IN RE WILLIAM NOAH KNIGHT, SR., A/K/A W.N. WRIGHT, A/K/A BILL KNIGHT A/K/A NOAH KNIGHT, DEBTOR. CHARLES A. GOWER, AS TRUSTEE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
WILLIAM NOAH KNIGHT, SR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

11th Cir. | 1987-07-08
No. 86-8779
Before TJOFLAT, HATCHETT and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
833 F.2d 1515 Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 19 cases

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Holding

The court held that the district court correctly reversed the bankruptcy court's order setting aside the default judgment.


Facts & Procedural History

The Trustee filed a complaint to deny discharge, and the debtor failed to file an answer within the time limit. The bankruptcy court initially set asi…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM:

The appellant, William Noah Knight, appeals the entry of a default judgment against him in this bankruptcy case. We affirm.

Knight filed a petition in bankruptcy. On January 16, 1986, the Trustee filed a complaint to deny Knight’s discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. Knight did not file an answer within thirty days, and on March 4, 1986, the Trustee filed an application for entry of default under bankruptcy rule 7055. The same day, Knight filed his answer to the complaint. The next day, the bankruptcy court entered a default judgment against Knight. About nine days later, after a hearing, the bankruptcy court granted Knight’s motion to set aside the default and allow the answer. The Trustee appealed to the district court which reversed the bankruptcy court.

On appeal, we review the district court’s decision to reverse the setting aside of the default judgment. Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F. 2d 677 (11th Cir.1984); Moldwood Corp. v. Stutts, 410 F. 2d 351 (5th Cir.1969).

Where a party offers no good reason for the late filing of its answer, entry of default judgment against that party is appropriate. McGrady v. D'Andrea Electric, Inc., 434 F. 2d 1000, 1001 (5th Cir.1970).

Likewise, the setting aside of a default judgment where no good reason has been offered for the default constitutes an abuse of discretion. In explaining the default, Knight’s lawyer, stated: “The reason for default is basically my own responsibility and I will say that I very foolishly relied on the elements of professional courtesy in this case....” Knight’s lawyer also characterized his failure to file a timely answer as an “oversight.” At no time did the lawyer attempt to show excusable neglect. Despite the lawyer’s reference to his “foolish reliance on the elements of professional courtesy,” he has not alleged any misconduct by the adverse party which led to the late filing.

We agree with the district court that the interests of justice will be better served by enforcing the rule of procedure than by allowing this case to proceed on the merits.

AFFIRMED.


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Citator

Cited By (17 total)

  • …ment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), (6); see also Fed R. Civ. P. 55(c). Thus, a district court may set aside an entry of default only if the defaulting party can provide a good reason for the district court to do so. See Gower v. Knight (In re Knight), 833 F. 2d 1515, 1516 (11th Cir.1987). The appellees contend that the district court properly granted their motion to set aside the default because Brown’s Chapel, the alleged title holder of the property in dispute, was not named as a defendant. It is certainly…
  • In re Knight v. Knight, 833 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987)
    …ark would withdraw the opinion and reverse the district court and the other members of the panel abide by the original opinion. The following is Judge Clark’s dissent. The original opinion was not published. The clerk will now publish that opinion 833 F. 2d 1515, along with this denial of petition for panel rehearing and the accompanying dissent. The appellant, Knight, requested a rehearing and suggested in banc consideration by the full court. The mandate will be withheld until all active members of the co…
  • …Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d at 1295 (alteration added; quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where a party offers no good reason for the late filing of its answer, entry of default judgment against that party is appropriate." In re Knight, 833 F.2d 1515, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Rule 60(b)(4). A judgment may be deemed “void” under Rule 60(b)(4) only in narrow circumstances – specifically, when the issuing court lacked jurisdiction, or the judgment was entered in violation of due p…

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