STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANK DON ALVAREZ, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court order dismissing charges against defendant Alvarez for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure do not authorize a motion for rehearing from an order granting a defendant's motion to dismiss, and the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its dismissal order based on a change of mind on a legal question.
No. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss. Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no provision authorizing a motion for rehearing in this context, unlike civil procedure rules. The trial court's inherent authority to correct orders (limited to cases involving fraud, collusion, deceit, or similar grounds) does not extend to correcting judicial error based on a mere change of mind on a legal question.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant a motion for rehearing from an order dismissing a defendant's sworn motion to dismiss when no rule of criminal procedure authori…
[2] A trial court's inherent right to correct orders entered due to fraud, mistake, or similar circumstances does not extend to reconsidering a judicial error of law after th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for a motion for rehearing from an order granting a defendant's sworn motion to dismiss, unlike Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a) which permits rehearing following entry of an order of summary judgment”
Establishes the critical procedural distinction showing the trial court lacked authority to grant the state's motion for rehearing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court initially dismissed charges due to the state's failure to file a timely traverse to defendant's sworn motion to dismiss. The state fil…
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
This is an appeal by the state from an order which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and discharged the defendant. We affirm.
The trial court originally entered an order of dismissal because of the state’s failure to file a timely traverse to the defendant’s sworn motion to dismiss. The state then filed a motion for rehearing which was heard on March 13, 1985, but not ruled upon that day. On March 14, 1985, the state filed a notice of appeal, which it voluntarily dismissed the following day. On March 20, 1985, the trial court granted the state’s motion for rehearing, finding that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the late filing of the traverse, and reinstating the charges against the defendant, who then filed a motion to dismiss, which led to the order now being appealed.
As the state concedes, there is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for a motion for rehearing from an order granting a defendant’s sworn motion to dismiss, unlike Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a) which permits rehearing following entry of an order of summary judgment. The state argues, nevertheless, that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider its motion for rehearing on the au thority of State v. Burton, 314 So. 2d 136 (Fla.1975).
We disagree. Burton involved the trial court’s inherent right to correct an order which was entered as the result of fraud, collusion, deceit, mistake or the like. Here, any mistake was a change of mind by the trial judge on a question of law, i.e. a mistake of law, for want of a better description. Nothing decided since Burton that we have located authorizes such reconsideration. The reason we have not found such authority may well lie in State v. Morris, 359 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), which observed that judicial error is not oversight, neglect or accident; and to permit a trial court to continue to correct judicial error after conclusion of a matter would adversely affect the finality of a judgment. Clearly the matter can be corrected in the future, if the supreme court wishes, by an addition to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g) authorizes the delay of rendition by timely, authorized and listed motions, according to the committee note. As things now stand, no such motion exists.
DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cited By
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Acosta v. State, 515 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…(Fla.1975), none of which admittedly exist here, there is no authority in the criminal rules or otherwise for the trial court to reconsider the correctness of the final disposition adverse to the state of a criminal prosecution.1 State v. Alvarez, 492 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1987), correctly so holds in the entirely indistinguishable instance of an order granting a sworn motion to dismiss. Accord State v. Morris, 359 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert, denied, 36…
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State v. Juleo Lopez, 526 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…(Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (in the absence of fraud, mistake, inadvertence, misconduct or the like, there is no authority for a trial court to reconsider the correctness of a final disposition). This court addressed a similar situation in State v. Alvarez, 492 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 4th DCA1986), rev. denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1987). The trial court had originally entered an order of dismissal because of the state’s failure to file a timely traverse to the defendant’s sworn motion to dismiss. Later, the trial court gran…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Ollis Burton, 314 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1975)
- State v. Morris, 359 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)