IN RE ESTATE OF KATHRYN RAYHILL. LAWRENCE MAXWELL, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF KATHRYN RAYHILL, APPELLANT,
v.
BURNETT ROTH, APPELLEE
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In an estate dispute involving a will procured by undue influence, the court addressed whether an attorney who represented both the guilty personal representative and an innocent co-representative could recover fees. The court held that while fees for services to the innocent co-representative were theoretically permissible, the trial court's award lacked evidentiary support and must be remanded for proper findings.
While an attorney may theoretically recover fees for services rendered to an innocent co-representative, the trial court's $70,000 fee award lacked evidentiary support for the claimed services to Jefferson National Bank or administrative duties. The case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but the attorney cannot recover for partial success in defending against alternative objections (improper witnessing and lack of testamentary capacity) because such success benefited only the wrongdoer and not the estate.
[1] An attorney is not entitled to fees from an estate for services rendered to a co-personal representative innocent of wrongdoing if there is no evidence that the attorney…
[2] A partial success in defending a will against certain objections does not warrant fees from the estate if the proponent of the will was found to have procured it by undue…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there is simply no evidence to support the trial court's finding that the attorney rendered specifically identifiable legal services to the bank which were of benefit to the estate”
Establishes the core holding that the fee award lacked evidentiary support
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMargaret Rose, a personal representative of Kathryn Rayhill's estate, procured the will through undue influence. Attorney Burnett Roth represented bot…
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PER CURIAM.
While we agree with the appellee-at-torney that our decision in In re Estate of Hand, 475 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), does not preclude him from being awarded fees from an estate where, as here, the fees sought are for services rendered not to the personal representative found to have procured the will by undue influence,1 but are for services rendered to a co-personal representative, Jefferson National Bank, innocent of such wrongdoing, there is simply no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the attorney rendered specifically identifiable legal services to the bank which were of benefit to the estate. See In re Estate of Hand, 475 So. 2d 1337. Despite the fact that the trial court found “[t]hat by far, the major portion of Mr. Roth’s legal services were performed on behalf of the probate of a will that has now been declared invalid, and in the defense of his client, Margaret Rose, in the proceedings and trial leading to the revocation of the will,” and, abiding by our decision in Hand, refused to award Roth a fee for these services, it went on to conclude that “a reasonable fee for services performed for the estate for administrative duties and Jefferson National Bank is in the amount of $70,000.” Since we find no evidentiary support for this latter conclusion, or, for that matter, the conclusion that Roth did anything for Jefferson or performed any administrative duties, we must reverse.
However, because the trial court reached its conclusion without the benefit of an appropriate evidentiary hearing, wherein Roth might attempt to establish what is now missing, we remand this case for further proceedings. Roth’s cross-appeal, seeking to overturn the trial court’s denial of fees for services rendered to the undue influencer, is affirmed on the authority of Hand.
On remand, the trial court is advised that it may not, as it may have done, award Roth fees for services rendered to Margaret Rose, on the theory that Roth was successful in defending the will against the alternative objections that it was not properly witnessed and that the testatrix did not possess testamentary capacity. This partial success was of no benefit to the estate, and in no way detracts from the determination that Margaret Rose, having been found guilty of procuring the will by undue influence, could not in good faith have offered the will for probate.2
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded.
HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ., concur. . This finding was affirmed by this court in Rose v. Maxwell, 483 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
. Indeed, the record in Hand reflects (although the opinion does not) that the proponent there was also successful in countering the objections that the will was not properly witnessed and that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity, but, as here, unsuccessful in connection with the charge that the will was procured by undue influence.
HENDRY, Judge,
dissents.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that appellant Roth is not entitled to recover the $70,000 awarded as attorney’s fees for “services performed for the estate for administrative duties and Jefferson National Bank.” The order appealed reflects the evidentiary basis relied upon by the court in making the attorney’s fee award: “the testimony on the fees hearing, the detailed time records submitted by Mr. Roth, and the court’s own knowledge gained from the trial of this matter.” In view of this proper evidentiary basis and the trial court’s further findings that “[e]ven additional hearings and testimony would not make it possible to completely define the relative portions of the work performed and the fee earned,” and “a reasonable fee for services performed for the estate for administrative duties and Jefferson National Bank is in the amount of $70,000.00[,]” I would affirm the fee award.
I concur in the holding of the majority as to the remainder of the opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cited By
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Davis v. Est. OF James H. Davis, 77 So. 3d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…r attorney’s fees, however, is dependent upon [*705] whether the attorney has “rendered services that have ‘benefited the estate.’ ” Cushing v. Estate of Reynolds, 489 So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citation omitted); In re Estate of Rayhill, 489 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Furthermore, “[t]he standard for awarding attorney’s fees from estate funds has long been well established. In order to be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from estate funds, the lawyer’s services, must have been either ne…
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In re Est. OF Kathryn Rayhill. Lawrence E. Maxwell v. Burnett Roth, 516 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…urt order awarding to Burnett Roth the sum of $80,-000 as attorney’s fees for services rendered to the Estate of Kathryn B. Rayhill, deceased. The order was entered after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to our remand in In re Estate of Rayhill, 489 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), in which we overturned a $70,000 fee award to Roth and instructed that Roth, although entitled to fees for services which benefited the estate, was not entitled to fees for his representation of the personal representative who ha…
Authorities Cited
- In re Est. OF Mary C. W. Hand. Alice Frances Wolf v. Ahlman, 475 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- In re Est. of Kathryn B. Rayhill v. Maxwell, 483 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)