STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER/CROSS-RESPONDENT,
v.
CHARLES WESLEY PRICE, RESPONDENT/CROSS-PETITIONER
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The Florida Supreme Court approved the reversal of Charles Wesley Price's conviction due to the improper admission of highly prejudicial testimony about third-party witness intimidation. The court held that evidence of threats by a third party is inadmissible to prove guilt unless the defendant authorized the conduct, and that such evidence's prejudicial impact substantially outweighed its probative value when introduced during the state's case-in-chief.
The Court approved the reversal, holding that evidence of third-party threats to influence a witness is inadmissible on the issue of the defendant's guilt unless the defendant authorized the third party's action. The probative value of the threats, even when offered to explain an inconsistent statement, is far outweighed by their prejudicial impact when introduced during direct examination.
[1] Evidence of a third party's attempt to influence a witness is inadmissible to prove a defendant's guilt unless the defendant authorized the third party's action.
[2] The probative value of evidence of third-party threats to a witness, introduced by the state on direct examination, may be outweighed by its prejudicial impact.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A third person's attempt to influence a witness is inadmissible on the issue of the defendant's guilt unless the defendant has authorized the third party's action.”
States the fundamental rule governing admissibility of third-party witness threats
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter a mistrial, Price was retried for drug distribution. At the first trial, witness Sonya Lee Whitlow Miller testified she had not received quaalud…
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SHAW, Justice.
We have before us by petition for review Price v. State, 469 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), due to express and direct conflict with Bell v. State, 473 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The relevant facts in this case, as stated by the district court, are as follows:
A mistrial was declared at defendant’s first trial and he was retried. At the first trial a witness, Sonya Lee Whitlow Miller, testified that she had not received quaaludes from the defendant. At the second trial the State called Ms. Miller and she testified that defendant gave her two quaaludes from a certain bag. Over the objection of defense counsel the trial court then permitted the state attorney to further question the witness to bring to the attention of the second jury that the witness had made a prior inconsistent statement at the first trial, that the prior sworn statement was not true and that the witness had made the prior untrue statement because one James Elliot had twice threatened the witness to the effect that if the witness ever told the truth about anything against the defendant, the witness would be shot.
Price, 469 So. 2d at 211.
The district court reversed because 1) “the testimony came in during the State’s case in chief and thus was untimely and improper,” Id., and 2) the “evidence was highly prejudicial and harmful and its admissibility was objected to and constitutes reversible error.” Id. at 212. We approve the decision but disapprove the reasoning to the extent it conflicts with Bell.
A third person’s attempt to influence a witness is inadmissible on the issue of the defendant’s guilt unless the defend ant has authorized the third party’s action. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 1156 (1977) and cases cited therein. Here the objectionable evidence ostensibly came in to explain the prior inconsistent statement. Care must be taken, however, not to allow the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence simply because the evidence is admissible under a different rule. We find that the probative value of the third-party threats to Miller, introduced by the state on direct examination, is far outweighed by its prejudicial impact.* This is not to say that inconsistent statements and the explanation for them can never be elicited on direct examination, and we have held to the contrary in Bell v. State, 491 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1986). We disapprove the district court’s suggestion that such a procedure is per se erroneous.
The decision of the district court, reversing Price’s conviction and remanding for a new trial, is approved.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and BOYD, OVER-TON, EHRLICH and BARKETT, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.
*
Although there was no evidence that Price authorized Elliot’s threats, the trial court nevertheless was so impressed by this testimony that it exceeded the maximum recommended guidelines sentence several times over on the basis that Price had threatened witnesses.
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1991)…friend threaten to harm or kill him if he decided to testify. He said other unidentified people made similar threatening remarks when he was in jail on charges unrelated to the murder. This issue is analogous to the one presented in State v. Price, 491 So. 2d 536 (Fla.1986). There, a state witness testified in direct examination that she had been threatened by a third party. We held that “[a] third person’s attempt to influence a witness is inadmissible on the issue of the defendant’s guilt unless the defend…
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Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 2014)…he threats are shown to be attributable to the defendant.”) (citing Duke v. State, 106 Fla. 205, 142 So. 886 (1932); Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Coleman v. State, 335 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)); see also State v. Price, 491 So. 2d 536, 536-37 (Fla.1986) (“A third person’s attempt to influence a witness is inadmissible on the issue of the defendant’s guilt unless the defendant has authorized the third party’s action.”); Manuel v. State, 524 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (not…1 / 4
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Koon v. State, 513 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1987)…led to point out, however, that there are circumstances where testimony concerning third-party threats may properly be admissible under a recognized theory of evidence and yet be deemed so prejudicial as to require its exclusion. See State v. Price, 491 So. 2d 536 (Fla.1986). Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that such undue prejudice existed. Even if it could be said that the admission of such evidence was error, we consider it harmless in this case. See Duke v. State. Turnikng to Koon’s o…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bell v. State, 491 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1986)
- Bell v. State, 473 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Price v. State, 469 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)