DARRYL GLOSSON, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE HAROLD SOLOMON, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, RESPONDENT
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The petitioner, a probation violator incarcerated in Dade County Jail, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to consider his request for bail pending disposition of the probation violation charge. The court held that the judge's blanket policy of never setting bail on probation violations violates Florida Statute Section 948.06(1), which grants trial courts discretion to release accused probation violators with or without bail.
A trial judge's invariable policy of refusing to set bail on all probation violation charges violates Section 948.06(1) and constitutes an abuse of discretion. The trial court must hear and consider each probation violator's claim for bail release rather than applying a blanket refusal.
[1] A trial court's refusal to exercise discretion granted by statute is an error that may be remedied by mandamus.
[2] Florida law permits a trial court to release a probation violator pending a hearing, with or without bail.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial judge's announced policy of never setting bail on a probation violation charge is in derogation of Section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which permits the trial court to commit one accused of violating the terms and conditions of a probation order 'or release him with or without bail to await further hearing.'”
Establishes the core legal violation—the judge's blanket policy conflicts with the statutory discretion to set bail
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDarryl Glosson was incarcerated in the Dade County Jail on a charge of violating probation. He was also charged with vehicular manslaughter, for which…
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
The petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Dade County Jail on a charge of violating probation, requests this court to issue a writ of mandamus1 directing the respondent judge to hear and consider the petitioner’s claim that he should be released pending disposition of this charge with or without bail.2 He claims, and we agree, that the trial judge’s announced policy of never setting bail on a probation violation charge3 is in derogation of Section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which permits the trial court to commit one accused of violating the terms and conditions of a probation order “or release him with or without bail to await further hearing....”
The statute in question, Section 948.06(1), has been interpreted as investing the trial court with the discretion to set bail for accused probation violators. See Bennington v. Thornton, 370 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Where a court is given discretion to act on a matter, the refusal to exercise such discretion is error, see Fazio v. Russell Building Movers, Inc., 469 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (reversing denial of motion for new trial where sole reason for denial was trial court’s invariable policy of denying all such motions except when based on some post-trial occurrence; remanded with directions that trial court exercise discretion accorded it), which may be remedied by mandamus.
Accordingly, the trial court is directed to hear and consider the petitioner’s claim that he be released with or without bail pending final disposition of the revocation of probation charge, or show cause to this court within five days why such relief should not be granted.
. Alternatively, the petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, but, as will be seen infra, we decide only that the trial judge must consider the claim for bail, not grant it.
. The petitioner is also charged with the substantive crime of vehicular manslaughter, upon which charge bail, originally set at $15,000, has been reduced to $6,000.
. The defendant’s counsel informed the court that the statute:
"says that bond is a discretionary matter. We would ask the Court if it is going to deny bond, the Court has indicated it has a policy of not granting bond in these cases, I assume that’s the policy in every case?”
The court replied:
"[y]es, it is.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Woods v. State, 987 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…(2006), and rule 3.790(b) provide courts with the discretionary power to grant or deny bail to individuals who are charged with violating their probation. See, e.g., Bennington v. Thornton, 370 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). In Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), the Third District specifically held that a trial judge’s announced policy of never setting bail on a probation violation charge is in derogation of section 948.06 and therefore error. It appears, therefore, that the circuit…
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Henry v. State, 581 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…nce so that the trial judge may consider the matter as one within his discretion.” Id. at 1197 (footnote omitted). See also Berezovsky v. State, 350 So. 2d 80, 80-81 (Fla.1977); Doe v. State, 499 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). On remand, the trial court may, of course, reimpose the life sentence, or a term less than life, under the statutory procedure. See State v. Brown, 530 So. 2d at 53 n. 2 (“the legislative intent clearly was only to make the l…
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Eason v. Colbath, 586 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…keenly aware of the discretionary nature of an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), and also of the general rule that a refusal to exercise discretion is error. See e.g. Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So. 2d 94 (Fla.3d DCA 1986) (trial court’s announced policy of never setting bail on probation violation charge was in derogation of discretionary provision of bail statute); see also Mank v. Hendrickson, 195 So. 2d 574 (Fla.4th DCA 1967) (“every litigant is…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bennington v. Verne C. Thornton, Jr., 370 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Nunzio Michael Fazio v. Russell Bldg. Movers, Inc., 469 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)