MARK H. FELDMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STEPHEN GLUCROFT, M.D., JOEL B. DENNIS, M.D., LLOYD A. MORIBER, M.D., MELVYN G. DRUCKER, M.D., KENNETH HODOR, M.D., HUGH UNGER, M.D. AND ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCIATES, P.A., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1986-04-29
No. 85-1262
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ.
488 So. 2d 574 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

A podiatrist challenged the revocation of his hospital privileges and sued physicians for defamation based on statements made during medical review committee proceedings. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Florida Statute 768.40(4) creates an absolute privilege barring defamation claims arising from medical review committee proceedings and is constitutionally valid.


Holding

Section 768.40(4) creates an absolute privilege that totally abolishes any defamation action arising from proceedings before medical review committees. The statute is constitutionally valid and does not unconstitutionally deny access to the courts.


Headnotes

[1] A statute providing absolute privilege for statements made in medical review committee proceedings bars defamation claims arising from such proceedings.

[2] Statements made in medical review committee proceedings are inadmissible as evidence in defamation actions.

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Key Quotes

“the language of the statute creates an absolute privilege and means that any existing defamation action has been totally abolished”

Establishes the court's interpretation of section 768.40(4) as creating an absolute privilege that completely eliminates defamation claims in this context

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Facts & Procedural History

Mark Feldman, a podiatrist, had his privileges to perform certain procedures at Parkway General Hospital revoked following proceedings before hospital…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

The appellant is a podiatrist whose privileges to perform certain procedures at Parkway General Hospital were revoked. He brought the instant action against several medical doctors, claiming, insofar as is now relevant,1 that they had defamed him in the course of the proceedings conducted concerning his case by the appropriate hospital medical review committees. We agree with the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that no such action may be maintained under section 768.40(4), Florida Statutes (1983) (formerly section 768.131(4)), as interpreted in Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla.1984). It is true that Holly and Parkway General Hospital, Inc. v. Allinson, 453 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), are, strictly speaking, only discovery cases, and do not treat the present situation of the plaintiffs total inability to establish a claim by virtue of the fact that the very subject matter of the alleged defamation is barred under the terms of the statute from “introduction into evidence.” Nevertheless, we think it clear from the Holly case, particularly when read in the light of Justice Shaw’s dissenting opinion — which does directly treat the point — that the language of the statute creates an absolute privilege and means that any existing defamation action has been totally abolished.

Nor do we agree with Dr. Feldman that, as so interpreted, the statute unconstitutionally denies access to the courts as provided by Article I, Section 21, Florida Constitution.2 The public policy consideration expounded in Holly and the statute itself, see also Dade County Medical Association v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), provide ample basis upon which the legislature could validly have eliminated the action. See Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla.1985); Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948).

Because of the importance and novelty of the precise issues presented, we certify to the supreme court that this decision passes upon the following questions of great public importance:

(1) Does section 768.40(4) totally abolish a defamation claim arising in proceedings before medical review committees?

(2) If so, is section 768.40(4) invalid as in conflict with Article I, section 21, Florida Constitution?

Affirmed, questions certified.

. A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim asserted in a separate count has been abandoned. See Hull v. Board of Comm’rs of Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 453 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).

. We find the appellant’s separate equal protection claim totally unconvincing.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Feldman v. Stephen Glucroft, M.D., 522 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1988)
    …OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition to review Feldman v. Glucroft, 488 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), in which the Third District Court of Appeal held that a defamation action could not be maintained against medical review committee members and the hospital they serve due to the privilege established by section 768.40(4), Florida…
  • Feldman v. Stephen Glucroft, M.D., 553 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …is court affirmed, holding that a defamation action could not be maintained against medical review committee members and the hospital they serve due to the privilege established by section 768.40(4), Florida Statutes (1983). See Feldman v. Glucroft, 488 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). This court certified the question and the supreme court, in Feldman v. Glucroft, 522 So. 2d 798 (Fla.1988), held that a defamation claim arising under that statute is not totally abolished since a plaintiff may proceed with such…

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