ELLIOTT LEWIS BROCHE, APPELLANT,
v.
MARGARETHE S. BROCHE, APPELLEE
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In this interlocutory appeal, the court addresses whether child support obligations terminate when a child reaches age eighteen (the age of majority at the time of the support order in 1983) or age twenty-one (the age of majority at the time of the original 1970 divorce). The court holds that the law in effect when the support order was entered controls, not the law at the time of divorce.
The law applicable at the time the support order was entered controls the duration of support payments. Absent an indication that support was determined at the original divorce proceeding and thereafter continued until majority, the age of majority at the time of the support order determines when support terminates.
[1] Child support obligations are governed by the law in effect at the time of the support order, not the law in effect at the time of the original divorce, unless the origin…
[2] A court order for child support payments until the child reaches majority is controlled by the age of majority as defined by law at the time of that specific support orde…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Absent some indication that the matter of support was determined at the original divorce proceeding and thereafter continued until majority, which would have been twenty-one years of age, it is the law applicable at the time of the support order that controls the duration of support payments.”
This is the controlling legal principle establishing that the law in effect when the support order is entered, not when the divorce occurred, determines the age at which support terminates.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceElliott and Margarethe Broche divorced on June 11, 1970, when they had one minor child aged two. Their divorce agreement deferred child support determ…
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[*842] BARFIELD, Judge.
In this appeal from an interlocutory order requiring the appellant to continue child support payments until the minor child reaches the age of twenty-one years, this court is asked to determine whether this case is controlled by the law applicable at the time of the divorce, when the age of majority was twenty-one, or by the law applicable at the time of the support order, when the age of majority was eighteen.
The parties, Margarethe Broche and Elliott Broche, were divorced on June 11, 1970. There was one minor child, two years old at the time of the divorce. An agreement was entered between the parties and approved by the court. The only reference to child support was contained in the following paragraph 6:
The Husband and Wife do hereby acknowledge that at the time of the execution of this Agreement, the Husband is recovering from a serious illness and is unemployed. For this reason the parties hereby agree that the matter of support is expressly left open to be determined at such time as the Husband becomes employed either by subsequent agreement between the parties or by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Intervening proceedings were held in which custody changed and other agreements were made between the parties culminating in a parental responsibility agreement in August, 1983. In addition to the former wife having sole parental responsibility for the minor child, the agreement provided for the former husband to pay child support “until the child reaches majority, marries, dies or becomes self-supporting.” The child was fifteen years old at the time of the agreement.
The former husband ceased making payments after the payment of August 1, 1985 because the daughter turned eighteen years old on September 5, 1985. The present proceedings ensued resulting in a court order that the husband continue payments until the child reached age twenty-one. We reverse.
Absent some indication that the matter of support was determined at the original divorce proceeding and thereafter continued until majority, which would have been twenty-one years of age, it is the law applicable at the time of the support order that controls the duration of support payments. Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 487 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
REVERSED.
NIMMONS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bocchino v. Braner, 546 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…t amount originally ordered continues until the children reach twenty-one years old. But any child support ordered after July 1, 1973 terminates at the child’s eighteenth birthday. Aeree v. Aeree, 508 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Broche v. Broche, 489 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); accord, Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 487 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); but see, Aumaitre v. Troyanos, 344 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Consequently, the trial court could not order the increased child support for the eighteen yea…
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Reeves v. Reeves, 554 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…ntinue support of his or her child, absent a finding of dependency, only to majority upon reaching the age of 18 years. Spurlock v. Spurlock, 552 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Gelman v. Gelman, 512 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Broche v. Broche, 489 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Peeples v. Peeples, 516 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 487 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 430 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Thus, a former husband, absent extraordinary circums…
Authorities Cited
- Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 487 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)