RAYFIELD MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Rayfield Moore challenged his five-year sentence for grand theft, arguing the trial court violated the terms of his plea bargain without offering him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. The court held that when a trial court decides to deviate from an approved plea bargain, it must afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea before imposing sentence.
A trial court cannot dishonor the terms of a previously approved plea bargain without affording the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea. The court has an affirmative duty to inform the defendant of this right before imposing a sentence inconsistent with the bargain.
[1] A court cannot deviate from the terms of an approved plea bargain without first affording the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.
[2] A trial court has an affirmative duty to inform a defendant of their right to withdraw a plea when the court decides not to impose sentence in accordance with the plea ba…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the court was not bound to follow the terms of the plea bargain, Moore v. State, 339 So.2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), it erred in failing to give appellant the opportunity to withdraw his plea once it decided not to impose sentence in accordance with the bargain.”
Establishes the core holding that courts must provide an opportunity to withdraw a plea when deviating from bargain terms
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoore pleaded nolo contendere in exchange for six months' probation and a $500 fine. The trial court expressly stated it would defer sentencing and wa…
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GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant challenges the imposition of his five-year sentence for grand theft as a deviation from the terms of an approved plea bargain without first having been given an opportunity to withdraw the plea.
At the outset of the plea hearing, the court made clear the terms of the plea bargain. Appellant would plead nolo con-tendere in exchange for six months’ probation and a fine of $500. Appellant pled nolo contendere and the court determined the plea to be freely and voluntarily entered. The court then concluded with the following statements:
I accept your plea, adjudicate you guilty of the offense, and will defer sentencing until the 12th of September at 2:00 p.m., and you are to return here at 2:00 p.m. on the 12th of September. If you don’t return, then I will not be bound by my promise to limit the sentence, and can sentence you to the maximum time, which is five years in prison. Appellant responded that he would be present for sentencing.
Appellant did not appear for sentencing on September 12, 1983. Appellant was arrested almost two years later and then came before the court for sentencing. A different attorney represented him at sentencing. Appellant did not elect to be sentenced under the guidelines, and the court imposed the maximum sentence authorized by statute.
This court reviewed a similar plea colloquy in Nesmith v. State, 374 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), in which the trial judge added conditions after accepting a plea bargain. One of the new conditions was that the defendant would appear for sentencing on a particular date. Neither the defendant nor his attorney consented to the additional conditions. We held that the conditions imposed following the acceptance of the plea were not a part of the plea bargain.
Although appellant did not move to withdraw his plea, the court could not dishonor the terms of a previously approved plea bargain without affording him an opportunity to withdraw the plea. Dunkel v. State, 432 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Freeman v. State, 376 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The court has an affirmative duty to inform the defendant of that right. Dunkel; Reynolds v. State, 339 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Kiefer v. State, 295 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Although the court was not bound to follow the terms of the plea bargain, Moore v. State, 339 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), it erred in failing to give appellant the opportunity to withdraw his plea once it decided not to impose sentence in accordance with the bargain.
We remand for proceedings at which appellant shall have the opportunity to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty. If appellant does not move to withdraw his plea, the judgment and sentence shall stand.
LEHAN and SANDERLIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Quarterman v. State, 506 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…argain itself. In fact, it was appellant’s attorney who announced the terms of the bargain that included the provision of increased sentence for failure to appear for sentencing. Pumphrey v. State, 502 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Moore v. State, 489 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The state objected to the continuance for sentencing, stating: “[T]he State is not agreeable to having the sentencing postponed until Monday inasmuch as it took five months to find the defendant after his crime was committed.” W…
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Fambro v. State, 581 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…nt relies upon a line of cases for the proposition that conditions to a plea agreement, added subsequent to formal acceptance of the plea, are not part of the plea agreement. See Pumphrey v. State, 502 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Moore v. State, 489 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); LaBaissiere v. State, 429 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Nesmith v. State, 374 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The above cited cases all involved additional conditions added after formal acceptance, but imposed unilaterally by the…
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Pumphrey v. State, 502 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…ecifically all obligations the defendant will incur as a result. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.172(c)(vii). The cases are clear that no additional conditions may be imposed after the trial judge accepts the plea bargain and the defendant’s plea. Moore v. State, 489 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); LaBaissiere v. State, 429 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Nesmith v. State, 374 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). This case is very similar, factually, to Moore, supra. In Moore, the court made clear the terms of the plea bargain.…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Freeman v. State, 376 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Reynolds v. State, 339 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Nesmith v. State, 374 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Kiefer v. State, 295 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Moore v. State, 339 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Dunkel v. State, 432 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)