H. RICHARD BATES, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DR. PHILIP O. LITTLEFORD, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
COOK, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, CROSS-APPELLANT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that the significant relationships test should be used to determine in which state a cause of action arose for the purpose of applying Florida's borrowing statute.
This court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding the application of Florida's borrowing statute to a theft of trade secrets caus…
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GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge:
This court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the following question:
For the purpose of applying Florida’s limitation of actions “borrowing” statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.10 (West 1982), is the determination whether a cause of action for theft of trade secrets has arisen in a state other than Florida to be made solely with reference to the state in which the “last act necessary to establish liability” occurred, Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla.1972), or with reference to the “significant relationships” that the respective states have to the cause of action, Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1000-01 (Fla.1980)? Cf. Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1323 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.1983), review denied 446 So. 2d 99 (Fla.1984); Meehan v. Celotex Corp., 466 So. 2d 1100 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1985); Steiner v. Mt. Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 3 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.1985) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the question exactly as phrased and responded as follows:
We are now convinced that just as in the case of other issues of substantive law, the significant relationships test should be used to decide conflicts of law questions concerning the statute of limitations. Our ruling does not do violence to Florida’s borrowing statute. We simply hold that the significant relationships test should be employed to decide in which state the cause of action “arose.” The borrowing statute will only come into play if it is determined that the cause of action arose in another state.
Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla.1987).
This case is REMANDED to the district court for reconsideration under correct standards. Bates, 791 F. 2d 1525, 1526 n. 1.
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Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Althea G. Bishop and William J. Bishop, Sr. v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980)
- Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1987)
- Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972)
- Dave Zinn Toyota, Inc. v. Dep't OF Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 432 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Carmella Meehan v. The Celotex Corp., 466 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Bates v. Cook, Inc., 791 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1986)
- Steiner v. MT. Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)