ALFRED DENSON, PETITIONER,
v.
HERB A. SANG, SUPERINTENDENT, DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, RESPONDENT
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A tenured teacher filed a notice of appeal to the District Court of Appeal 29 days after the school board terminated his employment, but the school board moved to dismiss arguing the special Duval County Teacher Tenure Act required review by certiorari to Circuit Court within 10 days. The court held that because the final order failed to inform the teacher of his judicial review rights as required by statute, the order was a departure from essential requirements of law and must be quashed and remanded for a new order with proper notice.
The court held that the final order departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to comply with section 120.59(4), which mandates that final orders inform the recipient of available judicial review, the procedure to obtain it, and applicable time limits. The order was therefore quashed and remanded to the school board with instructions to enter a new final order providing the required notice.
[1] A final order terminating a tenured teacher's employment must inform the recipient of available judicial review, the procedure to obtain it, and the applicable time limit…
[2] A failure to include information regarding judicial review in a final order may constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 120.59(4) mandates that final orders shall inform the recipient of any "judicial review which may be available to him, shall indicate the procedure which must be followed to obtain ... the judicial review, and shall state the time limits which apply."”
Establishes the statutory requirement that the school board violated by not informing Denson of his judicial review rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlfred Denson was a tenured teacher with the Duval County school system. Following a formal hearing before a hearing officer of the Division of Admini…
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PER CURIAM.
Denson filed a notice of appeal 29 days after the rendition of a Duval County School Board final order terminating his employment as a tenured teacher with the Duval County school system. Duval County then moved to dismiss the appeal because the proceedings governing the dismissal of tenured teachers in Duval County is governed by the Duval County Teacher Tenure Act, Chap. 21197, Laws of Florida. The special act provides that review of a decision against a tenured teacher is to be by certiorari to the Circuit Court of Duval County within 10 days of rendition of the final order. This court ordered Denson to show cause why the motion to dismiss should not be granted, and he responded explaining that the hearing officer had informed him that he had a right to appeal the school board’s order to the District Court of Appeal in Tallahassee within 30 days of the order. The Duval County Teacher Tenure Act (Act) provides tenured teachers with the right to a formal hearing before a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. In accordance with the Act, Denson requested and received such a hearing. The Act also provides that the hearings shall be conducted under §§ 120.-57(1), 120.58 and 120.59.
Section 120.59(4) mandates that final orders shall inform the recipient of any “judicial review which may be available to him, shall indicate the procedure which must be followed to obtain ... the judicial review, and shall state the time limits which apply.” None of the foregoing requirements were included in the final order dismissing Denson.
Because the final order did not inform Denson of his rights regarding judicial review, we ordered the school board to show cause why the notice of appeal and initial brief should not be treated as a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the final order as a departure from the essential requirements of law. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c). Instead of responding to the question presented, the school board responded by defending the merits of the order. The school board apparently misunderstood the nature of the order directing it to show cause. Under the Act, this court does not have jurisdiction to review the merits of a final order dismissing a tenured teacher.
However, we consider the school board’s response a concession that the final order departed from the essential requirements of the law for failing to inform Denson of his right to judicial review.
Pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.100(c) we quash the final order and remand to the school Board with instructions that it enter a new final order informing Denson of his rights in accordance with section 120.59.
BOOTH, C.J., and ERVIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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Latin Express Serv., Inc. v. State, 660 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…th invoking that right, the order departs from the essential requirements of law. In that circumstance, we quashed the defective order, and remanded to the agency with directions to enter a new final order complying with the statute. Denson v. Sang, 491 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Although the order in this ease adequately apprised appellant of its right to institute an action in circuit court or an administrative forum, it did not, as required by section 120.59(4), apprise appellant of its alternative r…
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Davis v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 660 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…oceedings belie DHSMV’s claims of finality for the form order. The letter of April 26, 1994, invited judicial review. See generally Latin Express Serv., Inc. v. State of Florida, Dep’t of Revenue, 660 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Denson v. Sang, 491 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Gadsden State Bank v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Under the statutes and rules in effect at the time, the form order was not an order of the department (as opposed to action by a “DUI Evaluator” not even employed…