WILLIAM A. SIMMONS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Simmons appealed the denial of his motion to suppress marijuana found in his car during a search at a residence where a valid search warrant was executed. The court held that the vehicle search was proper because sufficient evidence connected the car to the premises, including that Simmons lived in the residence, kept controlled substances there, and was in control of the vehicle parked within the curtilage.
The court held that the search of Simmons' vehicle was proper because sufficient evidentiary connection existed between the vehicle and the residence. The connection was established by the fact that Simmons lived in the residence, kept controlled substances there, and was in control of the vehicle parked within the curtilage.
[1] A search warrant for a residence and its curtilage may authorize the search of vehicles parked within the curtilage if there is evidence linking the vehicle to the premis…
[2] Evidence linking a vehicle to a residence, for purposes of a search warrant covering the curtilage, may include the discovery of controlled substances within the residenc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where a warrant authorizes the search of a described building together with the curtilage thereof, parked automobiles or other vehicles found within the curtilage are proper subjects of search under the warrant”
Establishes the foundational rule that vehicles within curtilage can be searched under a residence warrant
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice executed a search warrant at Stephen Brodsky's residence authorizing a search for controlled substances. During the search, they discovered mai…
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MILLS, Judge.
Simmons entered a plea of nolo conten-dere to a charge of possession of cannabis with intent to sell and, pursuant to his reservation of the right to do so at the entry of that plea, now appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his car. Simmons’ counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) averring that he is unable to present an argument for reversal. Simmons was given the opportunity by this court to file a pro se brief, but has not elected to do so. We affirm.
In April 1985, police executed a search warrant at the residence of one Stephen Brodsky. The warrant authorized the search of the “property and the curtilage thereof” for “controlled substances.” During a search of a bedroom in the house, police discovered mail and prescription bottles bearing Simmons’ name, as well as marijuana and cocaine residue and drug paraphernalia.
While the interior search was being conducted, Simmons drove into the driveway of the residence and parked his car. He got out and provided identification to officers outside. When his identity was revealed to the officers conducting the search, a search was made of the vehicle. A rental agreement in Brodsky’s name was found, as was one-and-a-half pounds of marijuana. Simmons was then arrested and charged with possession of cannabis with intent to sell.
Simmons moved to suppress the marijuana discovered in the car on the grounds that the warrant’s authority did not extend to the vehicle. At the suppression hearing, he relied on Dunn v. State, 292 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) cert. dism. 296 So. 2d 47 (Fla.1974), where it was held that, before the search of a vehicle within the curtilage of a residence is covered by a warrant for that residence, there must be some evidence to connect the vehicle with the premises. Simmons contended that no such evidence existed in his case. The trial court found otherwise and denied the motion.
In Alexander v. State, 108 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959), the search warrant described a residence and included the yard. An automobile located in the yard , was searched and the defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered therein because no description of the car appeared in the warrant. In a specially concurring opinion to an affirmance without opinion, it was held that, where a warrant authorizes the search of a described building together with the curtilage thereof, parked automobiles or other vehicles found within the curtilage are proper subjects of search under the warrant. Alexander at 309.
This holding was modified in Dunn, supra, which pointed out that, in Alexander, there was evidence linking the car to the premises involved, namely the car “sloshed” when shaken (it was a ‘moonshine’ case) and the keys were obtained from inside the house. The Dunn court therefore stated the additional requirement that “some such evidence (linking the vehicle to the premises) was necessary in order to authorize the search of a vehicle parked even within ‘the curtilage’.” Dunn at 436.
This court similarly held in Joyner v. State, 303 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) cert. dism. 325 So. 2d 404 (Fla.1976), that an automobile within the curtilage and “identified by the use of keys obtained from the occupant” of the residence is a part of the curtilage and subject to search under a valid warrant authorizing the search of the residence and the curtilage. Joyner at 64. Subsequent cases have adhered to the requirement of some evidentiary connection of the vehicle with the residence. See Stipp v. State, 355 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); State v. Haugee, 402 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) p.f.r.d. 415 So. 2d 1360 (Fla.1982).
We find a sufficient evidentiary connection between the residence herein and Simmons’ vehicle to support its search under these authorities. Prior to Simmons’ placement of the vehicle within the curtilage, the police had discovered that he lived in the subject residence and that his room therein contained objects of the search, i.e., controlled substances. Further, before searching the vehicle, police identified Simmons as the driver. Because Simmons lived in the house, kept controlled substances therein and was in control of the vehicle parked within the curtilage of the house, the search of the car was proper. Affirmed.
WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Miller v. State, 516 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…ch warrant was executed). After a careful review of the record herein, we find no evidentiary connection between the residence authorized to be searched and appellants’ vehicle. This case is therefore controlled by our decision in Simmons v. State, 491 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), which had not been released when the trial court entered its order in the present case. We are aware that our decision conflicts with that of the Fifth District in State v. Haugee, supra. In support of our holding here, we note…
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Bryon Keith Wheeler v. State, 62 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…is vehicle, although acknowledging that the search of his person would not be authorized (apparently based on Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979)). [*1222] A seemingly contrary view is expressed in Simmons v. State, 491 So. 2d 1307, 1309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), where the court held that there must be “some evidentiary connection” between the searched vehicle and the residence that is the object of the search. In that case, the court determined that the connection was established…
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Lowe v. State, 751 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…earch warrant a final, and conclusive, authority for doing so exists. Id. at 141. The First District in Miller reached a contrary result concerning the search of Miller and his vehicle, asserting a reliance on the earlier case of Simmons v. State, 491 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The court in Miller and Simmons reached opposite results based on similar search warrant provisions that authorized the search of “premises and curtilage thereof.” Apparently, the warrants in those cases did not specifically aut…
Authorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Joyner v. State, 303 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Baldwin v. Louie L. Wainwright, 303 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Archway Ocean Props., Inc. v. Lamparas Quesada Sales Corp., 108 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Stipp v. State, 355 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- State v. Haugee, 402 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Dunn v. State, 292 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Joyner v. State, 325 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1976)
- State v. Dunn, 296 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1974)
- Al-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Oscar Valdes & the Indus. Relations Comm'n, 296 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1974)