LOWELL L. HICKS, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RUTH L. HICKS, APPELLANT,
v.
HOWARD G. HICKS, BY AND THROUGH HIS GUARDIANS, OLIVIA H. WILSON AND DEBORAH H. MITSON, OLIVIA H. WILSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND DEBORAH H. MITSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND MORRELL HICKS, III, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES
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The court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the grantor's action to set aside a warranty deed, holding that the grantee's reasonable explanation overcame the rebuttable presumption of undue influence and clarifying that the burden of proof in inter vivos gift cases is the same as in will cases.
The burden of proof in an inter vivos gift case is no different from that in a will case, and the grantee's reasonable explanation overcame the rebuttable presumption of undue influence.
[1] In an action to set aside an inter vivos gift based on undue influence, the burden of proof is the same as in a will case; a presumption of undue influence creates only a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRuth L. Hicks, the grantor, brought an action to set aside a warranty deed executed in favor of grantees including her granddaughter. The personal rep…
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
This is an appeal by the grantor’s personal representative of a final judgment in favor of the grantees in an action originally brought by the grantor to set aside a warranty deed. We affirm and conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s decision, given the reasonable explanation of the grantee granddaughter to overcome the rebuttable presumption of undue influence. Although each point raised by appellant has not been discussed, each has been given careful consideration.
We take this opportunity to clarify the court’s position on the burden of proof in a deed case and hold that the burden of proof in the case of an inter vivos gift is no different from that in a case involving a will. We adopt the position taken in Jordan v. Noll, 423 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In our view In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1971), applies to the present case; and the burden of proof did not shift, just the burden of going forward. See In re Estate of Davis, 462 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Accordingly, the footnote in National Bank of Melbourne and Trust Company v. Batchelor, 266 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), which traced the pre-Carpenter decision in Tallahassee Bank and Trust Company v. Brooks, 200 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), is no longer appropriate, as its source is no longer viable.
ANSTEAD and STONE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- In re Est. of Coketine Bray Carpenter v. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1971)
- Maudie Mae Jordan v. Essie Lee Noll, 423 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Nat'l Bank OF Melbourne & Tr. Co. as Executors of the Ests. of Ralph E. Balch & Bess D. Balch v. Lael N. Batchelor, 266 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- The Tallahassee Bank & Tr. Co. v. Brooks, 200 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)
- In re Est. OF Arthur E. Davis, 462 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)