ESTHER SEGAL, BERNARD MAZIE, FRED MAZIE, MIRIAM BECKMAN, NORMAN MAZIE, AND BENNETT MAZIE, APPELLANTS,
v.
I. STANLEY LEVINE, AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF SIDNEY LEFKOWITZ, DECEASED, AND DAVID D. PHILLIPS, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1986-06-10
No. 85-2036
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ.
489 So. 2d 868 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1986) Positive Treatment
Cited by 11 cases

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Holding

The trial court erred in denying attorney's fees and costs to appellants who rendered services to the estate by helping to clarify the decedent's intent.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellants, nieces and nephews, sought attorney's fees from the decedent's estate after a declaratory judgment action to interpret ambiguous will prov…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants, nieces and nephews of the decedent’s wife, appeal the trial court’s denial of their petition for attorney’s fees and costs to be taxed against the decedent’s estate. We reverse.

The decedent left a will which contained three ambiguous provisions. Because the trustee was not sure how the assets should be distributed, he filed a petition for declaratory relief, seeking to have the court determine the proper distribution. Various groups of relatives responded to the petition. The trustee and the different groups of respondents took diverse positions on the proper construction of the ambiguous provisions. The court’s interpretation of the will was a composite of the different views advanced by the parties and adopted no one’s position totally. It adopted appellants’ construction of the will as to one of the ambiguities. Although the other respondents and the trustee of the estate were awarded attorney’s fees, appellants were not.

Under Florida law, “[a]ny attorney who has rendered services to an estate” may recover fees and costs from the estate. § 733.106(3), Fla.Stat. (1985). An attorney renders services to an estate by bringing about an enhancement in value or an increase in the assets of the estate. An attorney also benefits (“renders services to”) an estate if, by his actions, the intent of the decedent is established and his estate properly divided. In re Estate of Lewis, 442 So. 2d 290 (Fla.4th DCA 1983); In re Estate of Barret, 137 So. 2d 587 (Fla.lst DCA 1962); In re Estate of Farris, 113 So. 2d 721 (Fla.3d DCA), cert. denied, 116 So. 2d 775 (Fla.1959).

Because the will contained several ambiguities, the decedent’s wishes were unclear. All the respondents came into court to offer their view of the proper construction of the will. As did the other respondents, the appellants helped to effectuate the intent of the decedent, and, therefore, attorney’s fees should have been awarded to them as well.

Reversed and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …ay apply for an order awarding attorney’s fees.” This provision has been construed to permit the recovery of attorney’s fees when the estate has benefited by the services of counsel. In re Gleason’s Estate, 74 So. 2d 360 (Fla.1954); Segal v. Levine, 489 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); In re Estate of Freedman, 340 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Gastel contends that appellees are not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 733.106(3), Florida Statutes, because appel-lees’ actions tended to break down and [*…
  • Tillman v. Smith, 526 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
    …Attorney’s fees have been awarded to parties who contest probate of a will, but in those cases, the final will of the decedent was determined and his estate properly divided and distributed to his intended beneficiaries. See, e.g., Segal v. Levine, 489 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); In re Estate of Griffis, 366 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); In re Jones’ Estate, 352 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977). Here Elmer Smith clearly intended the antenup-tial agreement to control and intended for his surviving spouse t…
  • In re Est. OF Frank Shefner v. Shefner-Holden, 2 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
    …: (1) bringing about an enhancement in value or an increase in estate assets, or (2) actions which establish and effectuate the decedent’s testamentary intent. See, e.g., Estate of Brock v. Brock, 695 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Segal v. Levine, 489 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); In re Estate of Lewis, 442 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Lewis illustrates how services may benefit an estate by effectuating a testator’s intent. In Lewis, a decedent’s widow sued to revoke a devise alleging undue influence,…

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