)
    …ve opened the door to testimony of the defendant’s violent past. See Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874, 877-78 (Fla.1997); Medina, 573 So. 2d at 298; see also Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F. 2d 1439, 1445-48 (11th Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 833 F. 2d 250 (11th Cir.1987). In this case, two of Asay’s siblings testified on cross-examination that he had previously threatened to kill his brother’s father-in-law. The.siblings also believed that Asay had stabbed his brother’s dog. Finally, when examining…
  • Elledge v. State, 706 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1997)
    …motion for post-conviction relief and a state habeas corpus petition were denied in Elledge v. Graham, 432 So. 2d 35 (Fla.1983). However, Elledge received federal habeas relief in Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F. 2d 1439 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted in part, 833 F. 2d 250 (11th Cir.1987). Elledge’s third sentencing proceeding was held in 1989 and he was again sentenced to death. That death sentence was vacated in Elledge v. State, 613 So. 2d 434 (Fla.1993). Elledge’s fourth sentencing proceeding took place in Novemb…
  • Elledge v. State, 911 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2005)
    …e United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit based on the trial court’s decision to order Elledge shackled during the proceedings. See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F. 2d 1439 (11th Cir.), opinion partially withdrawn on petition for rehearing, 833 F. 2d 250 (11th Cir. 1987). Elledge’s third penalty phase proceeding again resulted in the entry of a death sentence. In 1993, this Court reversed that sentence and remanded the case for a new penalty phase proceeding due to the trial court’s failure to cond…

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