RODGER G. MEADOWS, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA C. BACON F/K/A LINDA C. MEADOWS, APPELLEE
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Court reversed a civil contempt order against a former husband for failure to pay a joint credit card debt, holding that contempt power cannot be used to compel payment of debts to third parties and the order was procedurally defective.
Contempt power cannot be used to compel a former spouse to pay a debt owed to a third party, even when required by a property settlement agreement.
[1] Contempt power cannot be invoked to compel a party to pay a debt owed to a third party, as such obligations constitute divisions of property rather than direct violations…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is also substantively defective in that it purports to use the contempt power of the court to compel the husband to pay a debt due to a third party”
Court's explanation of why the contempt order was substantively improper
A former husband was ordered to pay his portion of a joint Master-card indebtedness as required by a property settlement agreement incorporated into t…
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ORFINGER, Judge.
The former husband appeals from an order adjudicating him in civil contempt for failure to pay his portion of a joint Master-card indebtedness as required by the property settlement agreement incorporated into and made a part of the final judgment dissolving the marriage between the parties. We reverse.
Not only is the order procedurally defective because it fails to find that the appellant presently had the ability to comply with the order and willfully failed to do so, Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1985), and additionally because it fails to contain a provision by which the contemnor may purge himself of the contempt, Starchk v. Wittenberg, 411 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), but it is also substantively defective in that it purports to use the contempt power of the court to compel the husband to pay a debt due to a third party. See State ex rel. Cahn v. Mason, 148 Fla. 264, 4 So. 2d 255 (1941); Marks v. Marks, 457 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Schminkey v. Schminkey, 400 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Nothing in the property settlement agreement incorporated into the final judgment indicates that the provision requiring the payment of this indebtedness is anything other than a division of property. The order adjudging appellant in contempt is
REVERSED.
COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Montanez v. Montanez, 697 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…of this debt was connected with any duty to pay the former wife spousal support. Thus, the former husband’s liability under this provision arises solely from a division of property rights under a property settlement agreement. See Meadows v. Bacon, 489 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Crea v. Willick, 478 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). , Under these circumstances, the trial court was prohibited by the well-settled law of Florida from using the power of civil contempt to compel the former husband to pay his sh…1 / 3
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Finney v. Finney, 603 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…t to a final judgment of dissolution of marriage because the final judgment is in the nature of a property settlement. Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So. 2d 357, 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Hobbs v. Hobbs, 518 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Meadows v. Bacon, 489 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Marks v. Marks, 457 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Further, neither order contains the requisite finding of appellant’s present ability to pay the debts nor does the record contain any such finding by the lower court. The abs…
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Contella v. Contella, 557 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). . Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1977); Demetree v. State ex rel Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla.1956); Knowles v. Knowles, 522 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.1988); Meadows v. Bacon, 489 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Allman v. Johnson, 488 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Carter v. State, 409 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Damkohler v. Damkohler, 336 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Ca…
Authorities Cited
- Eugenia Bowen & the Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1985)
- State ex rel. Albert B. Cahn v. Mason, 148 Fla. 264 (Fla. 1941)
- Starchk v. Wittenberg, 411 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Schminkey v. Schminkey, 400 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Marks v. Marks, 457 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)