ANDRES ARAUJO, APPELLANT,
v.
LEOPOLDO RAMIREZ-LIMON, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed that a defendant imprisoned in Mexico and never residing at his family's Dade County home lacks a "usual place of abode" there for service of process purposes under Fla. Stat. § 48.031(1).
A residence where a defendant has never actually lived, even though his family resides there, does not constitute his "usual place of abode" for service of process under Florida Statutes § 48.031(1).
[1] A defendant's "usual place of abode" for service of process under Fla. …
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The court quoted Panter v. Werbel-Roth Securities, Inc. to establish that actual residence is necessary for a usual place of abode.
Ramirez-Limon lived with his family in Houston, Texas until his imprisonment in a Mexican jail. After his incarceration, his family moved to a home in…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The appellee Ramirez-Limon lived with his wife and children in Houston, Texas until he was imprisoned in a jail in Mexico, where he still remains. After his incarceration, his family moved to a home in Dade County, but Ramirez-Limon has never resided there. Because the appellee can hardly be said to have been “actually living [there] at the time of service,” Panter v. Werbel-Roth Securities, Inc., 406 So. 2d 1267, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), we agree with the trial court that the Dade County residence is not his “usual place of abode,” under section 48.031(1), Florida Statutes (1983).1 See State v. Heffeman, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145 (1940); Hauser v. Schiff, 341 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); cf. Bull v. Kistner, 257 Iowa 968, 135 N.W. 2d 545 (1965) (home where prisoner resided before imprisonment and where wife and children still live is his “usual place of abode”). Accordingly, the order quashing the substr- tuted service of process attempted at that address through the appellee’s wife is
Affirmed.
. Section 48.031(1) provides:
48.031 Service of process generally.—
(1) Service of original process is made by delivering a copy of it to the person to be served with a copy of the complaint, petition, or other initial pleading or paper or by leaving the copies at his usual place of abode with any person residing therein who is 15 years of age or older and informing the person of their contents. Minors who are or have been married shall be served as provided in this section.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Stern v. Amnon GAD, 505 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…on the date of purported service, and that in fact he does not reside in the United States. We recognize that residence and “usual place of abode” are two different terms. State v. Heffeman, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145 (1940); Aravjo v. Ramirez-Limon, 490 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Panter v. Werbel-Roth Securities, Inc., 406 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We merely hold that the record in this case will not support a finding that the appellant/defendant was served at a “usual place of abode” in this count…
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Shurman v. Atl. Mortg. & Inv., 740 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…e, where he had resided prior to his incarceration.1 A final judgment based on default was entered against Shurman and he now appeals challenging jurisdiction. Shurman asserts that the trial court erred in its reliance upon Araujo v. Ramirez-Limon, 490 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 500 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1986), and in finding that his “usual place of abode,” as that term is utilized in section 48.031(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), was at the residence where he had lived with his wife prior to his inc…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- State ex rel. King Merritt v. The Honorable David J. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496 (Fla. 1940)
- Hauser v. Schiff, 341 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Mann v. State, 406 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)