TYRONE JEFFERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Tyrone Jefferson appealed his first-degree murder and firearm possession convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude a juror for cause, forcing him to waste a peremptory challenge and ultimately seat another objectionable juror. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the cause challenge and that this error was not harmless.
The court held that the trial court erred in denying the cause challenge because the juror's responses raised reasonable doubt about her ability to render an impartial verdict solely on the evidence and law. The court further held that forcing a party to exhaust peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause is error that abridges the right to exercise peremptory challenges, and such error cannot be deemed harmless.
[1] A juror must be excused if there is a basis for any reasonable doubt as to their ability to render an impartial verdict solely on the evidence and law presented.
[2] A trial court commits error by forcing a party to exhaust peremptory challenges on jurors who should have been excused for cause, as this abridges the right to exercise p…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If there is a basis for any reasonable doubt as to any juror's possessing that state of mind which will enable him to render an impartial verdict solely on the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial, he should be excused.”
Establishes the legal standard for juror competency and grounds for cause challenges.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJefferson was convicted of first-degree murder and unlawful firearm possession. During jury selection, a prospective juror whose husband worked in the…
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HENDRY, Judge.
Tyrone Jefferson appeals his convictions and sentences for first degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. We reverse appellant’s convictions and remand for a new trial on the following briefly stated analysis.
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is that he was forced to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror when the trial court denied his motion to exclude her for cause. As a result, an objectionable juror was seated after defendant used all of his remaining peremptory challenges and the trial court refused to allow defendant one extra.
The law is clear that the test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court. State v. Williams, 465 So. 2d 1229 (Fla.1985); Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 67 (Fla.1984); Waddell v. State, 458 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), review denied, 466 So. 2d 218 (Fla.1985). If there is a basis for any reasonable doubt as to any juror’s possessing that state of mind which will enable him to render an impartial verdict solely on the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial, he should be excused. Graham v. State, 470 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), citing Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1959).
In the case at bar, the juror’s husband was currently employed in the circuit court clerk’s office and he had been employed in various law enforcement capacities for a number of years. The juror gave very equivocal answers about whether her husband’s career would possibly affect her ability to be impartial and whether she would favor the state. Her response to a question regarding the weight to be given to police testimony was also equivocal. There was an indication that she misunderstood the allocation of the burden of proof in a criminal case. The doubts about her impartiality were not adequately resolved by the trial court. We find that it was error not to excuse this juror for cause.
As noted above, defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to exclude this juror. He was then forced to accede to an objectionable juror because he had by then exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges. As we stated in Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1981): “it is error for a court to force a party to exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause since it has the effect of abridging the right to exercise peremptory challenges,” citing to Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). See also Anderson v. State, 463 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 475 So. 2d 693 (Fla.1985).
Because we cannot say that the errors herein are harmless, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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Price v. State, 538 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…be excused for cause. Moore v. State, 525 So. 2d 870, 872 (Fla.1988); Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988); see Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 22 (Fla.1959); Jefferson v. State, 489 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.1986); Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1981); see also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431…
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Club W., Inc. v. Tropigas OF Fla., Inc., 514 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…t based solely on the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial he should be excused on motion of a party, or by the court on its own motion. 109 So. 2d at 23-24; accord Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985); Jefferson v. State, 489 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.1986); Leon, 396 So. 2d at 205; see Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(c)(1); cf. Sydleman v. Benson, 463 So. 2d 533, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (“Close cases should be resolved in favor of excusing the juror rat…
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Ortiz v. State, 543 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…t that would affect her decision. Although she also stated that she could base her verdict solely on the evidence, her responses to the questions were sufficiently equivocal to require the trial court to excuse her for cause. See Jefferson v. State, 489 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA) (trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss for cause potential juror whose husband was employed by circuit court clerk’s office, where potential juror gave equivocal responses to questions about effect of husband’s emplo…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1965)
- Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959)
- Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1984)
- Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- State v. Williams, 465 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1985)
- Goldwire Anderson v. State, 463 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Joscelyn Amanuel Graham v. State, 470 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Waddell v. State, 458 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)