DANIEL C. PEAKE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Daniel Peake appealed his sentence for two counts of lewd assault upon a child, challenging the trial court's departure from sentencing guidelines. The court affirmed the 10-year concurrent sentences, finding the trial court properly considered the defendant's attempt to blame the child victim as a valid sentencing factor that compounded the emotional harm to the victim.
The trial court's sentences are affirmed. The defendant's attempt to place blame for the assaults on the young child is a valid reason for departing from the guidelines because it compounded the emotional and psychological injury to the victim, and such blame is distinguishable from cases prohibiting departure based on lack of remorse or untruthfulness.
[1] A trial court may depart from sentencing guidelines when a defendant attempts to blame the victim for the offense.
[2] A defendant's attempt to blame the victim for the offense can be considered a factor that compounds the emotional injury to the victim.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Defendant's attempt to place some of the blame for these repulsive acts upon the young child. This factor undoubtedly compounded the emotional injury which this defendant's unspeakable acts have visited upon this eight year old victim/stepdaughter.”
The trial court's reason #4 for departure, which the appellate court found valid because it related to the harm inflicted on the victim rather than the defendant's character.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePeake pleaded guilty to two counts of lewd assault upon a child. The victim was his eight-year-old stepdaughter. The sentencing guidelines range was 4…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Aggravating Factors In Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
NIMMONS, Judge.
This is an appeal from two consolidated cases in each of which appellant plead guilty to one count of lewd assault upon a child. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court’s reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines range of 4½ to 5¾⅛ years. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent 10 year terms in each of the two cases. We affirm the sentences finding no merit to appellant’s arguments and find it necessary only to discuss reason #4 which the trial court gave for departure:
4. Defendant’s attempt to place some of the blame for these repulsive acts upon the young child.
This factor undoubtedly compounded the emotional injury which this defendant’s unspeakable acts have visited upon this eight year old victim/stepdaughter. One of the other separately-stated reasons, which we find to be valid, was the “emotional and psychological impact upon this young child and the family.” See Ochoa v. State, 476 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985). Reason #4, as suggested above, compounds the emotional injury suffered by the victim.
We do not believe that the validity of reason # 4 is governed by the cases which have disapproved the trial court’s reliance upon the defendant’s apparent untruthfulness at trial or lack of remorse. See Perez v. State, 485 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Hubler v. State, 458 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Guerrero v. State, 484 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986); and Pursell v. State, 483 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986).
In Hubler, the defendant pled not guilty, went to trial, and presented certain alibi witnesses. The jury found him guilty. In departing from the guidelines sentence, the trial court gave as reasons Hubler’s lack of remorse and his apparent subornation of perjury. In reversing, this Court stated:
[Wjhere the defendant has at all times denied committing the battery charged and has persisted in maintaining his innocence, we conclude that it was improper for the trial court to aggravate the sentence imposed because the defendant failed to exhibit remorse for having committed the offense. This is but a corollary of the rule that a trial court may not impose a greater sentence because the defendant has availed himself of his constitutional right to a trial by jury (citations omitted).
Id. at 353. In the instant case, as reflected in the presentence investigation report, the defendant admitted the offenses from the time of his arrest. However, in an apparent effort to mitigate his conduct (as opposed to a defense to the charges), he claimed that his eight year old stepdaughter initiated his sexual encounters with her. Thus, the defendant did not continue to maintain his innocence in the face of accusations, as was the concern in Hubler, but, rather, admitted the crimes and understood them to be wrong.
We have also considered the extent of guidelines departure and find no error. AFFIRMED.
MILLS, and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
K.N.M. v. State, 793 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…nstitution. A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994, 995-996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). A corollary is that it is improper for the trial court to aggravate a sentence because the defendant failed to exhibit remorse for having committed the offense. Peake v. State, 490 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). This constitutional right is also enjoyed by juveniles in their criminal adjudicatory proceedings before the court. A.S. at 996 (citing R.A.B. v. State, 399 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)). Although the lack of remorse and unwill…
-
Blanchard ST. VAL v. State, 958 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…ases involve defendants who maintained their innocence at sentencing, not defendants who did not contest their commission of criminal acts, but who failed to exhibit remorse for them. The first district recognized this distinction in Peake v. State, 490 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); the court upheld an enhanced sentence imposed on a defendant for lewd assault on a child, where the defendant did not protest his innocence, but exhibited a lack of remorse when he argued in mitigation that the eight year…
-
Avery Corbitt v. State, 220 So. 3d 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…testimony regarding his involvement in the crimes during trial. See Lincoln v. State, 978 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); St. Val v. State, 958 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), review dismissed, 982 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2008); Peake v. State, 490 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); see also Peters, 128 So. 3d at 847. In Peake, the defendant entered a plea to the crimes charged and was sentenced. 490 So. 2d at 1325. He challenged his sentence on appeal,- contending that four reasons existed to revers…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hubler v. State, 458 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Pursell v. State, 483 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Ochoa v. State, 476 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Bienvenido Guerrero v. State, 484 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Perez v. State, 485 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)